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Globalization and Development: The start of modern globalization is often said
to date back to the 19th century (Daudin et al., 2008). This process gained further
trajectory during the 20th century due to several innovations in transportation and com-
munication technology. In this regard, globalization shapes economic development and
is not a mono-causal process, but rather multi-facetted encompassing political, social,
and economic aspects (Dreher, 2006). Global political institutionalization, including
the UN system, fosters peace (Hultman et al., 2014). Socially, gobalization leads to a
spread of ideas and people, which affects norms (Barsbai et al., 2017; Kis-Katos et al.,
2018), technology (Kanwar, 2012) and skill complementarities between workers of dif-
ferent origin (Alesina et al., 2016). While global value chains offer opportunities for
economic upgrading among economic latecomers (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2016),
financial flows – if allocated prudently – can foster growth (Galiani et al., 2017; Harms
and Méon, 2018).
Recently, the financial crisis in 2007/08 has demonstrated the perilous effects of glob-
alization, inducing strong increases in globalization criticism and discontent. Yet, there
were several forceful criticisms of globalization prior to this recent economic downturn.
This includes Keynes, who stated in 1933 experiencing the great depression that he
would sympathize “with those who would minimize, rather than with those who would
maximize economic entanglement among nations” (Keynes, 1933). And indeed there
are several challenges and trade-offs linked to global integration, which affect domestic
economic development.
For instance, the spread of ideas can have adverse consequences, exemplified by
the adaptation of Western lifestyles leading to a rise in non-communicable diseases and
large associated costs for national health systems (Demmler et al., 2017; Bommer et al.,
2017). While an effective international refugee regime does not exist, high-skilled mi-
gration often hurts the migrants’ home countries in terms of brain drain (Beine et al.,
2008). Further, trade integration might lead to an offshoring of environmental pollution
(Baghdadi et al., 2013). What is more, the public and academic discourse associates
globalization with rising inequality (Milanovic, 2007; Dreher and Gaston, 2008; Lang
and Tavares, 2018) and job insecurity (Autor et al., 2013). This gives rise to a polit-
ical backlash in terms of increasing populism (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017), nationalism
(Acemoglu and Yared, 2010) and global de-integration, exemplified by Brexit and the
policies of the Trump administration (Piketty, 2016; Brakman et al., 2018).
Considering the promises of economic development, globalization is not a “yes”
or “no” issue, but rather asks for well crafted and evidence-based policies to reduce
potential perils. Consequently, decisions have to build on a deliberate societal discourse
and one should be allowed to question if “globalization has gone too far?” (Rodrik,
1998).
Here, academic research can make a substantial contribution to an informed debate.
Against this background, this thesis provides insights into globalization’s implications
for economic development with a special focus on politico-economic factors. Due to the
multi-dimensional nature of globalization it is necessary to focus on certain aspects.
This thesis focuses on two major fields of globalization – development cooperation and
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trade. Billions of foreign dollars are invested every year into development cooperation,
but evidence on its effectiveness is at best mixed (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008;
Galiani et al., 2017; Dreher and Langlotz, 2017). In contrast, trade offers opportunities
for low and lower middle income countries to achieve economic development on their
own. However, international and national policy making can constrain or enhance
potential gains. The following chapters take multiple perspectives to study constraints
and opportunities as described subsequently.
Level of Analysis: One striking feature of globalization is that it involves processes
on the international stage which feed back into the national development of countries.
Taking either a macro-economic or a micro-economic perspective, one faces a trade-off
between deriving broader implications versus gaining more detailed insights in terms
of mechanisms. Thus, it is essential to adjust the empirical lense to a suitable level.
As Figure I illustrates, different chapters of the thesis focus on the macro (Chapter 1 ),
meso (Chapter 2 and 3 ) and micro (Chapter 4 ) levels of analysis.
Figure I Perils and Promises of Globalization
Source: Own depiction.
Chapter 1 investigates the role of globalized flows of finance (development aid) and
goods (trade). Both factors are of international character and relate to the global
perspective. Thus, we choose macro lenses and combine the well-established economic
theory of comparative advantage with a spatial perspective on trade costs in order to
study third-country effects of development aid.
Although economic theories stress the potential of trade for sustainable and inclusive
economic growth, actual outcomes depend crucially on how gains from globalization are
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shared. Political interest groups have a large influence on the distribution, which can
be conceptualized by an economic quid pro quo model, where groups are targeted in
turn for their electoral support (Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Franck and Rainer, 2012;
Bueno De Mesquita, 2005). In- and out-groups can be constructed along visible traits,
for instance regional and ethnic lines. In order to examine these group level differences,
Chapter 2 zooms into the meso level considering subnational data and the distribution
of gains from trade.
Group level inequalities, e.g., “grievances” (Cederman et al., 2013), are a recurring
theme in political science, and often thought to be a main driver of conflict in contrast
to purely economic greed (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Returning to the effects of
aid, Chapter 3 considers those group level inequalities also from a subnational meso
perspective. Yet when considering aid projects, it is of utmost importance to be aware
of heterogeneities. If the development projects are successful and contribute to growth,
the projects could be in theory a promising tool to reduce conflict risk by increasing
economic opportunity costs of fighting.
However, many of the projects remain unfinished (Williams, 2017) or fail (Müller and
Pape, 2018) in low resource or fragile contexts. Success of development projects might
highly depend on targeted populations’ uptake. Thus, the final chapter of the thesis
considers individual level data and zooms into the micro level of development economics
to evaluate the support of the Safe Childbirth Checklist intervention in Indonesia and
Pakistan. For this purpose, we consider a framework grounded in social psychology
“The Theory of Planned Behavior” (Ajzen, 1985). This framework identifies three
main determinants – perceived behavioral control, subjective norms, and individual
attitudes towards behavior – which we consider to explain intervention uptake.
Data: As the following chapters are located at different levels of analysis, they build
on various different datasets. Those data include well-established macro datasets like
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators or UN Comtrade’s information on
trade flows. Meso level analyses build on innovative geospatial datasets on aid (Strange
et al., 2017; Dreher et al., 2016; Strandow et al., 2011), conflict (Croicu and Sundberg,
2015; Hendrix and Haggard, 2015), as well as individual opinions (Afrobarometer, 2018).
Finally, we also use self-collected survey questionnaires and experimental data from
Pakistan and Indonesia.
Methods: In order to provide relevant advice for effective decisions, we carefully
chose suitable methods for the context and level of analysis in question. More specif-
ically, it is important to consider several factors which might drive both outcome and
explanation as dynamics are intertwined in the multi-causal settings of globalization
and development. For this purpose, panel data approaches are applied, which help to
control for various unobserved factors. As outcomes could be subject to endogenously




In three of the four chapters we identify plausibly exogenous effects by interacting
external global variation with country or region specific scaling variables. In this regard,
the analysis in Chapter 1 builds on an interaction of aggregate donor budgets with a
pre-determined country-level recipient probability to estimate a synthetic measure of
aid due to Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017) in a control function approach (Wooldridge,
2015). In Chapter 2, I exploit variation of global commodity price changes, which
should have differential effects on the regional level depending on local capacities to
extract these goods. Chapter 3 involves an instrumental variable approach, where we
interact donors’ aid budgets with regional recipient probabilities.
Finally, we induce external variation in Chapter 4 by randomizing one sub-
determinant of the theory of planned behavior – namely attitudes – in a framed field
experiment. More specifically, we expose respondents randomly to information on the
implementers’ origin in order to carve out how changes in individual attitudes affect
support for the intervention. While we analyze the causal mechanisms quantitatively,
the micro level analysis also allows us to provide supportive evidence from qualitative
research.
Findings: Chapter 1 considers development aid as a financial transfer from the global
North to the global South. Based on the theoretical model by Trionfetti (2017), we de-
velop predictions on how this would translate into positive implications for neighboring
countries of recipients. More specifically, we hypothesize that aid leads to a higher
demand by recipient nations for goods, for which they themselves have no comparative
advantage (e.g., goods that are produced typically by richer countries). Assuming that
trade costs are lower with regard to proximate countries, aid induces a higher demand
for more advanced products from neighbors, which can help neighboring countries to
upgrade their export portfolio. However, this is by no means a mechanistic pattern. In
contrast, intra-regional transport costs need to be low enough to make products from
neighbors in the global South more attractive than products from the global North.
Moreover, neighboring countries need to have sufficient capacities to produce those
more advanced products in order to meet the growing demand by neighbors. We illus-
trate this with subsample regressions for Asia and Africa. Several Asian governments
promoted export-led growth strategies via preferential treatment for manufacturing sec-
tors and targeted investments in infrastructure. Of course there are also several African
success stories to be named – e.g., the Rwandan coffee sector or the Kenyan flower in-
dustry. However, transport costs (Storeygard, 2016) and the shortage of human capital
(Page, 2012) are still a constraint for many African states. National policy making
could, thus, potentially enhance third country effects via complementary investments
in education and infrastructure. Moreover, global development policy can make a sub-
stantial difference as the results indicate that the manifestation of the pattern in Asia
is driven by the period after the Paris Declaration in 2005. The Paris Declaration con-
cluded an untying of development aid from donor exports despite the antagonism of
commercial interest groups in donor countries. However, economic development is not
only influenced by global politics.
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Also domestic politics can distort the participation in economic development.
Against this background Chapter 2 studies domestic politico-economic factors, which
distort gains from agricultural commodity trade in African countries. Agriculture
is a particularly relevant case to study as it constitutes the main employment base
for several African countries.1 The high labor intensity of agriculture increases its
potential for inclusive growth, in contrast to more easily appropriable natural resources
or development aid. However, political distortions reduce agriculture’s potential for
pro-poor growth. Theory and empirics are ambiguous whether affiliations with the
current national leader have positive or negative effects on participation in agricultural
commodity trade (Kasara, 2007; Bates and Block, 2010). Combining high-resolution
geospatial data with surveys for 33 African countries, I distinguish ethnic and regional
political affiliation to resolve existing ambiguities. Results indicate that ethnic
affiliation positively affects gains from trade, while this pattern is further enhanced
when living in the leader’s birth region. The findings suggest that leaders target
coethnics via subsidies and a preferential tax treatment rather than via the provision
of public goods. Those individually targeted benefits contrast previous accounts of
the windfall-driven provision of regional public goods (Hodler and Raschky, 2014).
Democratic institutions counteract but do not offset this pattern.
Chapter 3 also focuses on the meso level by employing subnational data. More
specifically, we make use of innovative data on subnational development aid for two
major donors – the World Bank and China. While the World Bank is often perceived
as a donor who lays great importance on human rights (e.g., in terms of conditionality),
China is seen by many as a “rogue donor” (Naím, 2007) who mainly follows its own
aims. We link the information on aid provision to subnational occurrences of organized
violence and social conflict on the African continent, which was the stage of some of the
most intense conflicts including violence in Congo DRC, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan.
A large strand of literature stresses the conflict fueling role of development aid, but
uses macro level data to test theories on individual conflict actors (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004; Nunn and Qian, 2014). Using subnational data enables us to test theories of
conflict more carefully by considering aid types, conflict actors, ethnic power groups
and spatial spill-overs. The results show that aid projects on average seem to reduce
rather than to fuel conflict. We also find no increased likelihood of demonstrations,
strikes or riots associated, but a higher likelihood of non-lethal government repression
in areas where China is active. While it is in the interest of China to sustain stability in
its partner countries, there seems to be a willingness to compromise on political rights
in order to guarantee political survival of its partner regimes. For World Bank finance,
our analysis indicates that conflict reducing effects are driven by less lethal violence by
governments against civilians, and by projects in the transport and financial sectors.
Thus, development interventions might have positive effects if they – as suggested by
peace and conflict theory – succeed in “winning the hearts and minds” (Berman et al.,
1Although this thesis mainly applies cross-country approaches, country studies constitute a valu-
able source to understand the heterogeneous effects of globalization. For this reason, the references
provide a selection of complementing case studies.
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2011) of the local population.
This is only possible if implementers succeed in convincing recipient communities
of the use of interventions to change behavior in the long term. Often interventions
fail to achieve these aims due to the complex interplay of incentives in developmental
contexts (Hanna et al., 2016). While there is a large demand for what works, there is
surprisingly little evidence explaining the determinants of behavioral change.
For this reason, Chapter 4 goes one step further on the continuum from the meso to
the micro level to understand the drivers of individual behavioral uptake of two compa-
rable health interventions in Indonesia and Pakistan. For this purpose, we borrow from
a model grounded in psychological theory called the “Theory of Planned Behavior.”
The framework suggests the perceived behavioral control, attitudes towards the behav-
ior and subjective norms of important others as main drivers of uptake. Considering
data both for Indonesia and Pakistan enables us to understand the context specificity.
While in the hierarchical clinical context of Indonesia subjective norms of the superi-
ors play a substantial role, the individual health providers in Pakistan feel constrained
due to a limited ease of applying the intervention (behavioral control). In both coun-
tries individual attitudes towards behavior are an important driver for both intended
and actual uptake. We complement this finding by considering attitudes more care-
fully. In a framed field experiment, we randomly stress different characteristics of the
implementers’ origin and examine how Indonesian respondents react. Although interna-
tional researchers (e.g., institutions of higher education from the Western hemisphere,
like JPAL or EPoD) often initially test development interventions, local authorities are
responsible for the implementation and roll-out. Our results indicate that Indonesian
health workers are significantly more supportive (measured in financial support) when
facing international implementers. This pattern is driven by previous experiences with
implementers – the greatest difference occurs when respondents have already partici-
pated both in local and international projects. On the one hand, this points to the
specific experience of the population under observation as a large amount of interna-
tional aid was disbursed in Aceh after 2004’s Tsunami. On the other hand, it enables
one to derive some broader implications for international and local policy making. As
previous experiences seem to have long-term effects, both local and international policy
makers should act in a responsible manner in order to guarantee support.
Summary: The following chapters indicate the politico-economic scope of channelling
the gains of globalization. While globalization promises gains such as the upgrading of
trade industries and poverty reduction, this is by no means a mechanistic process as
many undesirable outcomes around the globe indicate. In contrast, globalization is a
perilous process, highly dependent on the different layers of international and national
policy making. With this thesis I would like to contribute to a deliberate discourse
on how to shape trade and development cooperation in order to realize globalization’s
promises for economic development.
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Chapter 1
Your neighbor’s aid helps you
upgrade?
Third-country effects of
development aid on sectoral exports
Joint work with Hendrik W. Kruse
Abstract
In this paper we study third-country effects of foreign development aid on
sectoral exports. Based on the recent paper by Trionfetti (2017) we hypothesize
that development aid increases exports of neighboring recipient countries in sec-
tors for which donor countries have a revealed comparative advantage, assuming
lower trade costs among recipients than with donors. We use a panel of low and
lower middle income countries’ exports over the 2000-2013 period to test this
hypothesis. We find that the predicted pattern materializes only in a subsample
for Asia in the period after the Paris declaration.
9

Third-country effects of development aid on sectoral exports
1.1 Introduction
Transfers such as development aid affect not only the recipient country itself but also
affect the size of destination markets for potential exporters. Despite tied aid and
project aid relating to projects managed by organizations in donor countries, aid is not
entirely spent on imports from the donor country (Kruse and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2016),
and some third countries will benefit as well.1
In this paper, we study the effect that aid can have on the sectoral composition
of exports from other low and lower middle income countries. More precisely, based
on a recent model by Trionfetti (2017) we hypothesize aid is related to an increase in
developing countries’ exports of goods in which they have a comparative disadvantage
from a global perspective.
The model presented in Trionfetti (2017) has two regions “North” (N) and “South”
(S) in which a transfer takes place from N to S. Intuitively, a transfer leads to an
increase in demand in S. In a world with trade costs producers from S can sell at a
cheaper price in S than in N, because trade costs are lower within S. Thus, a transfer
from N to S makes producers in S more competitive. Due to trade costs, products
where S has a comparative disadvantage are more expensive in S than in N, whereas
products where S has a comparative advantage are cheaper in S. Producers in sectors
with a comparative disadvantage would, hence, benefit more because demand shifts to
a market where they find it easier to compete. We apply the model to a world with
multiple countries and show that its logic applies to exports of recipient countries, as
well, if certain conditions are met: trade costs between recipients of transfers have to
be smaller on average than between donors and recipients, and recipient countries have
to be characterized by similar patterns of comparative advantage.
We use a panel of sectoral export data for 55 low and lower middle income countries
from 2000 to 2013. Using a fixed effects approach, we test whether the third-country
effects of aid flowing to nearby countries are more pronounced in sectors where donors
have a comparative advantage. Since the extent of intra-regional trade costs between
recipients matters, we split the sample into Africa and Asia. According to Limao and
Venables (2001) and Storeygard (2016), trade costs are still a major impediment in
Africa and intra-continental trade is much lower than in other world regions (Sow,
2018). In order to address endogeneity we use a synthetic aid instrument based on
donor budgets developed by Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017), in a control function
setting.
It is mainly Asian countries enjoying a comparative advantage in similar sectors than
donors, which benefit from the shift of purchasing power to less competitive markets.
However, this effect is driven by the period after the Paris Declaration in 2005. The
latter hallmarked several changes in the international aid regime including reducing the
1Before concluding the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness in 2005, major donors still tied large
shares of aid to the procurement of goods from donor countries (e.g., Australia 37%, Canada 34% and
the US 54%) (Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2014). Since then the tying status was reduced drastically.
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share of tied aid.
Our study adds to the vast literature on the effect of development aid on recipient
exports. First, several studies are looking at the effect of bilateral aid on bilateral
exports to the donor. Pettersson and Johansson (2013) find a positive effect of aid in
some sectors, whereas Nowak-Lehmann D. et al. (2013) show that this effect vanishes
when using a fixed effects estimator. Second, others study the effect of aggregate aid
on aggregate exports. Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017) introduce a new instrument for
this purpose. However, they find no significant effect. Calì and te Velde (2011) and
Vijil and Wagner (2012) take particular interest in the effect of Aid for Trade (AfT)
on aggregate exports. Both studies find that aid for infrastructure, in fact, facilitates
trade and has an impact on overall exports. They also study the effect of aid dedicated
to specific sectors of the economy on exports in these sectors, but do not find any effect.
Rajan and Subramanian (2011) argue that by increasing domestic demand aid leads to
increasing wages and appreciation. They find that among manufacturing industries aid
leads to a reduction in value added of exportable industries indicating Dutch Disease
effects. Note that this is in contrast to Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017) who “do not
find symptoms of Dutch Disease.”
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies to assess the sectoral implications
of third-country effects of development aid, or explicitly model the link between aid and
comparative advantage. Trionfetti (2017) offers an explanation for this gap by showing
that in a world without trade frictions transfers do not have differential effects on
sectoral demand. Our main contribution is, thus, to provide empirical evidence of such
effects.
The existence of such effects has important implications for development policy. A
recent strand of literature argues that different sectors may have different potentials for
growth. Hausmann et al. (2007) stress the importance of technological sophistication.
Rodrik (2013) shows that productivity convergence is higher in manufacturing sectors.
In accordance with this, McMillan et al. (2014) stress that when employment shifts to
high-productivity sectors, growth prospects increase. Diao et al. (2017) highlight the
role of aid induced domestic demand to achieve those changes. In addition, third-country
effects of development aid as described in this study may be important in facilitating
structural change.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents our ana-
lytical framework and Section 1.3 its empirical implementation. Section 1.4 introduces
our data and provides some descriptive information about our main indicators of in-
terest. Our main results and robustness checks are presented in Sections 1.5 and 1.6.
Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Analytical Framework
In this section, we sketch a partial equilibrium framework in order to illustrate through
which channels development aid may affect third countries’ exports. For simplicity, we
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ignore second order effects such as price adjustments. We refer the reader to Trionfetti
(2017) for a complete general equilibrium analysis with price adjustments channeled
through labor markets. Here, our purpose is merely to make the underlying intuition
plausible. Consider a simple sectoral gravity equation as in Larch and Wanner (2017)
(see also Yotov et al. 2016). There are 𝐾 sectors, each of which comprise several
differentiated varieties of goods. Within each sector 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 preferences are characterized
by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Sectoral preferences are nested within a
Cobb Douglas utility function, such that expenditure shares for each sector are given.










where 𝑝𝑘𝑖 are factory gate prices in country 𝑖, 𝜏 𝑘𝑖𝑗 are iceberg trade costs between 𝑖








is the price index in sector 𝑘 in country 𝑗, and 𝜎𝑘 is
the elasticity of substitution. 𝐸𝑘𝑗 ≡ 𝛼𝑘(𝑦𝑗 +𝑇𝐹𝑗) is expenditure from country 𝑗 in sector
𝑘. 𝛼𝑘 is the expenditure share of sector 𝑘 (assumed to be equal across countries). 𝑦𝑗 is
market income (GDP) and 𝑇𝐹𝑗 is a transfer, the sum of which is 𝑗’s disposable income.
Note that transfers have to sum up to zero across countries; i.e., ∑︀𝑗∈𝑁 𝑇𝐹𝑗 = 0.










𝛼𝑘(𝑦𝑗 + 𝑇𝐹𝑗) (1.2)
In turn, in partial equilibrium changes in total sectoral exports due to changes in











without trade costs – i.e., 𝜏 𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 1 ∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 – sectoral exports are not affected by
a transfer between any two countries other than 𝑖. The reason is that optimal price
indices vary across countries only due to trade costs. Consider for instance a trans-
fer from country 𝑗 to country 𝑗′; i.e., 𝑑𝑇𝐹𝑗 = −𝑑𝑇𝐹𝑗′ . Without trade costs, it is











𝛼𝑘 (𝑑𝑇𝐹𝑗′ − 𝑑𝑇𝐹𝑗) = 0.
In reality, of course, trade costs are positive. Under such circumstances, it holds in
general that 𝑃 𝑘𝑗 ̸= 𝑃 𝑘𝑗′ . This is due to differences in remoteness across countries, and
due to the spatial distribution of factory gate prices across countries. (1.3) shows that
a sufficient condition for a transfer from 𝑗 to 𝑗′ to increase aggregate exports in 𝑖 is that
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𝜏 𝑘𝑖𝑗′ < 𝜏
𝑘
𝑖𝑗 and that 𝑃 𝑘𝑗′ > 𝑃 𝑘𝑗 , even though only one of the two conditions necessarily has
to be met.




𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏 𝑘
′
𝑖𝑗 the effect of a transfer from 𝑗 to 𝑗′ on exports




𝑗 . I.e., the effect
is going to be higher in sectors where the donor has a comparative advantage, and the
recipient has a comparative disadvantage.
1.3 Empirical Implementation
Unfortunately, (1.2) does not provide a direct way to test this hypothesis. The reason
is simply that (1.2) is an aggregate gravity model where the only free parameter is the
elasticity of substitution. Based on any estimate for 𝜎𝑘, our hypothesis follows directly
from the gravity model, given our assumptions. Instead, we are interested in whether
the intersectoral patterns predicted by the gravity model in fact materialize in the data.
For that purpose, we need a variable that captures in which sectors donors have
a comparative advantage, and recipients have a comparative disadvantage. We use a
variable constructed in a similar way as the PRODY index of technology content due to
Hausmann et al. (2007). Like the PRODY index, our measure is based on the revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) index due to Balassa (1965). The basic idea behind the
RCA index is that countries that have a comparative advantage in certain goods should
export relatively more of this good. In turn, the RCA of a country in a given sector







where 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 are country 𝑖 exports of good 𝑘 at time 𝑡. Left out indices indicate totals
across the respective dimension. We calculate comparative advantage at some base year
𝑡0 to avoid endogeneity. The PRODY index is calculated as the weighted average of







where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝.𝑐.𝑗𝑡 is per capita GDP of country 𝑗 at time 𝑡. This index is high
in sectors in which rich countries have a comparative advantage and low in sectors
in which poor countries have a comparative advantage. It is meant to capture the
technology content of a product. One shortcoming of the index for our purposes is
that rich countries are not of equal importance as donors, in particular, due to their
difference in size. For that reason, we slightly adjust the formula. We use the RCA
indices as weights for international transfers to infer whether a given sector is one in
which donors tend to have a comparative advantage or recipients.
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where 𝑇𝐹𝑗𝑡 are transfers, which are negative for donor countries. This index is
going to be negative if recipients have a comparative advantage and positive if donors
enjoy a comparative advantage (DORCA). While the DORCA index provides a major
improvement over the PRODY index for our purposes it still neglects one element of the
prediction. As trade costs matter, we should only expect to find the effects if relatively
nearby donors have an advantage compared to relatively nearby recipients. In order to









which is weighted by bilateral distance 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗. We will
employ all three indices but focus on the DORCA and PRODY index for comparability.
While the WDORCA and DORCA indices correspond more closely to our hypothesis,
the PRODY index is more closely linked to sectoral upgrading and allows a better
judgment as to whether the induced shift is likely to benefit the economy. Since the
indices are not easy to interpret quantitatively, we use a bin approach. I.e., we divide
the distribution of the indices into five different segments separated by quantiles and
each represented by a dummy. BIN𝑘𝑖 is a 5 × 1 vector indicating into which segment
— or bin — of the distribution the respective observation falls.2
Secondly, we need an estimation equation inspired by (1.2). We estimate the fol-
lowing equation:










⎞⎠+𝜓𝑘𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑘𝑖𝑡, (1.8)
where 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 are exports from country 𝑖 in sector 𝑘 at time 𝑡.
∑︀
𝑗 ̸=𝑖 𝑇 𝐹𝑗𝑡/𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the
contribution of development aid to external demand faced by exporter 𝑖 (i.e., it is aid
weighted by the inverse of distance); ∑︀𝑗 ̸=𝑖 𝑦𝑗𝑡/𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗, correspondingly, is the contribution
of GDP to external demand, and ∑︀𝑗 ̸=𝑖 (𝑦𝑗𝑡+𝑇 𝐹𝑗𝑡)/𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is a proxy for total market poten-
tial. 𝛽𝐺𝐷𝑃 and 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑑 are the respective 1 × 5 coefficient vectors that vary for each bin.
𝜓𝑘𝑖 are exporter-sector fixed effects, and 𝜃𝑡 are time fixed effects controlling for world
market fluctuations.
2The choice of five bins balances two considerations. On the one hand we want to allow a sufficient
degree of heterogeneity in the coefficients. On the other hand, we need sufficient variation within a
given bin to be able to identify the distinct effect of our variables of interest. Results using other bin
structures are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
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1.4 Data & Descriptives
The underlying sectoral export data for the 2000 to 2013 period are obtained from
the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution Database (WITS: COMTRADE).
Exports to the rest of the world and bilateral trade flows are taken as reported by the
exporter. Exports are retrieved for 32 sectors using Revision 3 of the ISIC classification.
Bilateral distance, used to calculate our market potential measure, is from CEPII. Total
GDP and GDP per capita are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI).3 We obtain data on our main variable of interest, net aid flows, from the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee (OECD, 2015).
Based on these variables we construct the three indices defined above. The PRODY
index and the DORCA and WDORCA indices are not quantitatively comparable.
The PRODY index is a weighted average of per capita income, whereas DORCA and
WDORCA are weighted averages of aggregate net outflows of development aid. We
are merely concerned with the ordering these indices imply. For that reason Table
1.1 reports the Spearman rank correlation coefficients. Unsurprisingly, the two indices
measuring Donor RCAs, DORCA and WDORCA, are highly correlated, with a rank
correlation coefficient of about 90 percent. In accordance with expectations, the rela-
tion of both indices to the PRODY index is less strong but still positive (73 percent and
80 percent, respectively) and highly significant. While DORCA and WDORCA on the
one hand and PRODY, on the other hand, were designed to capture different aspects
of sectors, they are still positively related and one may expect that if exports were to
increase in high DORCA sectors, this would typically mean that exports in sectors with
a high level of technological sophistication will increase. As WDORCA and DORCA
are highly correlated and depict generally similar patterns, the main analysis will focus
on the results for the DORCA and PRODY indices.4




WDORCA 0.7306* 0.9038* 1.0000
Note: * 𝑝 < 0.001 using Bonferroni correction.
Figure 1.1 depicts average index scores of the DORCA index for various sectors.
The results are in accordance with expectations. Donors tend to have a comparative
advantage in most manufacturing sectors with the exception of textile, apparel, leather
3The data have been obtained using the wbopendata command by Azevedo (2011).
4The WDORCA index is, however, of specific interest as it implicitly accounts for trade costs via
distance. Corresponding estimates using the WDORCA are, thus, for all main regressions depicted in
the appendix and fundamental differences between the indices will be noted in the main part.
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Figure 1.1 Average DORCA Scores
Source: Authors’ calculation based on WITS and OECD data.
Note: Averages across countries and time.
and basic metals according to the DORCA index (Figure 1.1). Recipients tend to have
a comparative advantage in mining sectors, agriculture and forestry.
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1.5 Results
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 present our first set of results. In all three tables, we estimate a
simple form of (1.8), using five bins of the respective index. We report the coefficients
on the contribution of aid to foreign demand — ∑︀𝑗 ̸=𝑖 𝑇 𝐹𝑖𝑡/𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 — for all five bins,
respectively. Moreover, we run the analysis not only for the full sample (column 1 of
Tables 1.2 and 1.3), but also for Asia (column 2) and Africa (column 3) separately.
At first sight, the prediction of the model does not seem to be borne out by the data.
For the full sample, results are largely statistically insignificant. For Asia, in contrast,
coefficients are always significant at the 10 percent level irrespective of the index used.
However, equally irrespective of the index the null hypothesis that all coefficients are
the same can never be refuted. Africa shows mostly insignificant results, and in some
cases, we even obtain negative and statistically significant coefficients.
A key concern regarding these results is the endogeneity of prices 𝑝𝑘𝑖 . 𝑝𝑘𝑖 is expected
to increase with growing demand from abroad or on the domestic market. This will
dampen the effect neighboring countries’ aid can have on exports which declines in 𝑝𝑘𝑖 .
The standard way in which the gravity literature deals with endogenous prices is by
imposing the market clearing condition and conditioning on the sectoral production
values (Yotov et al., 2016). Unfortunately, this is not a feasible option here, because
in order for the effects to materialize the sectoral production values have to change. In
this sense, total sectoral production is a “bad control” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
However, using sectoral market clearing conditions one can show that the factory
gate price is inversely related to the volume of production when demand is given. More-
over, one can show that the effect of additional demand on the factory gate price is
lower the higher the produced quantity.5 Thus, exporters that produce a relatively
small amount of a given product may be forced to increase their price, which in turn
may upset the expected sectoral export patterns. Exporters that produce a relatively
large quantity of a given product will find it easier to meet the additional demand.
This adversely affects the market prospects of exporters that produce relatively little.
This effect is due to heterogeneity within recipient countries or the “South” which is
not accounted for in Trionfetti (2017). As a result, countries that are close to recipients
and have a comparative advantage in similar sectors as donors should see an increase
especially in those sectors. Since they may absorb most of the additional demand in
high DORCA/WDORCA sectors, the expected pattern may not necessarily materialize
if countries have a comparative disadvantage. Thus, not only the comparative advan-
tage of donor countries matters but also the comparative advantage of the exporting
developing country. We allow for this possibility by introducing a dummy variable in-
dicating whether or not a given exporter has a comparative advantage (𝑅𝐶𝐴 > 1) in a
given sector. We augment our estimation equation (1.8) by allowing the intersectoral
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Table 1.2 DORCA Baseline




Dist. weight. neighbor aid (NAID) × DORCA bins
NAID ×1{Low DORCA} -0.0009** 0.0571* -0.0004**
(-2.06) (2.99) (-2.27)
NAID ×1{Medium low DORCA} -0.0009 0.0497* -0.0004*
(-1.40) (3.29) (-1.80)
NAID ×1{Medium DORCA} 0.0011 0.0683* 0.0014
(0.85) (3.25) (1.01)
NAID ×1{Medium high DORCA} -0.0008* 0.0523** -0.0002
(-1.67) (2.44) (-0.88)
NAID ×1{High DORCA} -0.0005 0.0602* 0.0000
(-0.86) (3.09) (0.09)
𝑁 20863 5642 12028
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
DORCA bins (segments) are separated by quantile. The construction of dis-
tance weighted neighbor aid is described in Section 1.3. All regressions include
exporter-sector and year fixed effects. All regression include interactions be-
tween the different segments and a market potential variable constructed as
distance weighted GDP in export markets as further control variables. Control
variables are omitted for brevity.
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Table 1.3 PRODY Baseline




Dist. weight. neighbor aid (NAID) × PRODY bins
NAID ×1{Low PRODY} -0.0005 0.0607* -0.0001
(-1.64) (3.56) (-0.86)
NAID ×1{Medium low PRODY} -0.0010** 0.0515* -0.0001
(-1.98) (2.83) (-0.69)
NAID ×1{Medium PRODY} -0.0005 0.0575* 0.0001
(-0.93) (3.17) (0.22)
NAID ×1{Medium high PRODY} -0.0005 0.0493* -0.0003*
(-1.06) (2.82) (-1.76)
NAID ×1{High PRODY} 0.0006 0.0681* 0.0008
(0.55) (3.17) (0.79)
𝑁 20863 5642 12028
Note: See Table 1.2.
patterns to differ depending on whether the exporter has a comparative advantage. I.e.,
𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +
(︁


















+ 𝜓𝑘𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑘𝑖𝑡,
(1.9)
where β0𝐴𝑖𝑑 (β0𝐺𝐷𝑃 ) is the vector of coefficients for the contribution of aid (GDP) to
external demand given that country 𝑖 has a comparative disadvantage in 𝑘 and β1𝐴𝑖𝑑
(β1𝐺𝐷𝑃 ) is the vector of coefficients if 𝑖 enjoys an advantage in 𝑘. I.e., instead of five
we will have ten different coefficients of the contribution of aid to external demand.
Based on the reasoning outlined above, we should expect that the pattern emerges for
countries with a comparative advantage, but may be weaker or fail to materialize for
countries that suffer a comparative disadvantage.
Results for the various indicators are reported in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. In order to
facilitate inspection, we present the results for one regression spread over two columns.
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The vector of coefficients β0𝐴𝑖𝑑 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡 ≤ 1) is reported in the first column and the
second column reports results for β1𝐴𝑖𝑑 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡 > 1). Apart from that, the tables are
structured in line with Tables 1.2 and 1.3.
For the full sample (columns 1 and 2 in all tables) we find negative coefficients that
are statistically significant in the medium-high bins if countries have a comparative
disadvantage, respectively. A similar picture emerges for the African subsample, except
that results are always insignificant when using the PRODY index.
As before, it is the Asian countries for which we find sizeable and statistically sig-
nificant coefficients. For disadvantaged country-sector combinations (column 3) we find
positive coefficients, statistically significant at least at the ten percent level, in all bins
and both tables. No clear pattern emerges and while the coefficients are statistically
different from zero, they are not statistically different from each other (with the excep-
tion of PRODY’s high bin which is significantly smaller than the first and second bin).
In accordance with our expectations, this changes when looking at advantaged country-
sector combinations. Here, when using the DORCA index, the strongest increases are
found in the medium, medium-high and high bin, supporting the hypothesized pattern.
Those coefficients are statistically significantly larger than the medium-low bin.6 At
the median neighbors’ aid would induce an export increase of 29% in the medium-high
and of 20% in the medium DORCA segment, while only leading to an increase by 14%
in the low bin.7 This is in line with our prediction, and indicates that at least between
these three bins the effect is highest in sectors where donors have a comparative ad-
vantage. Nonetheless, the results for the two extreme bins — the bins for low and high
index values — are not in line with this pattern for the DORCA.8 One possible reason
for this could be differences in demand structures between donors and recipients (i.e.,
our assumption of a constant 𝛼𝑘 across countries could be violated). The results for the
PRODY index, however, partially contradict this interpretation. Surprisingly, the pre-
dicted pattern materializes most strongly when using the PRODY index, although it is
based on GDP per capita instead of aid and does not account for the distance between
donors and recipients. The coefficient in the high bin for advantaged country-sector
combinations is statistically significantly larger and almost double in size compared to
the medium-high bin.9
These results are in line with Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) who show that aid
is more effective in Asian states. In contrast, one possible explanation for the dismal
6The comparison of coefficients is based on one-sided t-tests due to our theoretical expectation
regarding the estimated pattern.
7We refer to the median as there is a large variation in relative effects due to the heterogeneous
sample under observation.
8The coefficient structure for the WDORCA in Appendix Table A.5 is similar, although we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient in the medium-high bin is smaller or equal to the effect
in the medium bin. One potential reason for this could be that distance is only an imperfect proxy for
trade costs.
9Since theory and results suggest that aid to neighboring countries could induce shifts in demand
and export structure, one might be concerned about endogeneity of sectoral quantile rankings. Thus,
in a further test, the ranking of the initial sampling year 2000 was used. The results are robust.
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Table 1.4 DORCA (Dis-)Advantage




≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1
Dist. weight. neighbor aid (NAID) × DORCA bins
NAID ×1{Low DORCA} -0.0003 0.0059 0.0568* 0.1023* -0.0002* -0.0014
(-1.01) (0.56) (4.19) (1.91) (-1.82) (-0.23)
NAID ×1{Med. low DORCA} -0.0002 0.0045 0.0619* 0.0423 -0.0003 0.0073
(-0.89) (0.22) (4.20) (1.39) (-1.35) (0.42)
NAID ×1{Medium DORCA} 0.0015 0.0162 0.0630* 0.1505** 0.0014 0.0068
(1.12) (0.94) (4.39) (1.99) (1.03) (0.63)
NAID ×1{Med. high DORCA} -0.0010** 0.0485 0.0372** 0.2211** -0.0002 -0.0331
(-2.21) (1.48) (2.07) (2.19) (-0.78) (-1.19)
NAID ×1{High DORCA} -0.0005 0.1147 0.0525* 0.2378 0.0002 -0.0718**
(-0.93) (1.15) (3.74) (1.62) (0.34) (-2.11)
𝑁 20863 5642 12028
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01. The construction of distance
weighted neighbor aid is described in Section 1.3. The columns for sectors with 𝑅𝐶𝐴 ≤ 1 & 𝑅𝐶𝐴 > 1,
refer to one regression. All regressions include exporter-sector and year fixed effects. Control variables are
omitted for brevity. DORCA bins (segments) are separated by quantile. All regression include interactions
between the different DORCA segments and a market potential variable constructed as distance weighted
GDP in export markets as further control variables.
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Table 1.5 PRODY (Dis-)Advantage




≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1
Dist. weight. neighbor aid (NAID) × PRODY bins
NAID ×1{Low PRODY} 0.0000 0.0052 0.0607* 0.1135* 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.02) (0.82) (4.34) (2.59) (0.55) (-0.04)
NAID ×1{Med. low PRODY} -0.0000 0.0031 0.0629* 0.0914* 0.0000 0.0018
(-0.02) (0.26) (4.14) (1.96) (0.27) (0.23)
NAID ×1{Medium PRODY} -0.0001 0.0204 0.0568* 0.1279** 0.0002 0.0052
(-0.29) (1.08) (3.77) (2.09) (0.59) (0.35)
NAID ×1{Med. high PRODY} -0.0006* 0.1357 0.0439* 0.2027** -0.0001 0.1245
(-1.88) (1.16) (2.97) (2.05) (-0.69) (0.83)
NAID ×1{High PRODY} 0.0005 0.0806 0.0503* 0.3971** 0.0010 0.0139
(0.49) (1.16) (3.80) (2.47) (0.95) (0.21)
𝑁 20863 5642 12028
Note: See Table 1.4. PRODY bins (segments) are separated by quantile. All regression include
interactions between the different PRODY segments and a market potential variable constructed as
distance weighted GDP in export markets as further control variables.
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performance of the theory in Africa may be the lack of capacity of the African physical
infrastructure. As Brooks and Hummels (2005) and Storeygard (2016) report, trade
costs within Africa are much higher than in Asia. This implies that distance is a much
greater impediment to regional trade in Africa. Our distance weighted neighbor aid
measure may thus exaggerate the extent to which African countries face higher demand.
Cameroon and Vietnam can exemplify this difference between the continents. Both had
similar income levels, relied largely on exports of primary products at the turn of the
century and are neighbored by several major recipients of development aid. While
Cameroon is still highly dependent on commodities including petroleum and cocoa,
however, Vietnam increased its export sophistication via a shift towards manufacturing
of electrical communication equipment during our observation period (WITS, 2018).
Although both have concluded trade agreements with their neighbors, the World Bank’s
Trading across Borders ranking lists Vietnam on rank 94 and Cameroon 186 among 189
countries (World Bank, 2018a).10
1.6 Robustness
Third-country effects are less prone to endogeneity concerns of strategic aid allocation
than direct bilateral effects. However, as donors pursue regional development strategies
(te Velde, 2007; OECD, WTO, 2013; World Bank, 2018c), the argument of endogenous
aid allocation could be extended to the regional level. First, donors might support
regions, which already host important supply-chains rather than creating new initia-
tives for regional integration. In this case, development aid allocation might react to
upgrading trajectories rather than causing these developments among neighbors. What
is more, donors might allocate aid to neighbors of well-performing states to achieve
regional convergence. In this case, we would falsely count aid to more needy neighbors
as a reason for upgrading among regional top-performers.
In order to address these concerns, we build on Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017),
and construct a synthetic measure of aid based on the overall aid budget of the donor.
Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017) use average past values for the share of a given donor
country’s aid that has gone to a specific recipient in order to get counterfactual –
synthetic – bilateral aid flows. These bilateral aid flows are then aggregated for each
recipient, and the resulting aggregate is used as an instrumental variable (IV) for actual
aid flows. We use average bilateral shares for the 1990-1999 period to construct this







𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 for 𝑡 > 2000, where 𝑏𝑖𝑙.𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
is bilateral aid that 𝑖 received from 𝑗 and 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 is donor 𝑗’s total aid budget. While
10The Trading across Borders ranking measures costs and time of ex- and import procedures, in
terms of “documentary compliance, border compliance and domestic transport” (World Bank, 2018a).
The performance of the two countries extends to their regional trading blocks, where ASEAN members
rank in the middle and Cameroon’s potential trading partners within the CEMAC (Economic and
Monetary Community of Central Africa) are to be found at the bottom ranks. In this regard, the
WTO indicates that among CEMAC nations “infrastructure (road, rail and port networks) [...] is
either lacking or in poor condition” (WTO, 2013).
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recipient characteristics may be endogenous determinants of aid, in our setting donor
characteristics can arguably be treated as exogenous. Moreover, the synthetic aid vari-
able is also plausibly excludable because it represents merely a counterfactual aid flow.
Instead of applying a standard IV approach, we follow Wooldridge (2015) in using a
control function approach. The control function rests on similar identifying assumption
as the IV approach, namely excludability and exogeneity of the instrument. We estimate











+ 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (1.10)
where 𝑆𝑦𝑛.𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 denotes our synthetic aid variable, and 𝜑𝑖 are country and 𝜁𝑡 are
year fixed effects. While in an IV setting the predicted value from (1.10) would replace
the endogenous regressor in (1.8), in a control function approach we use the predicted
error term from (1.10) 𝑣𝑖𝑡 as an additional regressor in (1.8) to properly control for
the endogenous variation. Wooldridge (2015) has shown that in a linear model (with-
out interactions) this yields the same point estimates as traditional IVs. One decisive
advantage, however, is that the control function approach provides a simple Hausman-
test of endogeneity that can be easily made robust to heteroskedasticity. In a control
function approach, one can use a robust t-test to test the null hypothesis of exogeneity
of the variable of interest. If 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is insignificant the null hypothesis can be accepted.
As with a Hausman test, however, the validity of the test hinges on the validity of the
chosen instrument.
In a setting with interactions, the control function approach offers additional effi-
ciency gains compared to IV. The difference, as Wooldridge (2015) points out, is that
in an IV framework one has to treat every interaction as a single endogenous regressor.
In the control function approach, however, it suffices to simply include 𝑣𝑖𝑡, as in the
linear case. Intuitively, in an instrumental variable approach, one has to remove the
endogeneous variation in the interaction and the parent term. In the control function
approach, however, the original variables are not adjusted. Instead, by using the resid-
ual from the first stage, one controls for the endogeneous variation. Since the source
of the variation is the same, only one variable is required. Note that this is based on
the additional assumption that the variable that neighbor aid is interacted with is ex-
ogenous (e.g., not determined by the instrument). This is plausibly the case since the
DORCA/PRODY indices are not country specific.11
In this setting, we use the donor budget based synthetic aid measure due to Temple
and Van de Sijpe (2017) as the excluded instrument. Judging by the first stage F-
statistics, this instrument performs considerably well for the Asian subsamples. How-
ever, for the full and African sub sample the corresponding F-statistics are below the
11Although we do not provide a technical proof, the robustness of results when using advantage
indicators from the initial sampling year 2000, reduces concerns that the indices are subject to endo-
geneity.
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rule of thumb value of 10.12 Hence, as the approach is suitable for the subsample where
the study’s main results are found, we proceed with this strategy.
As suggested by Wooldridge (2015), we include the residual from the first stage
𝑣2 to control for endogeneity. According to Wooldridge (2015), the significance test is
tantamount to a heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test of the null hypothesis that our
variable of interest is exogenous, assuming that our instrument is. 𝑣2 is significant in
the full and Asian sub sample, which are, hence, subject to endogeneity. Controlling for
this endogenous part leaves the main results largely unchanged. The positive coefficient
of 𝑣2 suggests that previous fixed effects results were slightly upward biased.
Again, we find for the Asian subsample that in sectors with 𝑅𝐶𝐴 ≤ 1 exports
increase significantly, but the effects are not significantly larger in sectors with a high
DORCA or PRODY. In contrast, for sectors with 𝑅𝐶𝐴 > 1 larger coefficients occur
among higher DORCA bins in column 4 of Table 1.6. As before, results for the full
sample and for Asia are not in line with the predictions of the model. Our findings,
thus, seem robust to controlling for endogeneity.13
During the period between 2000 and 2013 low and lower middle income states in
our sample experienced a strong increase in both aid and exports (see Figure A.1 in
the Appendix).14 Especially, a strong jump occurs around 2005, which was marked by
important aid policy forums including the UN Millennium project, the Commission for
Africa as well as the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee donors’ Paris Decla-
ration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness (Minasyan et al., 2017). In the 2005 Paris Declaration
donors committed to successively reduce the amount of tied aid, which requires that
recipients spend development aid on goods from the donor country (OECD, 2008). Tied
aid could potentially undermine our prediction because it changes the effective trade
costs of recipients vis-à-vis donors. Neighboring countries may not benefit from aid
inflows if they can only be spent on goods from the donor country. In order to assess
if this structural break might contribute to the results found, we split the sample into
the 2000-2005 and 2006-2013 periods.
In Table 1.7 we conduct the same analysis as in Table 1.4 but restricted to the pre-PD
12We also considered potential alternative instrumental variables, which were recently suggested.
Galiani et al. (2017) use crossing the International Development Association’s gross national income
eligibility threshold as an instrument. However, the local average treatment effect in this “Quasi-
experiment,” which is only experienced for countries on a growth trajectory, is rather specific. This
might be problematic for our specific research question as shifts in the export structure are suggested
as growth determinants in the literature (Hausmann et al., 2005). Another alternative is Dreher and
Langlotz’s (2017) instrument, which is based on donor fractionalization and the probability to receive
aid. As a large part of the statistical power of this IV is derived from the Cold War period, which is
not covered by our sample, this identification strategy is not applicable to our research.
13Additionally to concerns of reversed causality, an obvious omitted variable bias could be associated
with the correlation of own and neighbors’ aid receipts. Further regressions, which include own aid as
a control variable, support the previous results found and are available upon request.
14One might be concerned that both dependent and independent variable would be driven by secular
trends that are due to other global changes, for instance, the rising participation of Asian countries in
global value chains (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015). In order to address this concern, Appendix
Table A.3 controls for segment-specific trends and depicts a qualitatively unchanged pattern.
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period. Compared to our previous results neither for the full sample nor for the African
subsample does this show a major effect on our results. For the full sample (columns
1 and 2) we only find negative and significant coefficients for disadvantaged sectors,
and for Africa (columns 5 and 6) hardly any coefficient is statistically significant. As
before, we do not find the predicted pattern in either case. In striking contrast to our
earlier results, however, we do not find statistically significant effects of neighbor aid
on exports in Asia for advantaged sectors. Hence, the pattern that we find in Section
1.5 does not materialize prior to 2005. But how do the effects change after 2005’s high
level fora meetings?
In Table 1.8 we restrict the sample to the post-PD period. For the full sample of
countries, the mostly negative point estimates are now indistinguishable from zero and
would, thus, correspond to neutral effects. The pattern for African countries remains
largely unchanged and only an additional significant negative effect in the medium-low
DORCA bin for sectors with 𝑅𝐶𝐴 > 1 occurs. Among the Asian countries, effects
are statistically significant across all bins with 𝑅𝐶𝐴 ≤ 1. In contrast to the pre-PD
results, we now find the predicted pattern (with the exception of the high DORCA bin)
among the sectors with 𝑅𝐶𝐴 > 1 with substantially larger and significant effects than
in Table 1.4. The results suggest that the policy change 2005 may indeed have allowed
some countries to benefit from aid flows to proximate countries. However, the evidence
of such an effect is limited to Asia. For African countries, not much seems to have
changed after 2005.
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Table 1.6 DORCA (Dis-)Advantage – Control Function




≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1
Dist. weight. neighbor aid (NAID) × DORCA bins
NAID ×1{Low DORCA} -0.0075** 0.0003 0.0435*** 0.0847 0.0003 -0.0012
(-2.24) (0.02) (3.57) (1.61) (0.08) (-0.15)
NAID ×1{Med. low DORCA} -0.0074** -0.0010 0.0491*** 0.0243 0.0001 0.0076
(-2.21) (-0.04) (3.71) (0.79) (0.04) (0.40)
NAID ×1{Medium DORCA} -0.0057 0.0100 0.0502*** 0.1322* 0.0019 0.0071
(-1.61) (0.51) (3.89) (1.76) (0.53) (0.55)
NAID ×1{Med. high DORCA} -0.0081** 0.0430 0.0235 0.2030** 0.0003 -0.0330
(-2.46) (1.30) (1.37) (2.02) (0.08) (-1.17)
NAID ×1{High DORCA} -0.0076** 0.1091 0.0387*** 0.2203 0.0006 -0.0717**
(-2.28) (1.10) (3.01) (1.50) (0.18) (-2.10)
𝑣2 0.0079** 0.0232* -0.0005
(2.19) (2.93) (-0.13)
Kleibergen-Paap under-ID p-val. 0.0038 0.0003 0.0322
Kleibergen-Paap weak ID F-stat. 8.072 133.664 5.139
𝑁 20863 5642 12028
Note: See Table 1.4. Correspondingly, the control function approach plugs in 𝑣2 from a specific first stage
regression per regional subsample, where first stage results can be found in Table A.2. All regressions include
exporter-sector and year fixed effects. All regression include interactions between the different DORCA segments
and a market potential variable constructed as distance weighted GDP in export markets as further control
variables. Control variables are omitted for brevity.
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Table 1.7 DORCA (Dis-)Advantage – pre 2005




≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1
Dist. weight. neighbor aid (NAID) × DORCA bins
NAID ×1{Low DORCA} -0.0023*** -0.0060* 0.0077* 0.0006 -0.0004** -0.0017
(-3.74) (-1.77) (1.75) (0.03) (-2.46) (-1.62)
NAID ×1{Med. low DORCA} -0.0007 -0.0067 0.0143** -0.0049 -0.0000 -0.0006
(-1.10) (-1.23) (2.50) (-0.27) (-0.08) (-0.40)
NAID ×1{Medium DORCA} -0.0014*** -0.0053 0.0106** -0.0048 0.0001 0.0001
(-2.85) (-1.08) (2.01) (-0.32) (0.81) (0.08)
NAID ×1{Med. high DORCA} -0.0033*** 0.0023 0.0078 -0.0080 -0.0004 -0.0070
(-2.99) (0.22) (1.50) (-0.37) (-0.94) (-1.22)
NAID ×1{High DORCA} -0.0027*** -0.0372 0.0098** -0.0264 -0.0001 N.A.
(-3.30) (-1.44) (2.31) (-1.40) (-0.43) (N.A.)
𝑁 8990 2232 5301
Note: See Table 1.4. Estimates refer to a sample from (including) 2000 to (including) 2005.
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Table 1.8 DORCA (Dis-)Advantage – post 2005




≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1 ≤ 1 > 1
Dist. weight. neighbor aid (NAID) × DORCA bins
NAID ×1{Low DORCA} -0.0001 0.0041 0.0443*** 0.2060** -0.0002** -0.0093
(-0.31) (0.37) (4.87) (2.01) (-2.00) (-1.17)
NAID ×1{Med. low DORCA} -0.0000 0.0001 0.0412*** 0.1693** -0.0003 -0.0138*
(-0.15) (0.01) (4.23) (2.54) (-1.30) (-1.76)
NAID ×1{Medium DORCA} 0.0017 0.0138 0.0530*** 0.1994*** 0.0015 0.0073
(1.22) (1.04) (5.23) (3.47) (1.01) (0.80)
NAID ×1{Med. high DORCA} -0.0002 0.0592 0.0255** 0.4257*** -0.0000 -0.0192
(-0.83) (1.49) (2.17) (2.94) (-0.02) (-0.38)
NAID ×1{High DORCA} 0.0003 0.0169 0.0342*** 0.1999 0.0003 -0.0119
(0.54) (0.20) (3.03) (1.36) (0.74) (-0.23)
𝑁 11873 3410 6727
Note: See Table 1.4. Estimates refer to a sample from (including) 2006 to (including) 2013.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study heterogenous third-country effects of aid on sectoral exports of
low and lower middle income countries depending on sectoral product sophistication.
Building on the theoretical framework by Trionfetti (2017), we show that aid should
lead to a shift in regional exports towards goods in which donors have a comparative
advantage if some general assumptions are met. In order to test this, we construct
an index called 𝐷𝑂𝑅𝐶𝐴, which measures to what extent donors enjoy a comparative
advantage in a given product. Empirically, the prediction of the model is only borne
out for Asian countries, and only if the countries enjoy a comparative advantage in
the product in question. The role of the country’s own comparative advantage is in
line with the model, as countries with an existing comparative advantage will find it
easier to meet additional demand. We hypothesize that the reason why the pattern
does not materialize in Africa is due to a relatively high level of regional trade costs
that is less weakly correlated with distance than in Asia. What is more, applying a
sample-split we find that the pattern found in Asia is driven by the post-2005 period.
This period was characterized by important changes in the development policy agenda
following the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and other high-level development
policy fora meetings. Results hold when applying several robustness checks including a
control function approach to address endogeneity.
In our view, these results are relevant for current development policy in a num-
ber of ways. First, we demonstrate the potential importance of third-country effects,
when assessing the effectiveness of development aid, although, as for now, they only
seem to materialize in Asia. The existence of third-country effects also underscores
the importance of regional approaches to development policies. This if of particular
relevance as the results on the country level are leaning towards insignificant effects of
aid on growth for the recipient itself (e.g., Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008; Dreher and
Langlotz, 2017).
However, note that we do not think that the patterns we document are a necessary
outcome of a mechanistic relationship. Our regional subsample estimations, which
support the predicted pattern for Asia and refute the hypothesis for Africa, are cases
in point. It is in accordance with the model, that if regional trade costs are too high
compared to trade costs vis-à-vis donors the pattern should not materialize. Thus,
several factors including infrastructure, regulation, informal trade barriers, and supply
chain governance might dampen or reinforce third-country effects. We leave a further
assessment of those channels for future research.
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1.A Data Sources
Variable Name Description Years Avail-
able
Source
Gross Exports Gross Exports on the sectoral level
(ISIC Rev. 3) reported by exporter.
2000–2013 WITS (2018)
Neighbor aid Own estimation based on distance and
net aid received / given.
2000–2013 Head et al. (2010)
and OECD (2015)
Market Potential Own estimation based on distance and
GDPs of potential partners.
2000–2013 World Bank
(2018d)





DORCA Own estimation based on aid and ex-
port data.
2000–2013 OECD (2015) and
WITS (2018)
WDORCA Own estimation based on aid and ex-
port data using distance weights.
2000–2013 OECD (2015),
WITS (2018) and
Head et al. (2010)
RCA Revealed comparative advantage
based on export data.
2000–2013 WITS (2018)
Table A.1 Countries in Sample
A. Low Income Exporters (Recipients)
Afghanistan Eritrea Mali Tanzania
Benin Ethiopia Mozambique Togo
Burkina Faso Guinea Nepal Uganda
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Niger Zimbabwe
Cambodia Madagascar Rwanda
Central African Republic Malawi Sierra Leone
B. Lower middle Income Importers (Recipients)
Armenia Ghana Moldova Sri Lanka
Bangladesh Guatemala Morocco Swaziland
Bolivia Honduras Myanmar Ukraine
Cameroon India Nicaragua Vietnam
Congo, Rep. Indonesia Nigeria Yemen
Cote d’Ivoire Kenya Pakistan Zambia
Egypt, Arab Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Papua New Guinea
El Salvador Lesotho Philippines
Georgia Mauritania Senegal
Note: Income groups according to World Bank definitions
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1.B Control Function Approach
Table A.2 Synthetic Aid – First Stage
Dep. Variable: Country 𝑖 distance weighted synthetic aid in neighboring countries at 𝑡
Full
sample Asia Africa
IV First stage: Synthetic Aid
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐷 i,t 3.2401*** 1.1469*** 6.4878**
(1.1404) (0.0992) (2.8620)
Kleibergen-Paap under-ID pval 0.0038 0.0003 0.0322
Kleibergen-Paap weak ID Fstat 8.072 133.664 5.139
𝑁 673 182 388
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01. The construction of
distance weighted neighbor aid is described in Section 1.3. All regressions include exporter and
year fixed effects. All regresions control for the exporters’ market potential variable constructed
as distance weighted GDP in export markets as further control variable in year 𝑡.
Table A.2 depicts the results for the first stage of our instrument. While the F-
Statistics are below the rule of thumb threshold of 10 in the full and African sample,
the instrument is sufficiently strong for the Asian subsample. As the instrument works
sufficiently well for the Asian sample, in which we find our main results, we consider
the instrument and the corresponding control function approach as sufficiently suitable
to address the potential endogeneity concerns in our setting.
1.C Segment Specific Trends
Parts of the increase in aid in Figure A.1 are due to changes in the international agenda
on development finance. Most notably, throughout our sample period the volume of
“Aid for Trade” (AfT) increased steadily (WTO, 2005; Bassnet, 2011; Lammersen and
Roberts, 2015). AfT comprises different types of development aid that are intended
to facilitating trade. Insofar as the trend is driven by AfT or the reduction of tied
aid, we would in accordance with the model expect corresponding trends in exports.
Controlling for linear trends will likely capture part of these induced increases in aid
and will make it harder to observe the expected pattern. Despite that, the results in
Table A.3 indicate that the main findings are robust to this modification. In line with
Table 1.4, we find significant positive increases of comparable size across the sectors
with 𝑅𝐶𝐴 ≤ 1. Estimations for sectors with 𝑅𝐶𝐴 > 1 indicate coefficients that are
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again of a larger magnitude in the third, fourth and fifth WDORCA bin.15
Figure A.1 Trends in Aid and Trade
Source: Authors’ calculation based on WITS and OECD data.
Note: Averages across quantiles and time.
15We also estimated results using sector-specific linear time trends and in line with the method-
ological caution by Christian and Barrett (2017) using segment-specific non-linear trends. Results are
largely unchanged and available from the authors upon request.
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1.D Tables and Figures
Figure A.2 Average WDORCA Scores
Source: Authors’ calculation based on WITS and OECD data.
Note: Averages across countries and time.
The picture from Figure 1.1 changes slightly when we look at the weighted DORCA,
which is depicted in Figure A.2. Interestingly, when taking distance into account the
scores for the manufacturing of food products and tobacco point to an advantage for
recipients. This is due to a smaller difference in RCAs between donor and recipient
countries that is overcompensated by bilateral distances. This value indicates that
while most recipient countries do not have an RCA in these products globally, they
could be competitive in regional markets.
36
Third-country effects of development aid on sectoral exports
Table A.4 WDORCA Baseline




Dist. weight. neighbor aid (NAID) × WDORCA bins
NAID ×1{Low WDORCA} -0.0012** 0.0549* -0.0007*
(-2.49) (3.01) (-2.89)
NAID ×1{Medium low WDORCA} -0.0009 0.0492* -0.0005
(-1.20) (3.16) (-1.46)
NAID ×1{Medium WDORCA} 0.0010 0.0658* 0.0012
(0.86) (3.22) (0.95)
NAID ×1{Medium high WDORCA} 0.0000 0.0684* 0.0003
(0.04) (3.43) (0.75)
NAID ×1{High WDORCA} -0.0007 0.0496** 0.0001
(-0.90) (2.31) (0.16)
𝑁 20863 5642 12028
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01. WDORCA bins
(segments) are separated by quantile. The construction of distance weighted neighbor
aid is described in Section 1.3. All regressions include exporter-sector and year fixed
effects. As further control variables all regression include interactions between the
different WDORCA segments and a market potential variable constructed as distance
weighted GDP in export markets. Control variables are omitted for brevity.
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Unequal Gains from Trade
The Role of Political Biases
Single Authored
Abstract
Agriculture constitutes the main employment base for several African countries.
However, political distortions reduce its potential for inclusive and pro-poor
growth. Theory and empirics are ambiguous whether ethnic and regional
affiliations with the current national leader have positive or negative effects on
gains from agricultural commodity trade. I combine innovative geocoded data
to distinguish ethnic and regional political affiliation to resolve these existing
ambiguities. Results indicate that ethnic affiliation positively affects gains from
trade, while this pattern is further enhanced for coethnics living in the leader’s
birth region. The findings suggest that leaders target coethnics via subsidies
or a preferential tax treatment rather than via the provision of public goods.
Democratic institutions reduce but do not offset this pattern.
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2.1 Introduction
African countries are often considered in the public perception as victims of their natu-
ral resource endowments, causing inequality and distributional conflict. While minerals
typically only benefit a narrow elite, the agricultural sector has theoretically a high
potential for more inclusive growth as it employs the majority of African workers (ILO,
2013). Still, research indicates low agricultural productivity and limited gains for small
holders (Zylberberg, 2013; McMillan et al., 2014). A comprehensive literature suggests
various politico-economic constraints, which contribute to disincentives and unsustain-
able policies (Lipton, 1977; Binswanger and Deininger, 1997; Anderson et al., 2013).
As an example, consider the redistributive policies of Kenya’s former president
Daniel arap Moi. Once arap Moi came into power in 1978, he redistributed resources
from the successful coffee growers, who supported his predecessor Jomo Kenyatta, to
benefit grain producers in his home region (Bates, 1989). More recently, the government
of Malawi’s former president Bingu wa Mutharika implemented a large-scale support
program for smallholders, which was appraised as a model for an “African Green Rev-
olution” (Denning et al., 2009). Yet, there are accounts that the president directed
higher fertilizer subsidies to coethnic Lomwe people in order to garner political support
after 2004’s elections (Abman and Carney, 2018). In this vein, Dorward and Chirwa
(2011) indicate inefficient targeting during the 2005/2006 period, which reduced the
program’s potential for poverty reduction.
Both examples point to a more general pattern in political targeting, leading to
biases in gains from agricultural commodity trade. Previous research provides some
rationale to why bad economics does not necessarily have to be bad politics as targeted
transfers can ensure political survival. Both theory and empirics are ambiguous about
the direction of those political biases. Bates and Block (2009) state that, in the eth-
nically diverse countries of Africa, policy makers would generate support by targeting
farmers of their home region via favorable redistribution. Contrastingly, Kasara (2007)
argues that leaders would counter-intuitively impose higher taxes on coethnic farmers
as they would have better monitoring capacities within their home region.
Against this background, this paper discerns the existing ambiguity in the literature
by distinguishing regional and ethnic biases in gains from trade, linking high-resolution
geospatial data to surveys for 33 African countries. This way, I examine if localized
shifts in producer prices heterogeneously contribute to poverty reduction depending on
individual residence and ethnicity. More specifically, the analysis considers whether
biases are driven by broader (e.g., via public goods) or more specific targeting (e.g.,
via taxation). One of the challenges is that political biases and local poverty could
directly influence local prices. Using an interaction of global commodity prices with
local productive capacities allows me to exploit arguably exogenous variation in poten-
tial gains from trade. Moreover, a placebo test reduces concerns that regional or ethnic
prosperity is laying the foundation for political power and, hence, reversely explains the
pattern. I rule out several alternative explanations based on further robustness tests.
The empirical analysis demonstrates that ethnic biases in gains from trade exist and
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are more nuanced in the leader birth region. Coethnics who reside in the birthplace
of their leader gain four to five times more than other people from the same ethnicity.
For the former group a change in global producer prices by one standard deviation
decreases the probability of being poor by 8% – a sizeable effect. Yet, there are no
disproportional gains for people of other ethnicities residing in the leader birth region.
This would not be in line with broader targeting via public goods (e.g., infrastructure)
and suggests rather an exclusionary targeting via subsidies or taxation in line with
the Malawian experience. Based on survey data, I provide some suggestive evidence
that the main beneficiaries – coethnics who reside in the leader birth region – have
indeed more positive perceptions regarding tax collection than other groups. Previous
literature on political favoritism suggests the “value of democracy” (Burgess et al.,
2015) for curbing discretionary transfers. The data reveal that democracies can reduce,
though not completely resolve, this form of political distortions.
The paper contributes to the open question in the favoritism literature of whether
ethnic affiliation of farmers increases or reduces gains from trade. This way, the findings
add to the ongoing debate on globalization and inequality. Moreover, they contribute to
comparative political economics, stressing the value, but also the limits, of democratic
institutions for a more equal distribution of economic gains. The following section
describes the different strands of research in order to provide a picture of existing gaps
and complementarities in the literature.
2.2 Literature
African economies are known for their large wealth of natural resources, which has been
identified as more of a curse than a blessing in the literature on resource-driven conflict,
corruption and Dutch Disease (Van der Ploeg, 2011).1 In contrast, agriculture employs
on average the majority of African workers, which theoretically increases its potential
to affect inclusive and pro-poor growth. The high labor intensity of agriculture ensures
that windfall gains are not easily captured by elites, as is usually the case for natural
resources or development aid. Although agriculture’s share in national GDP is larger
than in advanced economies, it is not proportional to the workforce it employs and
is, hence, plagued by low productivity. Thus, industrialization could be considered as
an alternative growth strategy, especially as recent work indicates the importance of
industrial upgrading for economic development (e.g., Hausmann et al., 2007). Despite
strong theoretical arguments for structural change (Lewis, 1954; Gollin, 2014), recent
studies demonstrate an employment shift to the agricultural sector, increasing rather
than decreasing its economic salience (McMillan et al., 2014; Rodrik, 2016).
Against this background, the global integration of agricultural value chains offers
ample potential for growth if institutions are in place that promote productivity and an
equitable distribution of gains (Zylberberg, 2013; Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2016).
1Dutch disease refers to resource export induced appreciations of the exchange rate, which lead to
reductions of competitiveness in other sectors.
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For this reason, the paper is concerned with understanding existing barriers for agri-
cultural commodity trade rather than examining drivers of structural change. In this
regard, comprehensive literature suggests various politico-economic constraints which
contribute to disincentives and unsustainable policies (Lipton, 1977; Anderson et al.,
2013).
As a result, agriculture is highly politicized, making it susceptible to political dis-
tortions and favoritism (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997). Although stressing different
aspects of the phenomenon, clientelism, patronage, and cronyism can be connected to
one strand of the favoritism literature.
Politico-economic theory can rationalize the behavior of policy makers. Bueno
De Mesquita (2005) argues that each polity has a group that decides who is the leader
of the state – the selectorate. Leaders, who want to stay in power, will have to focus
on their selectorate via the provision of benefits. Depending on the effective selectorate
in autocracies or democracies, those benefits will be provided via private (small selec-
torate) or public goods (large selectorate). This form of discretionary redistribution
can be summarized as favoritism. Yet, favoritism and vote-buying are by no means
exclusive to Africa and there are various accounts from different world regions and
political systems (Baskaran et al., 2015; Englmaier and Stowasser, 2017; Curto-Grau
et al., 2018). Thus, favoritism can be considered as an “axiom of politics” (De Luca
et al., 2018).
It is fair to assume that the role of ethnic cleavages is particularly strong in African
states due to its history. Especially, the arbitrary partitioning of states by the colonial
powers united people with very diverse identities within unitary nation states (e.g.,
Alesina et al., 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016). Thus, after independence,
the political landscape was structured strongly along ethnic lines (Van de Walle, 2003).
For this reason, strong patronage networks evolved, which have been both highlighted
in quasi- and experimental research (e.g., Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009; Keefer and
Khemani, 2014).
The literature distinguishes mainly between ethnic and regional favoritism.2 With
respect to regional favoritism, Hodler and Raschky (2014) show that the birth region
of the present chief executive of a country experiences higher night light luminosity,
which would proxy local wealth. As a striking example, they describe the rise and
fall of Mobutu’s ancestral village Gbadolite, which included a marvelous palace during
Mobutu’s kleptocratic reign.3
Franck and Rainer (2012) show that this pattern extends to ethnic favoritism. Us-
ing data from the Demographic and Health Surveys, they find that ethnic favoritism
manifests in worse health and education outcomes for people from ethnicities other
than the chief executives’. Regarding the channels of discretionary resource allocation,
Hodler and Raschky (2014) document the contribution of oil extraction for regional
2Regarding agriculture, the well-documented urban-rural bias (Lipton, 1977; Bezemer and Headey,
2008) comes to mind. Although there is partly an overlap between those literatures, heterogeneity
analysis indicates that this divide cannot fully explain the biases described subsequently.
3The Guardian (2015), last accessed September 21, 2018.
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public good provision. Dreher et al. (2016) indicate the discretionary allocation of de-
velopment finance on a subnational level. This form of favoritism can be considered as
particularly salient due to the fungibility of foreign assistance (Pack and Pack, 1993).
Bommer et al. (2018) show that biased resource allocation even extends to humanitar-
ian aid. All those studies have in common that they examine how windfall gains are
discretionarily reallocated via private and public goods along the lines of the selectorate
theory. As argued before, agricultural commodity trade might follow a distinct pattern
of favoritism caused by higher labor intensity and geographical dispersion of farmers.4
First, policy makers could target their selectorate via favorable trade policies. On
the one hand, policy makers can protect sectors from import competition via import
tariffs. On the other hand, political leaders have some leeway to redistribute gains
by imposing export tariffs on goods which are not produced by their support group.
However, Anderson et al. (2013) show a recent decline of those trade distortions. The
structural adjustment policies of the major international financial institutions – the
IMF and the World Bank – as well as the membership of several African states in the
WTO have substantially reduced the room for discretion.
Second, policy makers could also target their support group via regional public
goods, including infrastructure, electricity provision or irrigation systems. Deficient
infrastructure is a major constraint for African export performance (Limao and Ven-
ables, 2001; Page, 2012) and inequality (Bluhm et al., 2018). Especially, roads are
highly salient for commodity trade, as the quality of the road network determines both
travel time and fuel use (Storeygard, 2016). In this context, based on an impressive
digitization of Michelin atlases, Burgess et al. (2015) provide evidence that the home
regions of Kenyan politicians benefited disproportionally from road construction. How-
ever, the spatial dispersion of farmers constrains the potential of targeted public goods
allocation due to potential spill-overs to people from other groups and increasing costs
(Ejdemyr et al., 2018).
Third, policy makers can influence the gains from trade via domestic redistribution
in the form of subsidies and taxes like in the previously named example of fertilizer
vouchers in Malawi. In this regard, Bates and Block (2009, 2010) suggest that leaders
would reduce the effective tax burden for farmers who grow crops in their home region.
A case in point is Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who was the president of Ivory Coast from
1960 to 1993. Working as a planter before his medical and political career, he had
sympathy for the agricultural sector, which he supported by imposing lower taxes on
cash crops (e.g., cocoa and coffee). His agriculture-based development model for Ivory
Coast can be understood against this background.
This is contrasted by empirical work of Kasara (2007). Linking crops with the
home regions of political executives, she suggests a counter-intuitive pattern of a higher
agricultural tax burden for the ethnic group of the leader. She rationalizes this outcome
along the lines of a political-economy model by Padró i Miquel (2007) where, due to the
4This would be analogous to the heterogeneous effects of agricultural and mineral commodities on
conflict dynamics as suggested by Dube and Vargas (2013).
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lack of political competition, an extractive coethnic leader is preferred over an extractive
leader who favors other groups. This equilibrium is consolidated as farmers have low
capacities for collective action due to their geographical dispersion (Anderson et al.,
2013). Despite being taxed more heavily, farmers sharing the leader’s ethnicity would
benefit from other transfers (e.g., education and health benefits) and also draw further
“psychic benefits” from knowing that a coethnic is in power. Above that, leaders might
have better capacities to monitor their coethnics in the home region.
In sum, while Bates and Block (2009) argue that affiliation with the leader would on
average lead to favorable taxation, Kasara (2007) suggests an unfavorable tax treatment.
One explanation for those contradicting expectations could be the lack of distinction
of regional and ethnic affiliation. For instance, leaders might make use of monitoring
capacities to extract higher rents from other ethnicities in their home region, while
coethnics remain unaffected.5
Either form of (dis-)favoritism corresponds to a biased political system, and insti-
tutional change could reduce these inefficiencies (Bates and Block, 2013). First, when
facing autocratic institutions, chief executives are less constrained in decision making
(North, 1991; Acemoglu et al., 2004). Second, time horizons of politicians are shorter
in autocracies because turnover is inherently uncertain (Olson, 1993).6
On this basis, I can formulate the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) On average, coethnics of the leader will benefit disproportionally
more than people from other ethnicities if prices for agricultural goods in their region
increase. This will be even more so if they reside in the executive’s home region as
the feasibility of targeting via public goods or additional transfers (taxes or subsidies)
increases.
Hypothesis 2 (H2) People from other ethnicities who reside in the leader’s home
region will not benefit disproportionally. Spatial proximity facilitates monitoring and,
thus, discretionary transfers (taxation or subsidization).
Hypothesis 3 (H3) Political institutions confine this bias and, hence, heterogeneous
effects can be expected across autocratic and democratic systems.
Considering individuals rather than sticking to the unitary group level of regional
and ethnic populations, allows me to disentangle those concepts and analyze how they
influence the distribution of gains from trade. This assessment only recently became
possible due to innovative subnational data, which I present subsequently.
5Although there are several accounts, which indicate the high geographic concentration of ethnic
groups, a substantial portion of people lives outside of their homelands (see, e.g., Bommer et al., 2018).
6This would also be the case in a setting where leaders face a high risk of political turnover and
try to extract as much rent as possible even if it reduces agricultural export competitiveness. Based on
a political economy model, McMillan (2001) suggests that this setting might explain why short-term
oriented politicians choose to “kill the golden goose,” when facing an unstable political environment.
Although autocracies can be surprisingly stable, the history of several African states is marked by
various irregular leader exits (Posner and Young, 2007).
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2.3 Data
Thanks to growing scholarly efforts in environmental, economic and political sciences
an increasing body of data is available on the subnational level. Obtaining geolocalized
data on individual perceptions and economic well-being is still complicated for low and
middle income economies as survey data are usually scarce and often only available on
an aggregate level. Fortunately, more fine-grained data recently became available in the
framework of the Afrobarometer Survey Program (Afrobarometer, 2018). This study
uses data from six rounds of the Afrobarometer, which comprise more than 150,000 sur-
vey responses on individual perceptions from 34 countries and 544 subnational regions.
Appendix Table B.1 depicts the sampled countries.7 Afrobarometer samples data ran-
domly, but does not provide a panel structure of respondents. Thus, the study relies
on repeated cross-sections for the years 1999 to 2015 with gaps. The database provides
information on different socio-economic indicators along with perceptions on individual
well-being as well as opinions on politics and security. To answer my research ques-
tion, the data are used to obtain information on individual perceptions, respondents’
ethnicity and the main outcome – poverty.
In line with the capabilities approach of Sen (1993) and its empirical application
(e.g., Klasen, 2000; Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003; Alkire and Santos, 2014),
I consider different dimensions of well-being. Following McGuirk and Burke (2017), I
construct an index based on the five items in Afrobarometer which refer to poverty. The
survey questions read “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family
gone without: food to eat / clean water for home use / medicines or medical treatment
/ fuel to cook / cash income.”8 These items are listed on a 1 (“never”) to 5 (“always”)
scale and are aggregated into an unweighted poverty index. As this multi-dimensional
poverty measure is not based on monetary values, it is not necessarily comparable to
the World Bank’s “1.90 dollar-a-day” poverty line. However, this issue gets mitigated
by using country-period fixed effects as they account for national price levels. A further
relevant concern arises due to the self-reported nature of the poverty index. Thus, I
validated the poverty measure by correlating it with per capita expenditure from the
World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) for a limited subsample
of countries (Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania). Regions with a higher poverty index
have a lower per capita expenditure. Results are depicted in Table B.19.9
This paper makes also use of Afrobarometer’s rich data on individual perceptions
7The sample is highly diverse though, ranging from a 2% of agricultural employment share in
Botswana to a 60% employment share in Sierra Leone (World Bank, 2017a). Subsequent analysis con-
siders accounts for these differences via country-year fixed effects and heterogeneity analysis. Nonethe-
less, it is important to keep in mind that there is a distinct heterogeneity across African countries,
when interpreting the effects.
8While round 1 (exclusively) and round 2 (also) ask for availability of electricity, rounds 3-6 switch
to asking for availability of cooking fuel.
9Ideally, I would like to validate the main results using LSMS data. However, no data on ethnic
affiliation were collected and analysis is confined to leader birth regions. Results qualitatively support
subsequent findings on limited regional favoritism and are available upon request.
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in order to consider potential channels, specifically, regarding the support for taxes.
For the treatment indicator of interest, I employ data on commodity prices of five
main cash crops cocoa, coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco (World Bank, 2018b; IMF,
2018). I chose these particular crops as they are among the most important African
export commodities and play a smaller role for domestic consumption (Akiyama and
Larson, 1994). In order to maintain statistical power but reduce susceptibility to out-
liers, monthly prices are averaged over biannual periods. Commodity prices are then
combined with local land use indicators from Monfreda et al. (2008). For the latter
data, Monfreda et al. use information from international and national censuses as well
as satellite data to construct measures of land use. For this purpose, a gridded map of
crop-specific and total land use is constructed in order to obtain shares for each crop.
If no information was available land use data were imputed.





where 𝑃𝑗𝑡 is the price of good 𝑗 in period 𝑡, which is indexed for each product at 100
for the first period (July to December 1999). The global price of each commodity
is then interacted with the local production capacity 𝑆𝑐𝑗𝑟 to grow commodity 𝑗 in the
respective country-region 𝑐𝑟.10 I project the data on the level of first level administrative
boundaries based on Hijmans et al. (2012) to match regional price effects to survey
responses.
In order to examine the effects of favoritism, I obtain information if administra-
tive regions correspond to the birth region of the recent political leader from Dreher
et al. (2016). Using various databases, including Encyclopedia Britannica, CIDOB
and Wikipedia, I extended their data for additional years.11 Data on democratic and
autocratic polities are from Bjørnskov and Rode (2018), extending information from
Cheibub et al. (2010).
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics on the main dependent and independent
variables. The poverty indicator ranges from 0 to 25, where 25 indicates the highest
possible poverty incidence in all subcategories. Mean (median) poverty equals 10.7 (10).
This corresponds to an intermediate poverty level where respondents indicate for every
category that they would have gone in the past year “several times” without food, clean
Another potential indicator for regional economic well-being considered in recent scholarly work is
night-light output. Although regional light intensity is arguably a viable measure for local economic
activity, it is again hard to discern intra-group heterogeneity with this measure. Moreover, while lights
might be well-suited to measure industrial productivity, it is questionable if this holds for agricultural
output.
10Certainly, producer prices are correlated with the consumption side, which can influence individual
well-being drastically (Bellemare, 2015; Hendrix and Haggard, 2015). Considering cash crops for the
PPI reduces this issue slightly. Nonetheless, Appendix Table B.8 controls for a consumer price index.
Subsequent results are qualitatively unchanged.
11Information were cross-validated by another coder. What is more, although Wikipedia is less
reliable than other commercial services, errors can be considered as random noise.
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Figure 2.1 Poverty and Local Producer Price Indices
a) Average Poverty Indices b) Local Producer Price Indices
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Monfreda et al. (2008), FAO (2018), IMF (2018), World Bank
(2018b) and Afrobarometer (2018).
Note: Averages across regions and time.
water, medicine, cooking fuel and cash income. The second outcome measure from
Afrobarometer on individual tax support clusters around the mean with a variation
of one category.12 The treatment indicator of producer prices has a high standard
deviation (SD), which corresponds to the regional differences indicated in Figure 2.1b.
Only the minority of individuals in the considered surveys (approx. 40%) lives in
democratic regimes, which gives rise to expectations that there is substantial room for
favoritism.
Figure 2.1a provides an overview of the main outcome variable poverty and indi-
cates strong concentrations of poverty in Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, and
Senegal. However, there is a high level of subnational variation, which I will examine
in the analysis. Similarly, Figure 2.1b indicates that the main treatment indicator of
local producer prices varies on a regional level, where particularly high values occur in
Western Africa, potentially related to the spike in cocoa prices.13
Leader birth regions are depicted in Figure 2.2a. In contrast to widespread percep-
tions that African politics is characterized by long-term autocratic regimes, there is a
distinct degree of variation within countries. For instance, three leader changes took
place in Mali and Ghana, while there were two in Nigeria – all linked to changes in
12Tax support was measured via the approval of the statement “The tax department always has
the right to make people pay taxes.”
13I consider the temporal variation of the variable in more detail, when examining potential spurious
time trends in Section 2.4.2.
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Figure 2.2 Leader Birth Regions and Coethnicity
a) Leader Birth Regions b) Coethnics of Leader
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Dreher et al. (2016), Afrobarometer (2018) and own data
collection.
Note: Averages across regions and time.
Table 2.1 Descriptives – Main Variables
N Mean SD Max Min
Poverty Index 175,394 10.7 4.8 25.0 0.0
Tax support 145,141 3.7 1.2 5.0 1.0
Producer Price Index 175,394 2.3 5.0 36.8 0.0
Leader Region 175,394 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.0
Leader Ethnicity 126,317 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.0
Democracy 175,394 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.0
Age 173,325 37.0 14.6 130.0 0.0
Education 174,877 2.4 1.0 4.0 1.0
Urban Residence 174,514 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.0
Note: Survey items on tax support and ethnicity were not collected across all rounds.
the corresponding birth region. Several other countries at least observed one leader
change linked to distinct birth regions. Beyond local favoritism, the data by Dreher
et al. (2016) also consider ethnic affiliations. The underlying groups can be linked to
data on individuals’ ethnicity from Afrobarometer rounds 3 to 6. For the ethnic groups
also some distinct within-country variation can be observed, which ranges up to three
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different groups in Nigeria (Ijaw, Fulani and Yoruba). For an overview on the leaders
and ethnic groups considered please refer to Appendix Tables B.3 and B.4.
Although there is a strong positive correlation between leaders’ birth regions and
sharing the leaders’ ethnicity, Table 2.1 and Appendix Figure B.1 indicate that a consid-
erable fraction of the leaders’ coethnics live in other provinces.14 Similarly, a substantial
number of other ethnicities reside in the home region of the leader. First, this makes
targeting via public goods less viable due to segregation. Second, it underlines the
importance of distinguishing regional and ethnic affiliation more carefully.
Further control variables along with the underlying data sources and a balance test
are provided in 2.A.1.
2.4 Empirical Approach
2.4.1 Model
The outcome of the analysis is the individual poverty indicator, which was presented
in the previous section. The main hypothesis is that producer prices have a differential
impact on the gains from commodity trade contingent on ethnic or regional political
affiliation. I conceptualize this in the following empirical model:
(2.2)
𝑊𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑡 × 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑡 × 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑡
× 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑡 × 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑡 × 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡 +𝑋𝑖𝛽9 + 𝜃𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜅𝑐𝑟 × 𝑡+ 𝜖𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡,
where 𝑊𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the welfare indicator of an individual 𝑖 in country-region 𝑐𝑟 in period
𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑡 is the corresponding producer price index in country-region 𝑐𝑟 and period 𝑡.
The producer prices are interacted with 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑡, which is a binary indicator whether
a country-region 𝑐𝑟 is the leader birth region in period 𝑡, and with 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡, being a
dichotomous variable, which is one if the respondent 𝑖 shares the ethnicity of country 𝑐’s
leader in period 𝑡. As the temporal variation comes from global commodity prices, the
changes are arguably exogenous with regard to local conditions in subnational localities,
especially, when conditioning on country-period fixed effects. However, in order to
increase efficiency, all regressions account for individual covariates 𝑋𝑖 related to poverty,
e.g., age, education, gender and rural/urban residence.15 Furthermore, all specifications
include country-period fixed effects, 𝜃𝑐𝑡, survey round fixed effects, 𝛾𝑠, and country-
region fixed effects, 𝜅𝑐𝑟.16 The latter control for all time-invariant regional factors
14In the underlying sample the correlation coefficient of residence in the leader birth region and
sharing the leader ethnicity is 0.2214.
15Beyond individual factors, regional time-variant covariates (e.g., climatic shocks) will have a
distinct influence on poverty. As those indicators are not available for all region-period observations
(which would lead to a loss of more than 25% of observations), I add those covariates step by step.
Results remain qualitatively unchanged.
16Due to multiannual survey rounds it is possible to use them along country-period fixed effects.
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including the initial production capacity. Although the rich set of control variables
and fixed effects reduce endogeneity concerns partly, I consider potential identification
issues more carefully in the following section.
2.4.2 Endogeneity
A first and apparent concern arises with regard to endogeneity of local producer prices.
First, both local prices and poverty could be subject to a third unmeasured variable
(e.g., remoteness from markets). Second, poverty itself could influence local produc-
tion capacities due to reduced investments in inputs, including fertilizers or pesticides.
Third, although local price data are becoming increasingly available due to the spread
of mobile devices, a broad and unbiased provision of these data across countries is not
yet guaranteed. Especially, data from poorer regions could be of worse quality because
of the lower provision of mobile technology, inducing correlations in the measurement
error between dependent and independent variables.
In order to reduce these concerns, I considered for the local producer price index
(PPI), global price changes interacted with local production capacities as suggested
by McGuirk and Burke (2017).17 The measure resembles a Bartik instrument. Bartik
(1991) interacted cross-sectional industry shares with aggregate industry growth to de-
rive an instrument to study exogenous effects on the labor market. A further prominent
application is the interaction of Chinese exports volume with cross-sectional industry
exposure to imports from China to examine the “China Shock” on US manufacturing
(Autor et al., 2013).18
Bartik shift-share instruments resemble a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach
by interacting a global time-series (here prices) with cross-sectional variation (here
regional production capacities). Considering the initial production capacities in the
year 2000 rather than taking contemporary values, reduces the concern of regional pro-
duction capacities being endogenous to contemporary regional poverty. This way, the
approach comes closer to interacting two exogenous variables as suggested by Christian
and Barrett (2017). Analogous to a DiD setting the identification via global prices would
be invalidated if systematically different pre-treatment trends in the outcome variable
exist among high and low production capacity regions. Due to the interactive nature
of the shift-share treatment, no pre-treatment period exists, which precludes a formal
test. Instead, I conduct a graphical analysis of trends in the global price treatment and
in the outcome across groups with different crop-specific production capacities. Here,
a secular non-linear trend in global prices that would be more similar to the changes
in poverty among high or low production capacity regions would be problematic, as it
could be driven by a third omitted global parameter. Potential factors are global cli-
17Robustness to excluding crops of potential price makers, defined as ≥ 1% of world exports, in
Appendix Table B.13 reduces concerns that subsequent results are driven by endogenously determined
global prices.
18Further applications of Bartik instruments can be found in Nunn and Qian (2014), Bluhm et al.
(2016), Dreher and Langlotz (2017), and Ballard-Rosa et al. (2017).
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Figure 2.3 Cash Crop Trends
Cocoa Coffee Cotton
Tea Tobacco
Note: Prices and land use correspond to the specific crop under observation. Biannual periods start
in July 1999.
Source: Author’s calculation based on Monfreda et al. (2008), IMF (2018), World Bank (2018b) and
Afrobarometer (2018).
mate change or the financial crisis 2007/08 and its repercussions, including food price
speculation. However, Figure 2.3 shows no evidence for systematically different trends
across groups, increasing confidence in the estimation approach.
In this setting, one might be concerned that the power status of regions and eth-
nic groups might be endogenous. For instance, powerful regions might differ on some
other unobserved factor than power status. More specifically, the local population
might have better technologies to derive rents from crops. Recent research indicates a
strong relationship between historical emergence of ethnic groups as well as agricultural
technologies and institutions (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Michalopoulos, 2012; Giu-
liano and Nunn, 2018). Regional fixed effects would pick up these historical patterns,
but do not consider time-variant interactive effects, e.g., regarding access to transport
infrastructure. Therefore, I add control variables 𝑌𝑐𝑟𝑡 to the regression that could be
significantly related to ethnic power status and interact those with the treatment 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑡
as in Baranov et al. (2017). According to the previous literature this factors include
regional prosperity and infrastructure (Burgess et al., 2015; Alesina et al., 2016). What
is more, under certain conditions the interaction of an exogenous factor with an en-
dogenous factor can be interpreted as conditionally exogenous, following Nizalova and
Murtazashvili (2016):
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Figure 2.4 Trends in Producer Prices and Trends in Poverty across Power Status
a) Birth Regions b) Ethnic Groups
Note: As Afrobarometer only includes data on ethnic affiliation starting from round 3, Figure 2.4
only starts in 2005 (period 10).
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Dreher et al. (2016) IMF (2018), World Bank (2018b) and
Afrobarometer (2018).
First, the potentially endogenous constituent term needs to be included in the set of
explanatory variables. In my setting, this would correspond to the leader birth region
and leader ethnicity, which are both parts of Equation 2.2. Second, the potentially
endogenous factor (regional and ethnic power status) must be independent from the
treatment (producer prices). Especially in autocratic regimes, it is a concern that
regions or ethnic groups use economic rents to get into the presidential office. The
theory does not provide any clear guidance on the timing of economic rents and its
translation into political power. Therefore, I would ideally like to test different lag
structures to rule out that power status is determined by crop prices. As Afrobarometer
only provides repeated cross sections with periodical gaps between 1999 and 2015, the
data preclude such a fine-grained test. Instead, I regress the future power status of a
region or of an ethnicity on contemporary producer price changes. Based on this rough
test, Appendix Table B.17 provides no evidence for a systematic pattern.
Third, independence must also hold for potentially omitted factors correlated with
the power status. Specifically, it would be an issue if non-linear poverty trends in the
powerful/-less group would be more similar to the trends of the cash crop price index.
In this case the identifying assumptions would be violated, and a spurious trend rather
than a causal mechanism might drive the correlation between outcome and treatment.
I address this by graphically comparing trends of poverty across ethnicities or regions
that were at least one period affiliated to a political leader vis-à-vis groups with no
affiliation. Figures 2.4a and 2.4b do not indicate that one of the trends for ethnic and
regional groupings would be more similar to the trend in global price changes. Although
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graphical analysis reduces concerns that a spurious non-linear trend of poverty and
global prices causes the result further empirical analysis will address this potential
issue via a placebo and permutation exercise. While the placebo tests if the statistical
relationship holds before and after the leader is in power, the permutation exercise sets
the hypothesized mechanism inactive via randomizing the treatments across regions
and individuals. In both cases, results would turn insignificant if political biases in
gains from trade drive results.
2.5 Results
In order to get a first notion about the differential effects regarding favoritism on poverty
reduction via agricultural trade, Table 2.2 introduces the concepts of regional and ethnic
favoritism in separate regressions as well as via a triple interaction based on Equation
2.2. In column (1) an interaction of the producer price index (PPI) with the leader birth
region (local favoritism) is introduced, whereas column (2) accounts for an interaction
of PPI with the leader’s ethnicity (ethnic favoritism).19 Finally, column (3) considers
a combination of both concepts.
Table 2.2 Different Types of Favoritism – Baseline Results
Dep. Variable: Poverty Index of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 -0.017 0.017 0.004 -0.120 -0.387 1.022
(0.045) (0.072) (0.074) (0.109) (0.320) (0.960)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) -0.041 -0.013 -0.023 -0.012 0.001
(0.037) (0.040) (0.042) (0.067) (0.076)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.040*** -0.026** -0.025** -0.026* -0.029**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.079** -0.086** -0.115** -0.124**
(0.037) (0.036) (0.045) (0.050)
𝑁 171872 124320 124320 114566 75873 75873
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡: No No No Yes Yes Yes
𝐿𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑡−1: No No No No Yes Yes
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡: No No No No No Yes
Note: Only the main interactions are displayed for brevity. All regressions include country-period,
survey round and regional (province) level fixed effects. All models include individual control variables.
Standard errors clustered by region and by country-period in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05,
*** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Although signs are partly negative, Table 2.2 reveals no significant relationship of
19As information on individuals’ ethnicity is only available in survey rounds 3-6, the number of
observations is reduced when considering this factor.
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the PPI and individual poverty in the first row. On the one hand, this might be at-
tributable to the aforementioned low productivity in agriculture. On the other hand,
political biases might play a role, which I examine in terms of the interactions of the
PPI with ethnic and regional affiliations. In this regard, column (1) indicates a nega-
tive conditional correlation between higher producer prices and poverty in the leader
region, which is insignificant though. The insignificance contrasts previous findings on
the preferential treatment of the leader’s birth region (Bates and Block, 2010). How-
ever, due to the intra-regional ethnic heterogeneity (see Appendix Figure B.1), policy
makers might target supporters rather individually along ethnic lines. Column (2) tests
this notion empirically by interacting the producer price index with individual ethnic
identity. Now the coefficient is both negative and statistically significant, indicating
a favorable effect of price shocks for coethnic individuals. This finding indicates the
relevance of distinguishing ethnic and regional affiliation, but raises the question of
how leaders target their coethnics in order to favorably distribute the gains from trade.
Column (3) adds for this reason a further interaction term, which now considers the
interplay between regional and ethnic affiliation and reveals additional gains for coeth-
nics that live in the leader region. A one standard deviation (SD) increase in the local
producer price treatment would correspond to a decline in the poverty index by 0.11
SD for a coethnic respondent, residing in the leader birth region.
This might be driven by geographical proximity to policy makers, which increases
political clout. What is more, a higher concentration of coethnics facilitates targeting
(Ejdemyr et al., 2018). However, as column (3) indicates an insignificant interaction
between localized prices and residence in the leader region, this targeting would be
exclusionary. This does not correspond to the provision of public goods like wells,
roads or ports as there is no evidence for significant spill-overs to people from other
ethnicities in leaders’ birth regions.20
Column (4) considers this explanation more specifically by adding a further interac-
tion of the localized price indicator with local infrastructure characteristics, including
travel time to the nearest urban center, ports, the road network and distance to capi-
tal.21 However, adding those interacted infrastructure and remoteness measures leaves
the pattern unchanged. Due to the time invariant nature of the variables, part of the
temporal dynamic is, yet, not considered. For this reason, I add in column (5) the
first lag of nightlights as a crude proxy of time-variant economic infrastructure. While
20Several articles (including Dube and Vargas (2013), Berman and Couttenier (2015) and McGuirk
and Burke (2017)) suggest a causal relationship between commodity prices and armed conflict. A
decrease in the PPI causes an increase in conflict also in the underlying sample. Beyond human loss,
conflict can have severe consequences for economic poverty by destroying human and physical capital.
Differential effects of conflict can be expected as policy makers might deploy security personnel along
ethnic and regional lines to protect supporters. I close this channel by including the number of battle
related deaths as a further control variable in Appendix Table B.20. While the coefficients for conflict
are generally insignificant, the main findings regarding ethnic biases are robust.
21Appendix Table B.5 indicates that the latter three are significantly related with either the share of
coethnics among respondents or the leader birth region dummy. Thus, controlling for the interactions
with the treatment both closes a channel and reduces omitted variable bias.
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the general pattern remains unchanged, controlling for infrastructure characteristics
even increases the absolute coefficient size and suggests stronger ethnic biases.22 Public
goods allocation, therefore, does not explain the differential gains from trade.
Another potential explanation for the results could be that powerful groups occupy
farmland with better climatic conditions and indeed Appendix Table B.5 indicates
that coethnics of the leader rather reside in cooler areas with less rainfall. Adding
these climatic controls increases in absolute terms, if anything, the differential effect for
coethnic people in the leader birth region as indicated by column (6). A one SD increase
in the PPI would imply a 0.16 SD reduction in the poverty index. As commodity prices
also determine multi-dimensional poverty in the long term via investments in children’s
health or education, long term effects could be much larger (Cogneau and Jedwab,
2012). Thus, the estimates arguably constitute a lower bound.
2.5.1 Channels and Heterogeneities
If public good provision does not explain the pattern found, the question remains what
are the drivers of ethnic biases in agricultural trade? As discussed in Sections 2.1 and
2.2, policy makers might choose to target farmers individually via taxes or subsidies
analogous to the Malawian case.23 Unfortunately, data on tax collection are very limited
in African countries, and no cross-country data on the subnational level are available.
Nonetheless, Afrombarometer’s survey data allow me to proxy this channel in terms of
the support for taxation via the question “For each of the following statements, please
tell me whether you disagree or agree: The tax authorities always have the right to
make people pay taxes.” Although this is a crude proxy and results are only suggestive,
it is fair to assume that a favorable treatment would also improve individual perceptions
to contribute to public finance.24
Table 2.3 considers in this respect individual tax support as an outcome and intro-
duces regional and ethnic affiliation measures step by step. Columns (1) and (2) depict
no statistically significant coefficients. These null findings might correspond to the am-
biguous predictions in the literature on ethnic and regional favoritism in agricultural
trade and stress the importance of distinguishing the two concepts more clearly. Thus, I
consider in column (3) again the interaction of the two concepts. Coefficients suggest on
average a negative effect of producer prices on tax support for respondents that are not
coethnic and reside in the leader region, while this effect is neutralized for coethnics in
the leader region. This is also in line with further urban-rural heterogeneities. Results
in Appendix Table B.9 suggest that the largest gains occur for coethnic rural residents
22One might be concerned that nightlights would be by definition endogenous as they are frequently
also used as a measure of economic prosperity (Henderson et al., 2012). Regression results from
Appendix Table B.18 reveal that nightlights are not immediately affected by agricultural producer
price shocks. Moreover, using lagged values alleviates the endogeneity concern further.
23Taxes and subsidies refer here not only to transfers in the classical sense, but also to indirect
taxation/subsidies in terms of guaranteed producer prices.
24Tax support provides a notion if individuals feel treated differentially. This is also underlined by
the heterogeneous effects on measures of perceived inequality and poverty in Appendix Table B.6.
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Table 2.3 Channels – Tax Support
Dep. Variable: Support of taxes of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2) (3)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 -0.0264* -0.0222 -0.0234
(0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0166)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) -0.0173 -0.0405**
(0.0174) (0.0168)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.0020 -0.0037
(0.0020) (0.0023)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) 0.0393***
(0.0125)
𝑁 142927 117619 117619
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional
(province) level fixed effects as well as individual control variables analogous
to columns (1) to (3) in Table 2.2. Standard errors clustered by region and by
country-period in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
in the leader birth region, while I find poverty increasing though insignificant effects for
the remaining rural population in the leader birth region. This is not in line with public
goods provision, but corresponds to a more exclusive individual targeting. Thus, results
on ethnic biases in trade are distinct from previous findings on windfall gain-induced
regional public goods provision. While adding a comparable mineral producer price
treatment in Appendix Table B.7 leaves main results unchanged, the robustness test
confirms regional favoritism due to mineral resources in line with Hodler and Raschky
(2014). In contrast, local communities and coethnics are not among the beneficiaries
of mineral revenues.
Disentangling the two concepts of ethnic and regional affiliation does partly reconcile
the previously found ambiguity between Kasara’s (2007) coethnic tax discrimination
and Bates and Block’s (2010) prediction of favoritism.25
One highly relevant question for public policy is, how to reduce these biases. There
is a broad consensus in the literature that institutional change introduces checks and
balances, which limit the discretionary power of political leaders (North, 1991; Hodler
and Raschky, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015). I test this notion empirically by interacting
the main terms of interest with a binary indicator, which equals one if the national
25Beyond Kasara’s (2007) focus on regional affiliation (to examine ethnic linkages), her data focus on
the pre-2000 period. Agricultural distortions were more prevalent during this period (Anderson et al.,
2013). I also tested this notion by regressing nominal rates of protection and agricultural distortions
from IFPRI (2013) on the interactions of interest. Results were inconclusive and are available upon
request.
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regime is democratic and zero if it is autocratic.26
Table 2.4 Heterogeneous Effects across Regime Types
Dep. Variable: Poverty Index of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2) (3)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 -0.6989 1.1062 0.9892
(0.9182) (1.0166) (0.9426)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (1) -0.1792*** -0.2093 -0.2387***
(0.0215) (0.2445) (0.0480)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) 0.2002 0.7811
(0.5520) (0.6120)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (1) -0.2726 -0.7958
(0.5496) (0.6119)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.0908*** -0.0657***
(0.0243) (0.0213)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) × 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (1) 0.0713*** 0.0644**
(0.0015) (0.0309)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.2400***
(0.0501)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) × 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (1) 0.1443*
(0.0796)
𝑁 115662 75873 75873
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional (province) level fixed
effects as well as control variables from column (6) in Table 2.2. Standard errors clustered by
region and by country-period in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Two main findings can be drawn from Table 2.4. First, while in autocracies respon-
dents that are neither coethnics nor reside in the leader’s birth region experience no
reduction in poverty if prices for goods in their region rise, columns (1) and (3) indicate
that this would be the case in democratic systems. On the one hand, this points to
rent extraction and a neglect of politically unimportant regions in autocracies. On the
other hand, this could be driven by previous findings that democracies are generally
also more open to trade (Aidt and Gassebner, 2010). Second, while the interactions
of the PPI and leader ethnicity suggest a bias towards coethnics, especially for those
residing in the leader-region, democracy seems to decrease biases as indicated by the
positive regime type interactions. Therefore, the results indicate, in line with previous
literature, that democracies can reduce biases in gains from trade and provide some
further support that the pattern found in this study is driven by political discretion.
26I prefer this interaction due to comparability of the sample over a sample split. However, inter-
pretation of triple interactions is non-trivial. Therefore, I also estimated a model using sample splits.
Results are robust and estimates are displayed in Table B.16.
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2.5.2 Robustness
Several articles indicate the emergence of ethnicities along agricultural specialization
and stress in this regard the unequal distribution of agricultural skills and economic
power (Michalopoulos, 2012; Alesina et al., 2016; Giuliano and Nunn, 2018). Although
nightlights in column (5) of Table 2.2 partly account for the unequal distribution of
economic activity, it is worthwhile to consider more carefully that certain ethnic groups
might be both more prosperous and get a hold on political power, e.g., via networks.
There is indeed a vast literature that stresses the role of ethnic groups for international
trade (e.g., Rauch and Trindade (2002) on Chinese trading networks). Aker et al.
(2014) demonstrate that the transport costs induced by the inter-ethnic language border
between the Hausa and Zarma groups in Niger would be comparable to the inter-
national border between Niger and Nigeria. Iwanowsky (2018) generalizes this notion
for intra-African trade, indicating that minorities from the same ethnic group would
facilitate cross-border trade. Similarly, business networks might be structured around
ethnic lines and allow coethnics better access to market opportunities and inputs like
credit (Fafchamps, 2000). If ethnic networks or another omitted factor would be the
explanation for the differential gains from trade, the pattern should also persist before
and after groups gain access to the presidential post. As suggested by Bommer et al.
(2018), I test this via a placebo test in Table 2.5, which considers, instead of recent
affiliation, previous and future affiliation with the leader. If previous pattern would
not be linked to the power status, coefficients should turn insignificant. The results
in columns (2) and (3) indicate no significant relationship between the placebos and
disproportional gains from agricultural trade for coethnic respondents. Thus, results
provide further evidence that previous pattern is driven by political power structures.
Table 2.5 Robustness – Placebo Test
Dep. Variable: Poverty Index of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2) (3)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 -0.6534 0.6839 0.5764
(0.9575) (0.9749) (0.8736)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) 0.0501 0.0642
(0.0401) (0.0567)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.0062 -0.0176
(0.0196) (0.0205)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) 0.0110
(0.0253)
𝑁 115662 76919 76919
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional (province)
level fixed effects as well as control variables from column (6) in Table 2.2. Standard
errors clustered by region and by country-period in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, **
𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
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Considering the cautionary note by Christian and Barrett (2017), I apply a further
robustness test to assess if my results are driven by a spurious relationship. In a
permutation test, I randomize the treatment variables PPI and leader ethnicity 500
times, but keep the outcome (poverty) fixed. If differential exposure to local producer
prices and ethnic affiliation would indeed affect poverty, I should not expect to find the
pattern when the causal mechanisms are set non-operational by randomization. More
intuitively, if a cocoa growing region in Nigeria in 2011 is assigned the PPI from a
non-cultivatable Sudanese strip of the Sahara, producer prices should not contribute to
poverty declines. Similarly, if a respondent from the Yao ethnicity is treated in 2008 as
a coethnic of Malawi’s president Bingu wa Mutharika, who was in fact from the Lomwe
ethnicity, the pattern of coethnic biases should not materialize. Appendix Figure B.2
reveals that the baseline coefficient of 𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) is among the top 1% of
poverty reducing estimates. Thus, I do not find evidence for political biases in gains
from trade if the hypothesized mechanism is set inactive. This reduces concerns that
the main pattern is driven by a spurious trend.
The pattern of ethnic biases is also robust to the exclusion of price makers (Ap-
pendix Table B.13), outliers in terms of countries and years (Table B.15) as well as a
“leave-one-out” analysis of the specific commodities of the price index (Appendix Table
B.12). Further, Appendix Table B.11 tests for robustness considering an indicator on
respondents’ perceived honesty as the sensitive nature of political biases could compro-
mise data quality systematically (Adida et al., 2016). The pattern remains qualitatively
unchanged. Finally, results remain robust when I modify the treatment variable (e.g., a
broader producer price basket in Appendix Table B.8) or when I use a binary outcome
variable instead of the continuous index (Appendix Table B.10).
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Agriculture could theoretically contribute strongly to inclusive growth due to its large
employment level and Africa’s rich endowment with soils suitable for cash crops. How-
ever, research stresses that structural change and productivity growth are still fairly
limited (McMillan et al., 2014; Barrett et al., 2017). The domestic political economy
in African countries imposes strong distortions on agricultural markets (Lipton, 1977;
Anderson et al., 2013). Predictions in the literature of the outcomes are, however, am-
biguous. Bates and Block (2009) argue that coethnics are favored if a policy maker
from a rural region comes to power. Kasara (2007) suggests a contradicting pattern,
where coethnic farmers would be taxed more heavily due to limited political competi-
tion and higher monitoring capacities of coethnics. However, those former studies could
not sufficiently account for regional and individual ethnic divisions. This just recently
became possible due to the availability of high-resolution georeferenced data. Linking
geographic information on leader birth regions and local producer price indices with
Afrobarometer survey data from 33 African countries, I examine the hypotheses more
carefully.
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I find that coethnics disproportionally benefit from higher prices for commodities
that can be produced in their region, while other groups in the same region do not
benefit significantly. This suggests individual targeting rather than more general pub-
lic goods provision. Indeed, controlling for infrastructure provision does not alter the
findings. A placebo test supports the notion that this is indeed driven by political
factors and not by some spurious correlation of more agriculturally skilled groups being
also more likely to come to power. I provide some suggestive evidence that discrimina-
tory tax regimes might drive results. In line with previous arguments that institutional
change would improve agricultural productivity (Bates and Block, 2013), further econo-
metric analysis suggests that democratic institutions can reduce, though not completely
offset, these political biases. The example of discretionary fertilizer voucher distribution
under president Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi stresses that these political biases might
persist even in democracies. Persisting clientelism can be attributed to the challenge
of making credible commitments in young democracies (Keefer, 2007).
As success stories of African agricultural growth can be found in not fully demo-
cratic, hybrid regimes (e.g., the coffee industry in Rwanda), further research could shed
some light on the question which specific economic and political institutions are effec-
tive in curbing ethnic biases in gains from trade. What is more, an interesting route
for research is provided by the linkages of distinct ethnic groups, as Dickens (2018)
indicates that patronage networks can include several affiliated ethnicities.
Finally, one main caveat of this study remains. The main outcomes rely on self-
reported poverty assessments and perceptions due to the scarcity of data that provide
better quantifiable metrics (e.g., expenditures, tax burden) along with information on
individual ethnic affiliation. Future research could contribute to a more thorough un-
derstanding of the suggested pattern, once more data become available.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Data Appendix




Round 1: 1999-2000 Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nige-
ria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Round 2: 2002-2004 Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zim-
babwe
Round 3: 2005-2006 Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Round 4: 2008-2009 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho,
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Round 5: 2011-2013 Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagas-
car, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swazi-
land, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Round 6: 2014-2015 Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Table B.2 Data Sources
Variable Name Description Years
Available
Source
Tax Support Support for tax collection: (1) “Strongly
Disagree.” to (5) “Strongly Agree.”
2002-2015 Afrobarometer
(2018)
Poverty Aggregate of five individual poverty assess-




Leader Ethnicity Information on leader’s ethnicity combined
with information on individual ethnicity
from Afrobarometer Round 3-5: “What is
your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cul-
tural group.”





Gender, Age, Education, Urban/Rural. 1999-2015 Afrobarometer
(2018)
PPI/CPI Self-constructed index of agricultural pro-
ducer and consumer prices using prices and
land use data.




Democracy Binary variable if country has free & fair
elections with peaceful turnovers.
1980-2015 Based on Bjørnskov
and Rode (2018)
Leader Binary indicator if administrative region
was the leader birth region.
1980-2015 Based on Dreher
et al. (2016)
Total Road Length Length of all roads in the administrative
region measured in kilometers.
1992-2015 Data in Space
(2018)
Precipitation Precipitation data based on observational
and satellite data.
1980-2013 Adler et al. (2003)
& Tollefsen et al.
(2012)
Temperature Means of monthly global land surface tem-
peratures.




Distance to capital Distance to capital in kilometers. 1980-2014 Tollefsen et al.
(2012)
Travel Time Travel time to most proximate urban cen-
ter.




Boundaries of subnational administrative
divisions.
1980-2015 Hijmans et al.
(2012)
Control variables on climate, population density, and ethnic exclusion were obtained
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from the PRIO grid (Tollefsen et al., 2012). The regional development indicators dataset
provides information on oil fields and local road density (Data in Space, 2018). For a
further description of the variables and the respective sample years and sources consult
Table B.2. Individual socio-economic control variables are from Afrobarometer (2018).27
Producer and Consumer Price Indices are constructed by myself along the lines of
McGuirk and Burke (2017). The Producer Price Index is based on price data from
the IMF (2018) and the World Bank (2018b). As described in Section 2.3, prices
are multiplied with regional weights on the harvested area and potential yield for the
corresponding crop based on Monfreda et al. (2008).28 For the consumer price index,
regional weights are substituted with country-level caloric shares of crops from FAO’s
“Food Balance” sheets (FAO, 2018). The producer commodities include: cocoa, coffee,
tea, tobacco, and cotton. For consumers, I consider prices of cocoa, coconuts, coffee,
groundnuts, maize, palm oil, olives, oranges, rice, sorghum, soybeans, sugar, sunflowers,
tea, and wheat.
27Education is measured in four categories, where 1=No formal schooling; 2=Primary; 3=Sec-
ondary; 4=Post-secondary.
28Data from Mofreda, Ramankutty and Foley can be accessed via http://www.earthstat.org/data-
download.
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2.A.2 Analytical Appendix
Figure B.1 Regional and Ethnic Affiliation of Respondents
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Dreher et al. (2016) and Afrobarometer (2018).
Note: “Eth.” and “Reg.” refer to ethnic and regional affiliation respectively.
Balance Test Table B.5 presents coefficients from regressions of outcome variables
on the dichotomous indicators of leader ethnicity or birth region. The balance test re-
veals that regional affiliation is indeed correlated with the road and port infrastructure.
Regions with a higher share of coethnics are closer to the capital, had in previous peri-
ods a higher light output (proxying economic infrastructure) and face different climatic
conditions (e.g., temperature and rainfall are lower). These unbalanced covariates are
considered in columns (4)-(6) of Table 2.2.
Table B.5 Balance Test – Leader Birth Region & Leader Ethnicity
Leader Birth Region p-value Leader Ethnicity p-value
Travel Time -8.993 0.721 28.628 0.224
Cap. Dist. 12.621 0.597 -112.836 0.000
Road km 1,933.669 0.001 589.642 0.305
Ports 0.177 0.077 -0.067 0.538
log(lights) in 1999 0.067 0.175 0.124 0.003
log(lights) in t-1 0.006 0.906 0.069 0.074
Temperature 0.027 0.948 -4.080 0.000
Precipitation 3.015 0.843 -64.047 0.000
Note: Comparison of coefficients for different indicators of leader affiliation.
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Table B.6 Inequality & Poverty Perceptions






𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) -0.0054 0.0043*
(0.0092) (0.0022)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) 0.0069*** 0.0005
(0.0023) (0.0005)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) 0.0156** -0.0042**
(0.0070) (0.0020)
𝑁 120728 124320
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional
(province) level fixed effects as well as individual control variables described in
Section 2.4.1. Standard errors clustered by region and by country-period in
parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Perceived Inequality / Poverty The results on tax support in Table 2.3 would
correspond to a setting where respondents are aware of their differential treatment. In
order to test this more specifically Table B.6 provides results for the item “In general,
how do you rate: Your living conditions compared to those of other countrymen.”
Results are generally in line with the main pattern of ethnic biases in poverty reduction
and once more underline that individuals also feel relatively deprived. These grievances
can undermine societal stability, leading to conflict (see for instance, Cederman et al.,
2015). However, further assessment of this hypothesis is left for further research.
Mineral commodities As indicated in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, mineral resources could
have a very different effect on individual poverty vis-à-vis agriculture. Theoretically
one would expect less inclusive effects as extraction is less intensive in labor. I test this
hypothesis empirically estimating a regression analogous to column (6) in Table 2.2,
but adding to the specification a localized mineral commodity price treatment along
with the corresponding interaction terms. In line with Berman et al. (2017), I consider
platinum, copper, aluminum, gold, iron, lead, silver, tin, zinc, and nickel. The localized
mineral commodity price treatment was constructed by interacting global mineral prices
(based on data by the IMF (2018) and the World Bank (2018b)) with a binary indicator,
whether the specific resource is mined in this region (based on Data in Space (2018)).
For easier comparability, I depict the coefficients for the agricultural and mineral price
treatment from one regression in columns (1) and (2) of Table B.7. Coefficient size of
point estimates in Table B.7 is not directly comparable across agricultural and mineral
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commodities.29 Nonetheless, it is informative to compare signs and significance levels
across columns. There are three takeaways from Table B.7. First, the pattern of ethnic
biases in agricultural commodity trade is robust to the inclusion of localized mineral
price treatments. This further reduces concerns that an important omitted variable
would drive results as agricultural prices might move in parallel to mineral prices (e.g.,
petroleum). Second, the regional mineral price treatment induces, surprisingly, an
increase in poverty. This is also the case for coethnics. Third, results only indicate
poverty reducing effects in the leader birth region. A potential explanation could be
that negative externalities occur locally, while leaders transfer rents to their home
region. A case in point is the Niger delta region, where oil spills caused severe harvest
loss and health hazard (e.g., Idemudia, 2009; Bruederle and Hodler, 2017). In line with
theory, mineral commodity price changes are, hence, linked to a very different pattern
of political distortions.
Table B.7 Agricultural and Mineral Commodities
Dep. Variable: Poverty Index of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2)
Agriculture Mining
𝑃𝑃𝐼 t 0.565 0.003*
(1.049) (0.002)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 t × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 it(1) 0.034 -0.002***
(0.065) (0.001)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 t × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ it(1) -0.026* 0.000*
(0.014) (0.000)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 t × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 it(1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ it(1) -0.152*** 0.001
(0.044) (0.001)
𝑁 75873
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are based on one regression. All regressions
include country-period, survey round and regional (province) level fixed
effects and are structured analogously to column (6) in Table 2.2. Stan-
dard errors clustered by region and by country-period in parentheses.
* 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Prices The assumptions made for the definition of price indices are not arbitrary.
The main part shows results for cash crops. As McGuirk and Burke (2017) also suggest
a broader producer price basket, I extend the producer price index to maize, palm
oil, rice, sorghum, soybean, sugar, and wheat in Table B.8. The pattern remains
qualitatively unchanged, but the coefficient for the interaction with leader ethnicity
turns statistically insignificant. Yet, in all cases 𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟(1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ(1) is
29The former is based on an interaction with a production capacity indicator normalized between
zero and one, whereas the latter considers a dichotomous indicator for the interaction.
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statistically significant. Thus, the main pattern of ethnic favoritism within the leader’s
birth region is also retained when considering a broader basket of producer goods.
Table B.8 Other Price Definitons
Dep. Variable: Poverty Index of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2)




𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) 0.018 0.025
(0.019) (0.089)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) 0.002 -0.024
(0.006) (0.017)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.025** -0.111*
(0.013) (0.061)
𝑁 75873 75873
Country-Period FE: Yes No
Country-Trends: No Yes
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional (province)
level fixed effects and are structured analogously to Column (6) in Table 2.2.
Column (1) applies a broader producer price basket, whereas column (2) includes
consumer prices as a further explanatory variable. Standard errors clustered by
region and by country-period in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Due to the scarcity of data, it is not possible to construct a localized measure of
consumer price volatility in a consistent way for a broader set of countries. However,
as the FAO provides data on national consumption patterns, it is possible to construct





where 𝑃𝑗𝑡 is the price of good 𝑗 in year 𝑡, which is multiplied with 𝐶𝑖𝑗, the share of
product 𝑗 in average calorie consumption of country 𝑖. Column (2) in Table B.8 adds an
interaction with those consumer prices to Equation 2.2. As consumer prices only differ
on the country level, country-period fixed effects are substituted by linear country-level
trends. While the ethnic bias in the leader birth region persists, I do not find significant
heterogeneities for consumer prices.30
Urban-Rural Divide The main analysis of the paper is based on all available respon-
dents in Afrobarometer, as I assume that commodity prices have a comprehensive effect
30Results are available upon request.
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on poverty due to agriculture’s economic salience. As Kasara’s (2007) argumentation
is based on the taxation of farmers, I would ideally like to consider the respondents’
occupation. However, Afrobarometer only provides information on occupation in a
limited subset of rounds (1,2,3,5), and some respondents did refrain from answering.
Therefore, I prefer to work with a slightly broader definition of the urban-rural divide.31
Information on residence in an urban or rural locality is available for the majority of
respondents, and it is fair to assume that in rural regions most of the employment is
related to agriculture. Table B.9 is structured analogous to columns (1) to (3) of Table
2.2, but adds to all terms of interest a further interaction with a binary indicator on
rural residence. Results reveal three main findings. First, there seems to be indeed
a counter-intuitive poverty increasing effect of higher agricultural commodity prices in
rural localities. In line with previous results, poverty among people from other ethnic-
ities would increase if surplus rents are extracted via taxes, while other consumption
prices increase (e.g., food and fuel prices). Second, results provide further evidence on
gains among coethnics, which are more nuanced in the leader’s birth region. Third,
those gains for coethnics center in rural regions. The concentration of gains in rural
regions provides further confidence that results correspond to agricultural production
and not to an unrelated spurious pattern. Overall, I do not find a negative pattern for
coethnics concentrated in the leader region as suggested by Kasara (2007). In line with
Anderson et al. (2013), this could point to a reduced scope for regional taxation via
trade policy measures. As argued before previous results rather suggest an individual
targeting via taxes or subsidies. These findings also add to the literature on the urban
bias (Lipton, 1977). As in most African countries, the majority of farmers does not
share the leader’s ethnicity, the poverty increasing effects for other ethnicities in the
second row would be in line with an existing urban-rural bias. The favorable effects for
coethnic rural populations suggest that individual targeting has the potential to reduce
this gap, but is strongly biased towards political support groups. This can explain, why
agricultural development has so far not reached its full potential for inclusive pro-poor
growth.
31The occupation data are only available for a minority of individuals. Data could be missing
systematically as the hypothesis suggests biases against farmers. Moreover and most importantly, the
limited number of observations would leave only small sub-groups for the analysis, which makes the
estimates prone to outliers (e.g., only 168 farmers in leader birth regions are also coethnics of the
leader).
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Table B.9 Urban-Rural Divide
Dep. Variable: Poverty Index of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2) (3)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 -0.0334 -0.0111 -0.0218
(0.0456) (0.0727) (0.0742)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 (1) 0.0270*** 0.0423*** 0.0387***
(0.0091) (0.0083) (0.0092)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) -0.0380 -0.0413
(0.0343) (0.0453)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 (1) 0.0044 0.0631
(0.0242) (0.0452)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.0197 -0.0077
(0.0156) (0.0148)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 (1) -0.0427** -0.0381*
(0.0179) (0.0222)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.0324
(0.0428)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 (1) -0.0896*
(0.0537)
𝑁 171872 124320 124320
Note: “Rural” is a binary indicator, which equals one for rural and zero for non-rural residence.
All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional (province) level fixed effects as
well as individual controls analogously to Table 2.2 columns (1) to (3). Standard errors clustered
by region and by country-period in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Table B.10 Poverty – Binary Outcome Measure
Dep. Variable: Binary poverty indicator of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.009 -0.048 0.094
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.032) (0.095)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.004*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.012** -0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
𝑁 171872 124320 124320 114566 75873 75873
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional (province) level fixed effects
and are structured analogously to Table 2.2. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure, if the
individual is above or below the median of the poverty index. Standard errors clustered by region and
by country-period in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
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Binary Outcome Variable The specifications in Table B.10 include a binary out-
come variable in the same setting as Equation 2.2. The dependent variable is a dichoto-
mous measure if the individual is above or below the median of the poverty index. The
pattern remains unchanged. Column (6) implies for coethnics residing in the leader
birth region that a one standard deviation increase in producer prices would induce a
8% lower probability to be poor.
Honesty Afrobarometer also includes an item, which indicates whether the inter-
viewer had the impression that the respondent is answering honestly. This might play
a role in the African context, where other studies indicate that coethnicity can influence
response under certain conditions (Adida et al., 2016). As this item is self-reported and,
hence, might also suffer from bias, it is only included for a robustness test. Here, I ei-
ther constrain the sample to respondents, who were considered as honest or interact the
producer price change with the honesty indicator. For the “honest sample” in column
(1) the interaction of 𝑃𝑃𝐼×𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ(1) is negative though insignificant, but the signifi-
cance for the coefficient of ethnic favoritism in the leader birth region is retained. When
considering the interaction of the PPI with the categorical honesty variable of interest
in column (2), both coefficients for ethnic biases are robustly negative and significant.
Table B.11 Robustness – Perceived Honesty




𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) 0.000 0.002
(0.089) (0.076)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.018 -0.029**
(0.017) (0.014)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.144** -0.123**
(0.062) (0.052)
𝑁 60609 75792
“Honest” Subsample: Yes No
Interaction with honesty: No Yes
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional (province)
level fixed effects as well as control variables from column (6) in Table 2.2. Afro-
barometer interviewers report if they perceived the respondent as answering hon-
estly. This measure is either used to constrain the sample or used for interactions.
Standard errors clustered by region and by country-period in parentheses.
* 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
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Randomization Inference (RI) based Permutation Test The main concern with
the underlying identification strategy is that the variation in the global treatment (e.g.,
price changes) might follow a similar secular trend as the outcome variable – the poverty
index. The graphical inspection based on Figures 2.3 and 2.4 provides no indication
that one of the treated groups would follow a differential non-linear trend.
Figure B.2 Randomization Inference – Producer Prices and Coethnicity
a) Producer Price Index b) Leader Coethnicity
Note: Density plot of point estimates from 500 permutation tests analogous to Table 2.2 column (1).
I apply a further robustness test, where the basic idea is to assume uncertainty
about the actual treatment allocation and running a permutation test analogous to R.A.
Fisher’s approach of statistical inference (Young, 2017). The randomization would set
the hypothesized causation de facto inactive. Figure B.2 shows a density distribution
of coefficients for 𝑃𝑃𝐼 t × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ it(1) based on 500 permutation tests, which either
randomly allocate the PPI or leader ethnicity. Randomly allocating producer prices,
Figure B.2b indicates that the coefficient from column (6) of Table 2.2 would be among
the top 1% of most negative coefficients. In the case of randomly allocated leader
coethnicity, the picture is even clearer, where none of the 500 estimated coefficients
would be as small as the original estimate from column (6). Hence, I do not find
the previous pattern of differential effects for coethnic respondents if the hypothesized
mechanism is not active.
Leave-one-(commodity)-out Analysis The literature has indicated strong hetero-
geneities across crops – e.g., some ethnicities might specialize in farming specific com-
modities corresponding to different degrees of labor intensity or vulnerability towards
climatic shocks (see, e.g., Murdock, 1959; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). In order to
reduce susceptibility to one of these relationships, I address this potential caveat via
a “leave-one-out” analysis in Table B.12, where I exclude in each column one of the
respective commodities from the cash crop index.
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The exclusion of cocoa and coffee, which are main cash crops in Cameroon, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda, has some effect on results.
Notably, the coefficient for 𝑃𝑃𝐼 t × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 it(1) becomes statistically significant and
positive, when cocoa is excluded. Moreover, the interaction for 𝑃𝑃𝐼 t × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 it(1) ×
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ it(1) and 𝑃𝑃𝐼 t × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ it(1) become insignificant in columns (1) and (2)
respectively. Yet, the main pattern of disproportionally stronger gains for coethnic
respondents is robust. Coefficients point in the expected direction and either the coeffi-
cient for general ethnic biases or for ethnic biases in the leader birth region is statistically
significant.
Table B.12 Robustness – Leave One Commodity Out
Dep. Variable: Poverty Index of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cocoa Coffee Cotton Tea Tobacco
𝑃𝑃𝐼 3.851 0.830 0.681 1.019 1.080
(2.724) (1.102) (1.199) (0.966) (0.973)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) 0.521*** -0.001 -0.102*** 0.001 -0.001
(0.124) (0.076) (0.038) (0.076) (0.075)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.111*** -0.024 -0.028* -0.029** -0.029**
(0.039) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.163 -0.125** -0.052** -0.124** -0.121**
(0.173) (0.052) (0.026) (0.050) (0.049)
𝑁 75873 75873 75873 75873 75873
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional (province) level fixed
effects as well as control variables from column (6) in Table 2.2. The commodity in the column
head was left out for the estimation of the producer price treatment. Standard errors clustered by
region and by country-period in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Price Makers Readers might be concerned that global commodity prices cannot be
treated as exogenous for the main producers of certain crops. For instance, if farmers in
Ivory Coast – the main exporter of cocoa – are affected by an unrelated poverty shock,
they will be less able to invest in their cocoa plantations. This lowers the harvest in
the subsequent year, which will then again contribute to poverty. Table B.13 addresses
this concern by excluding crops for the construction of the PPI if the country exports
≥ 1% of the global trade volume. Given that African countries are among the main
exporters for several cash crops, this is a fairly conservative robustness check. While
the main effect of ethnic biases in gains from trade is retained in columns (2) and (3),
the interaction with the leader birth region becomes statistically insignificant, but keeps
the expected sign. Thus, the pattern is not driven by the fact that African countries
are potentially price makers at international markets.
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Table B.13 Robustness – Without Price Makers
Dep. Variable: Poverty Index of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2) (3)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 0.292 0.447 0.479
(0.263) (0.274) (0.296)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) -0.095 -0.020
(0.183) (0.172)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.183*** -0.170***
(0.036) (0.040)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.137
(0.126)
𝑁 171872 124320 124320
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional
(province) level fixed effects and are structured analogously to Table 2.2
columns (1) to (3). Standard errors clustered by region and by country-
period in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Susceptibility to outliers Although the pattern is not driven by one specific com-
modity, the possibility remains that one period, country or even region is driving the
results. As there is no formal statistical test to pick outliers, I address this concern by
a graphical analysis in Figure B.3, which plots the PPI against the regional mean of
the outcome variable. Moreover, I consider the statistical leverage in Table B.14.32
Figure B.3 Partial Regression Plots
a) Countries b) Years
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Monfreda et al. (2008), World Bank (2018b) and IMF (2018).
32For this purpose I regress regional means of the poverty index on the PPI and the set of fixed
effects included in all regressions. Subsequently, I obtain the statistical leverage.
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Figure B.3a indicates that Nigerian regions are subject to outliers of PPI and poverty
at both ends of the distribution. What is more, Figure B.3b reveals that there could be
potential outliers in the years 2000, 2005 and 2014. This is potentially problematic as
these observations are at the beginning and end of the time series and could, thus, induce
a correlation with a time trend. Although Nigeria does not feature that frequently in
the top 30 leverage observations, Table B.14 indicates that the observations at the end
of the panel (2014 and 2015) have a high leverage. Those are the sampling years of
the sixth Afrobarometer round and it might be problematic if one survey round would
drive results (though survey round fixed effects partly account for this issue). For this
reason, Table B.15 tests robustness excluding Nigerian respondents in column (1) and
the years 2000, 2005, 2014 and 2015 in column (2). Although the triple interaction in the
fourth row loses statistical significance in column (1), the pattern remains qualitatively
unchanged and the main interaction points to significantly higher poverty reducing
effects for leaders’ coethnics. The robustness test in column (2) corresponds to the
main pattern and indicates that high leverage years do not drive the main results.
Table B.14 Leverage – Top 20 Observations
(1) (2) (3)
Country ADM1 Year
1 Uganda Kampala 2015
2 Gabon Wouleu-Ntem 2015
3 Nigeria Lagos 2003
4 Uganda Bundibugyo 2008
5 Algeria Relizane 2015
6 Gabon Moyen-Ogooué 2015
7 Kenya Isiolo 2014
8 Kenya Samburu 2014
9 Gabon Ogooué 2015
10 Niger Diffa 2013
11 Algeria Tipaza 2015
12 Egypt Bur Sa‘id 2015
13 Tanzania Njombe 2014
14 Kenya Mandera 2014
15 Gabon Nyanga 2015
16 Algeria Mila 2015
17 Uganda Yumbe 2005
18 Egypt Aswan 2015
19 Gabon Haut-Ogooué 2015
20 Kenya Nyamira 2014
Note: Statistical leverage is based on a re-
gression of regional mean poverty on the re-
gional PPI as well as regional, country-period
and survey round fixed effects.
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Table B.15 Robustness – Excluding High Leverage Observations




𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) -0.060 -0.002
(0.052) (0.066)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.046*** -0.042***
(0.012) (0.012)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.071 -0.086
(0.049) (0.068)
𝑁 68847 59418
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional (province)
level fixed effects as well as control variables from column (6) in Table 2.2. Column
(1) excludes Nigerian respondents, column (2) excludes the years 2000, 2005, 2014
and 2015. Standard errors clustered by region and by country-period in parentheses.
* 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Miscellaneous
Table B.16 Heterogeneous Effects across Regime Types – Sample Split




𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.227*** -0.121
(0.046) (0.073)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) 1.399 -0.064
(1.345) (0.084)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.062*** 0.003
(0.021) (0.028)
𝑁 40402 35471
Note: Sample split analogous to column (6) of Table 2.2. Standard errors
clustered by region and by country-period in parentheses.
* 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
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Table B.17 Pre Trends of Power Status and Producer Prices
Dep. Variable: Binary power status of







Note: All regressions include country-period,
survey round and regional (province) level
fixed effects and are structured analogously
to column (6) in Table 2.2. Standard errors
clustered by region and by country-period in
parentheses.
* 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Table B.18 Correlation – Lights & Producer Prices
Log of night light emission in







Note: All regressions include period and regional
(province) level fixed effects. Standard errors clus-
tered by region and by country-period in parenthe-
ses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
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Table B.19 Correlation of Poverty Index and Expenditure
Dep. Variable: Regional average of Poverty Index (0-25)
(1)
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝.𝑐.c,r,t -0.0021*** -0.0017**
(0.0000) (0.0001)
𝑁 75 75
Country FE: No Yes
Year FE: No Yes
Note: Expenditure data are based on Living Standard Mea-
surement Surveys. Standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Table B.20 Robustness – Controlling for Conflict
Dep. Variable: Poverty Index of individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in country 𝑐
(1) (2) (3)
𝐵𝑅𝐷 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
𝐵𝑅𝐷 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) 0.055 0.048 -0.033
(0.049) (0.048) (0.040)
𝐵𝑅𝐷 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) -0.047 -0.053 -0.011
(0.049) (0.034) (0.053)
𝐵𝑅𝐷 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 0.966 1.117 1.060
(0.968) (1.022) (0.952)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) -0.079 -0.001
(0.053) (0.077)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.050*** -0.028**
(0.015) (0.014)
𝑃𝑃𝐼 × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (1) × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡ℎ (1) -0.126**
(0.050)
𝑁 75873 75873 75873
Note: All regressions include country-period, survey round and regional
(province) level fixed effects as well as control variables from column (6) in
Table 2.2. The battle related death count variable is based on Croicu and
Sundberg (2015). Standard errors clustered by region and by country-period
in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
Aid and conflict at the subnational
level
– Evidence from World Bank and
Chinese development projects in
Africa
Joint work with Kai S. Gehring and Melvin H. L. Wong.
Abstract
Using georeferenced data on development projects by the World Bank and China,
we provide a comprehensive analysis of the effect of aid on conflict using fixed
effects and instrumental variables strategies. The results show that aid projects
on average seem to reduce rather than fuel conflict. Our analysis suggests that
this is driven by projects in the transport and financial sectors, and by less lethal
violence by governments against civilians. There are no clear differences based
on ethnic fractionalization and government affiliation of a region, but some in-
dications of spill-overs to other regions. We also find no increased likelihood of
demonstrations, strikes or riots associated, but a higher likelihood of non-lethal
government repression in areas where China is active.
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3.1 Introduction
Development aid has been criticized on several grounds, e.g., for being politicized
(Dreher et al., 2018) or lacking effectiveness (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009). How-
ever, one of the most alarming concerns is the suggestion that aid fuels conflict in the
receiving countries. Nunn and Qian (2014), for instance, show that US food aid leads
to more conflict, by using US wheat production to explain variation in the supply of
food aid. In contrast, Berman et al. (2011) use localized data to document that spe-
cific types of development projects succeed in reducing conflict in Iraq. Generally, the
existing literature on the relationship between aid and conflict is focusing rather on the
macro level (Nielsen et al., 2011; Nunn and Qian, 2014; Bluhm et al., 2016), specific
types of aid (Berman et al., 2011; Crost et al., 2014; Child, 2018), or on a limited subset
of countries (van Weezel, 2015; Crost et al., 2016; Sexton, 2016).
Our paper aims to combine the strength of the existing approaches. We consider
a large set of countries in Africa to draw broader implications, but use subnational
data to link aid projects and conflict events more precisely. This enables us to rule out
concerns about omitted variables and better understand the underlying mechanisms. A
deeper understanding of the impact of development projects is currently of particular
relevance, because fragile, conflict-prone states are described as the “new frontier of
development.”1 In this regard important donors, like the World Bank and the UK, plan
to increase their activities in those countries.
Our study makes three major contributions. First, we cover aid projects in a broad
set of developing countries in all of Africa and are able to assign projects locations to
specific subnational administrative units (Strandow et al., 2011; Strange et al., 2017).
This degree of precision in our dataset allows us to flexibly control for a wide range of
potentially distorting factors through fixed effects, time trends and observable region-
specific factors. To further reduce endogeneity concerns, we also propose an instru-
mental variable strategy that combines spatial variation in the region’s pre-determined
likelihood to receive projects with temporal variation that is exogenous to conflict in
particular regions.
Second, we consider two donors that represent contrasting types of projects and
approaches to development. The World Bank (WB) is a multilateral donor that em-
phasizes scientific expertise and expert knowledge, frequently imposes human-right and
sustainability conditions, and aims not only at growth but also at social and political
improvements in destination countries. China, in contrast, is not a member of the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and often portrayed as a “rogue”
donor (Naím, 2007). China conducts a policy of “non-interference” in the internal affairs
of recipient countries and emphasizes economic “mutual benefits.” In addition, Chinese
economic goals such as securing resource supply are observed as well and might be
incompatible with interests of local communities. It seems plausible to expect that WB
projects are less likely to cause conflict, whereas Chinese engagement is often seen more
1See The Economist (2017), last accessed June 14, 2018.
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critically and accused of fueling conflict and repression (Raleigh et al., 2010). Com-
paring two extreme ends of the spectrum provides a good impression of the underlying
relationship.
Third, we can consider aid projects in various sectors, and distinguish between con-
flict actors and types. In addition, we can exactly identify the regions within countries
where development projects are implemented, and where conflicts take place. We use
data on the spatial distribution of ethnic homelands, which we intersect with the ad-
ministrative regions, and combine with data about the group’s status as belonging to
the governing coalition or not. This allows us, for instance, to measure whether more
aid to regions controlled by the government increases the likelihood of government vi-
olence in non-governing coalition regions. By combining spatial data on development
projects and conflict actors we are, thus, able to also test specific mechanisms.
Using subnational data is, hence, not just a matter of more detail and precision, but
opens the opportunity to better understand and distinguish between different theories.
There are, generally, two main mechanisms emphasized in the literature linking aid to
conflict. On the one hand, the opportunity cost hypothesis claims that higher resources
and the associated revenues, as well as higher incomes, make it less likely that people
join rebel groups or fight (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; McGuirk and Burke, 2017). On the
other hand, resources may be regarded as a price of winning control, and the contest (or
rapacity) theory suggests that a higher price sets an incentive to engage into combat
(e.g., Grossman, 1992). Still, there are several other possible channels besides these
prominent main theories that we describe in more detail below.
To test for a potential effect of aid projects on conflict, we make use of georeferenced
project level data for the WB and China, available due to the efforts of various scholars
(see Strandow et al., 2011; Dreher et al., 2016; Strange et al., 2017) associated with
AidData. With US$ 13.4 bn disbursed in 2014 (World Bank, 2017b), the WB’s for-
eign aid arm “the International Development Association (IDA)” is arguably the most
important multilateral donor organization in the World. At the same time, China is
continually expanding its development and investment activities. Recently, the One
Belt, One Road initiative was prominently and controversially discussed, but China’s
engagement in Africa has started to expand considerably already in the late 1990s.
In order to further establish causality, we use an identification strategy combining
pre-determined cross-sectional variation interacted with a conditionally exogenous time
series (as in Dreher et al., 2017; Bluhm et al., 2018; Gehring and Lang, 2018 and
Lang, 2016). Following Nunn and Qian (2014) and Bluhm et al. (2018), we create
cross-sectional variation by computing the probability that a region receives aid from
a donor. Based on Dreher et al. (2017), we use official information on the World
Bank’s funding position and Chinese excess steel production (World Steel Association,
2014) as temporal variation that is arguably exogenous to conflict in individual region-
years when conditioning on regional and country-year fixed effects. Our results provide
several important insights. Most importantly, the OLS and IV specifications provide no
indication that aid fuels conflict on average. For the World Bank, a 10% increase in aid
even seems to reduce the likelihood of a conflict by up to two percentage points. This
87
Aid and conflict at the subnational level
result becomes insignificant when using an IV specification, however. More surprisingly,
there is also no conflict fueling relationship for Chinese aid on average. The point
estimates are mostly negative, but close to zero and in almost all cases statistically
insignificant.
Starting from these results, we then investigate heterogeneous effects and examine
some hypotheses in more detail. Regarding projects in different sectors, we find a signif-
icant negative relationship between projects in the finance sector (WB only), as well as
in the transportation sector (WB and China). Aid in no sector is related to significantly
more conflict. When considering conflict actors, we find that both WB and Chinese
engagements seem to lead to a reduction in lethal violence by governments against civil-
ians in the respective regions and years. We also find no evidence of a conflict-fueling
effect when considering different levels of aggregation, setting a higher threshold of
battle-related deaths for our conflict indicator, or when using the continuous number
of deaths instead. Additional specifications related to, among others, spill-overs, the
clustering of standard errors, and taking account of ethnic groups expand upon these
main results and are explained in detail in the respective sections.
Subsequently, we examine types of conflicts that might remain overlooked with
our main outcome variable, which is based on the number of battle-related deaths.
Specifically, we consider lower level types of conflict like demonstrations, riots and
strikes, as well as repression used by governments against the population. For both
donors, we find no positive effect on any of the first three measures. We do, however,
find that an increased Chinese engagement leads to an increase in non-lethal government
repression.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature and
outlines proposed theories linking development finance to conflict. Section 3 explains
the data and the corresponding sources, and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4
presents the specification and empirical strategy. Section 5 shows and discusses the
results, and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Existing Literature and theoretical considera-
tions
3.2.1 Literature and theories
Many papers have linked development aid to conflict in different ways. The underly-
ing theories, if spelled out explicitly, however, often make diverse and contradictory
predictions. Generally, aid can be considered as a type of windfall income shock, link-
ing this literature to the larger research field on (resource-related) income shocks and
conflict (e.g., Berman and Couttenier, 2015; Caselli et al., 2015; Morelli and Rohner,
2015; Berman et al., 2017). The literature then proposes two main mechanisms on how
aid affects conflict. The opportunity costs mechanism (e.g., Grossman 1991; McGuirk
and Burke 2017) and the contest model (e.g., Hirshleifer 1989, 1995). The first the-
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ory hypothesizes that with a rise in income the opportunity costs of fighting increase
(McGuirk and Burke, 2017), leading to less conflict on average. Similarly, if aid com-
mitments are withdrawn, e.g., negative aid shocks occur, recipient governments’ ability
to make credible commitments is weakened and citizens’ opportunity costs of engaging
into conflict are reduced (Nielsen et al., 2011; Strange et al., 2017). The contest model,
or rapacity effect, in contrast, predicts that with higher income the potential gains from
fighting increase. This makes fighting more attractive, both for groups as the payoff to
“winning” control increases and for individuals who are offered higher wages for fight-
ing in expectation of higher gains (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Considering aid projects
and conflict in the same unit of observation can reflect both those channels. This is the
main approach of our analysis, resembling Figure 3.1 a.).
Figure 3.1 Scenarios Linking Aid to Conflict
a) b)
c) d)
Source: Authors’ own depiction.
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As suggested above, the distributional dimension is important as conflict in many
African countries is often best characterized as conflict between opposing groups and
coalitions, less often between individuals (Cederman et al., 2009). In many cases, ex-
isting tensions between ethnic groups can be amplified or dampened by foreign aid
projects. Still, the incentives can be very different in regions controlled by the govern-
ment or by ethnic groups that are part of the governing coalition, than in other regions.
To examine a potential contest effect, where groups “fight” for the prize of holding the
government, more accurately, we distinguish between different groups of regions. More
specifically, we distinguish between (i) regions controlled by the government, (ii) those
being composed of ethnic groups that are not part of the ruling coalition, and (iii)
mixed regions.
Aid is usually controlled by the government and can help to undermine the political
power of opposing groups and increase support for the government (Beath et al., 2012).
Crost et al. (2014) suggest that rebel groups sabotaged a large community-driven devel-
opment program in the Philippines anticipating that it might be successful and weaken
support for the rebels. Sexton (2016) shows that aid is associated with increases in
insurgent violence in contested districts. Figure 3.1 b.) shows an example of a specifi-
cation focusing on regions, which are home to ethnic groups with differing power status
and, hence, more likely to be contested. Similarly, we can also restrict the analysis
to government-controlled regions, as Berman et al. (2013) postulate that communities
profit from aid projects only in areas controlled by the government.
Another large strand of the literature revolves around equity questions of local rev-
enues from resources (Morelli and Rohner, 2015). In this regard, the importance of
inter-group grievances is stressed, which would particularly play a role in the ethnically
diverse sub-Saharan African region (Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2011; Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou, 2016). To explore this, we test whether the relationship between
development projects and conflict differs between highly fractionalized and more homo-
geneous regions.
Moreover, intra-country spill-over effects are typically not considered. Aid payments
in one region might not fuel conflict in the region itself, but increase it in other regions.
Again, existing theories provide hypotheses about such a relationship that we can put
to an empirical test. For instance, other research emphasized that aid payments are
largely fungible. This means that governments that receive health aid might cut their
own health expenditures, and use the free funds to bolster military spending. Kishi and
Raleigh (2015) suggest that if a country receives Chinese aid, its military increases its
violence against civilians (including bombing them). Moreover, the government might
use developmental funds to increase its control over minorities’ homelands, which could
induce backlash effects by the “sons of the soil” (Fearon and Laitin, 2011). The same
holds for aid to regions controlled by rebel groups. A higher military capacity by
one conflict party can be used to attack regions controlled by rival groups or mixed
regions that feature both government-related and other groups. At the same time, a
more capable military might make it less likely that the respective other parties dare
to attack. The direction of the net effect is again theoretically unclear. Figure 3.1 c.)
90
Aid and conflict at the subnational level
depicts this case for the example of aid flowing mainly to non-coalition regions (and
potential rebel groups) as well as measuring conflict in regions that are part of the
governing coalition. Figure 3.1 d.) depicts this case for the example of aid flowing
mainly to the capital and measuring conflict in regions outside the capital.2
Nonetheless, our data also allow us to distinguish more nuanced theories and test
them empirically. For instance, when considering development aid as a potential price
for opposing groups, this would not apply equally to all types of aid. We can distinguish
between different aid types, some of them with output that is hard to loot (e.g., a street
or bridge) and others making looting more likely (e.g., expensive health equipment in
hospitals). The prior literature has also pointed towards an interesting incentive aid
can set for recipient governments. In order not to lose aid, they might be more reluctant
to engage in conflict actions that appear unnecessary or overly violent to reduce the
risk of being shamed at the international stage (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009). We test
both hypotheses by considering aid flows, specifically, to the capital region or regions
associated with the governing coalition, and relating those to higher or lower conflict
in other regions of the same country (e.g., Figure 3.1 d.).
Returning to the main theories, whether aid succeeds in raising average incomes and,
thus, increases opportunity costs is fiercely discussed in the aid effectiveness literature.
The results converge towards a null on average (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009) or
only small positive effects (Galiani et al., 2017). This effect is, however, depending
on whether aid was politically motivated or had a clearer development focus (Dreher
et al., 2018). Thus, the motivation of donors can be important. Accordingly, whether
and to what extent aid projects raise income at the regional level depends on the
circumstances. The effect is most likely quite heterogeneous, comprising both negative
and positive impacts.
When comparing the impact of aid projects to the gains from resource-related in-
come shocks (Berman et al., 2017; Gehring et al., 2018), it becomes clear that in both
cases the distribution of gains is also important. Dube and Vargas (2013) document that
in the case of Colombia, higher resource prices lowered conflict if the resource was more
labor-intensive. In contrast, if it was more capital intensive and the gains most likely
accrued only to a small elite, price spikes fueled conflict. Similarly, there will be groups
or people that profit from aid (the money must always go somewhere), but whether
these gains are used for short-term consumption, invested in fostering development or
ending up in the foreign bank accounts of government officials is unclear.
One aspect where aid differs from other shocks, prominently featured in the lit-
erature, is that donors can to some extent impose which conditions and procedures
need to be respected during the implementation. Minasyan et al. (2017), for example,
demonstrate the importance of donor quality for aid effectiveness and Berman et al.
(2013) hypothesize that projects are more successful in reducing violence if they re-
quire the integration of development experts. Aid can also be earmarked for certain
2Further work also stresses the context specificity of aid (e.g., resource endowments or institutions)
as well as its role for conflict dynamics (De Ree and Nillesen, 2009; Bluhm et al., 2016; Strange et al.,
2017) – two aspects, which we leave for further research on the local level .
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projects or sectors, for instance generally for infrastructure or specifically for building
a particular school or hospital, which is a second conceptual difference compared to
other windfall income gains. Berman et al.’s (2011) analysis of development projects in
Iraq, for instance, suggests that only a small share and specific types of projects have
a conflict-reducing effect.
Considering donors that reflect the different ends of the distribution along those
dimensions, can crucially contribute to evaluating the effect of aid on conflict more
systematically than the existing literature. The next section explains shortly why the
WB and China differ consistently with regard to (i.) the use of conditionality, (ii.) the
use of development expert knowledge, and (iii.) the focus of their projects.
3.2.2 Two Types of Donors: China versus the World Bank
The WB mostly reflects a model of conditional aid integrating expert knowledge with
a clear focus on development, whereas China specifically highlights non-interference,
mutual economic benefits and room to maneuver for the recipient governments. This
is visible along three dimensions. First, conditionality is very common and used inten-
sively by the WB. Projects often have a large variety of conditions attached ranging
from human rights and democratic procedures to gender equality. Second, the WB
employs a large team of academics and country experts with the aim to ensure that aid
is spent effectively. Third, WB projects have a rather clear focus on development and
supporting particular democratic institutions as well as civil organizations. Although
there is also some political influence on WB decisions (Dreher et al., 2018), its projects
are less politically motivated than other types of aid (e.g., Dreher et al., 2009).
The World Bank’s aid arm provided 16.8% of funding of traditional Western donors
between 1995 and 2012. This makes IDA the second largest donor after the EU insti-
tutions (18.7%) and before UN agencies (6.4%) (OECD, 2017). As mentioned above,
there are concrete plans to intensify and scale-up its involvement in conflict-prone re-
gions. For instance, the World Bank has spent up to 500 million in the Central African
Republic, approximately a third of the country’s GDP, to prevent the fragile state from
sliding back into civil war. The Kecamatan Development program, which was directed
by the World Bank Group in cooperation with the Indonesian government, was designed
to reduce conflict probability via a transparent and participatory approach (Gibson and
Woolcock, 2005; Barron et al., 2011). Nevertheless, WB projects have also been linked
to increases in civil unrest and conflict. The construction of the Pak Mun hydroelec-
tric dam in the rural north-east of Thailand, for instance, sparked widespread protests
due to complaints that it displaced families, destroyed local fish stocks and wrecked
irrigation systems.3
China, in contrast, is the most prominent example of an emerging “rogue” donor
(Naím, 2007), that is not a member of the OECD’s traditional Development Assistance
Committee (DAC). It is constantly expanding its activities in Africa, and during the
3See The Economist, “Rural unrest,” last accessed June 14, 2018.
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2000-2012 period, its official development aid (ODA) commitments equaled 17.8% of
US aid commitments (based on OECD, 2017; Strange et al., 2017). When consider-
ing ODA and other official finance (OOF) activities USAID and Chinese aid are en
par.4 The country is often characterized as ignoring conditions on human rights and
good governance practices, in particular by the Western world and media. One exam-
ple is Ethiopia, where large energy projects allegedly ignored the needs and demands
of the local population. As another case in point, China’s president has visited and
himself welcomed Zimbabwe’s former president Mugabe, contrasting efforts of Western
donors to sanction the country for electoral fraud and human right abuses.5 At another
instance, Uganda turned to China to increase its engagement, after Western donors
protested against strict “anti-gay” laws in the country.6 Regarding conditions and fo-
cus, the Chinese perspective is to run a policy of “non-interference” in the internal
affairs of recipients, where projects are more often directly offered to state leaders and
regimes focusing on economic “mutual benefit.”7 In this regard, Dreher et al. (2016)
find that Chinese projects in Africa are more likely to benefit the birth regions of the re-
spective leader, i.e., seem to be allocated less on a need-base. The implementation is in
most cases left to a larger degree to the respective partner governments, although there
are some cases where projects have been mostly implemented by China and Chinese
workers.
In contrast, Western development projects have also been criticized for a lack of
“ownership” and missing use of local knowledge in recipient countries. Hence, the Chi-
nese approach can have an upside, which several African countries have also welcomed
along with the larger focus on developing common business interests.8
Empirically, Dreher et al. (2018) and Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2013) suggest that
the degree to which the Chinese government considers demand-side humanitarian and
socioeconomic needs is comparable to Western donors. Even though China puts less
emphasis on strict human rights conditions, China’s increasing focus on humanitarian
issues becomes evident in its growing role in UN peacekeeping missions over time and
its official aim to “play a constructive role of settling conflicts and hot issues and
4Strange et al. (2017) as cited in Reuters, “New database focuses on China’s secretive aid to
Africa,” last accessed October 8, 2018. The authors refer to the OECD definition where OOF comprises
“[t]ransactions by the official sector with [developing] countries [. . . ] which do not meet the conditions
for eligibility as Official Development Assistance, either because they are not primarily aimed at
development, or because they have a grant element of less than 25 per cent.”
5Washington Post, “When China gives aid to African governments, they become more violent”,
last accessed July 26, 2018.
6See The Diplomat, “Uganda Looks to China,” last accessed July 26, 2018.
7David Shinn on Chinausfocus, “Africa Test’s China’s Non-interference Policy,” last accessed July
26, 2018.
8Anthony Germain on CBC, “China in Africa: No strings attached,” last accessed September 12,
2018.
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maintaining peace and security in Africa.”9 What is more, with its expanding activities
and larger presence of Chinese employees in Africa, it also has a rising interest in
avoiding conflicts that threaten the value of its investments or the life of its citizens.
To sum up, when considering the mechanisms highlighted above, it becomes ap-
parent that almost all of them work at the subnational level, whereas most of the
literature operates with national level data. When aggregating both aid and conflict
data at the national level most of the postulated conflict theories are indistinguishable
from each other. To analyze channels in more detail with the help of subnational data,
we differentiate between (i.) different types of aid, (ii.) different actors, (iii.) regional
attributes (e.g., fractionalization and power status), (iv.) different spatial aggregations
and (v.) spatial spill-overs. We will compare two donors. The WB with its strong use
of conditionality and expert knowledge, as well as its clear development focus should
theoretically have a low likelihood of leading to conflict. China, in contrast, is a donor
that most observers would deem much more likely to fuel conflicts due to the lack




Our unit of observation is the country-region-year, and the unit of analysis is the first
level of subnational administrative regions, henceforth ADM1 or regions (data from
Hijmans et al., 2012). The names of ADM1 regions vary by country but are commonly
known as “provinces” or “states.” We choose those ADM1 regions as the main unit
over lower level administrative regions (ADM2), ethnic groups, or grid-cells. Figure
3.2 shows that georeferenced projects alone, those that contain latitude and longitude
coordinates, comprise only less than 50% of overall projects. Taking projects assigned
to ADM2 and ADM1 regions also into account ensures that a reasonable share of total
aid is covered.10 The right hand side shows that for both China and the World Bank
this allows us to exploit variation covering over 90% of the overall spending by the two
donors in Africa. Note that we capture a lower fraction of projects for China, but these
are mostly smaller projects. The first order administrative level is also highly relevant
9See saferworld.org.uk, “China’s growing role in African peace and security” and The Guardian,
“New report discusses China’s role in Africa’s conflicts,” last accessed July 26, 2018. Moreover, The
Guardian, for instance, postulates that “Chinese aid to Africa is going to come with all sorts of strings
attached, despite the “no-conditionality rhetoric.” The Guardian: “The west has no right to criticise
the China-Africa relationship,”, last accessed August 30, 2018.
10The World Bank officially releases information on its disbursements. In contrast, the only oppor-
tunity to compile information on Chinese projects is the open source data collection on commitments.
In line with Dreher et al. (2017), who show that “project duration amounts to 664 days” on average,
we take this into account by assuming a two year lag until which Chinese aid projects would become
effective.
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for aid allocation, as many projects are assigned to specific regions, and the regional
government can decide how or where to spend the money, which is relevant for conflict
outcomes.
Figure 3.2 Distribution of Georeferencing Precision
a) Project Locations b) Disbursement / Commitment Amounts
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Strandow et al. (2011), Dreher et al. (2016) and Strange et al.
(2017).
Precisely georeferenced projects and projects where we possess information about
the ADM2 regions are assigned to the respective ADM1 region. In most cases, projects
also have several locations. When processing the project level data, we assume that aid
is distributed equally across locations and allocate aid proportionally to the locations
per region, which is in line with previous research (Dreher and Lohmann, 2015). For
instance, for a project with 10 locations, where four locations are in region A and six
locations are in region B, 40% of project volume would be accounted in region A and
60% in region B.11
The data appendix provides more details. The remainder with less precise locations
is mostly non-geocoded aid accruing directly to the government, which we assign to
the capital region in a robustness test when considering potential spill-overs. We show
results using the ADM2 regions as a robustness test in the appendix, and incorporate
ethnic group homelands by intersecting those with the regions.
Table 3.1 shows a comparison of the two donors in some important dimensions.
While information for aid disbursements by World Bank’s IDA is available from 1995
to 2012, information on Chinese aid commitments in Africa is constrained to the years




𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑗 , where p is the
project, i is the country, j is the region and t is the period for which we estimate the allocation shares.
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2000 to 2012.12 Over the sample period, the World Bank still outspends China with
USD 29.4 bn compared to USD 13.2 billion.13
Table 3.1 Donor Comparison – WB versus China
World Bank Aid Chinese Aid
Total Disbursements / Commitments (USD): 29.4bn 13.2bn
Active in number of Countries: 35 41
Number of projects: 1,472 333
Number of locations: 25,041 1,308
Mean number of locations per project: 17 4
Mean per project (USD): 19.97m 39.63m
Mean per location (USD): 1.17m 10.09m
Years covered: 1995–2012 2000-2012
Notes: Aid is measured in constant 2011 USD.
Both are active in most African countries, 35 for the World Bank and 41 for China.
They are, thus, mostly active in the same set of countries (Humphrey and Michaelowa,
2018), which adds to the comparability of donors. One interesting difference is that the
World Bank finances a larger number of projects which then also have more locations
across countries on average. China finances fewer but larger projects. Accordingly,
China spends nearly twice as much per project and nearly ten times as much per
project location.
We focus our analysis on the African continent and on countries with more than 1
million inhabitants and include all countries, which were on the OECD’s DAC recipient
list in the initial year of 1995. The remaining sample comprises 728 ADM1 regions in
45 countries. Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of our most important analytical
variables at the country-region-year level. With regard to the main treatment variables
World Bank and Chinese Aid, it becomes visible that the World Bank provides higher
levels of aid on average (e.g., USD 2.2 million versus USD 1.4 million per region-year).
12This analysis focuses on Official Development Aid (ODA) flows in contrast to other official finance
(OOF). OOF also plays a large role in China’s finance portfolio, but has a less development oriented
focus. The WB also augments its ODA with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD), which provides development finance in the form of loans with interest rates closer
to market rates. However, we expect a clearer relationship between aid and conflict than with less
concessionary development finance. One reason is that the domestic government’s role in distributing
concessionary development aid might increase the risk of distributive conflicts. Moreover, as develop-
ment finance is acquired on a loan basis, the respective government has to pay it back and, hence, has
larger incentives to invest it in a sustainable way.
13This also holds for the shorter 2000 to 2012 period (USD 27.9 bn).
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However, the large standard deviation indicates that Chinese aid has a higher degree of
variation, with the maximum Chinese spending per region-year being USD 900 million
– nearly twice as large as the highest value for the WB. The high project values indicate
China’s large involvement in mega-projects to fund infrastructure including dams and
power plants.
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics – ADM1 Region
Mean SD Min Max
World Bank Aid 2,240,340 8,991,909 0 488,643,178
ln(WB Aid) 6 9 -5 20
Chinese Aid 1,391,272 22,843,120 0 900,000,000
ln(Chinese Aid) -4 4 -5 21
Battle-Related Deaths 21 342 0 33,417
Conflict Incidence in Percent 12 32 0 100
Notes: Descriptive statistics for our main variables. ln(Aid) is based on aid
+0.01 USD. The sample period is 1995-2012 for IDA and 2000-2012 for Chi-
nese Aid. For Chinese Aid 41 and for the World Bank Aid 35 recipients are
considered respectively.
World Bank Aid
The dataset from AidData (Strandow et al., 2011) about World Bank aid disburse-
ments is comprehensive both regarding time, ranging from 1995 to 2012, and regarding
project scope. Geocoded disbursements sum up to US$ 29.4 bn distributed over 1,472
projects in 25,041 locations in Africa. Additionally, AidData provides information on
the sectoral allocation of disbursements, enabling us to distinguish potentially differ-
ential effects of different aid types on conflict probability and intensity. We focus
on disbursements by “the International Development Association (IDA),” the World
Bank’s arm for development aid.
Chinese Aid
Although China is perceived as a major political and economic actor, it was also a
recipient of sizeable amounts of development aid until recently. For instance, China
only graduated from IDA in 1999 (Galiani et al., 2017). Since the 2000s, China has
become a major donor itself and extended its activities especially in Africa. However,
China does not provide official disaggregated information on aid flows according to the
DAC standards. One reason is that large disbursements could lead to Chinese citizens’
discontent since they might prefer regional development programs in China. We build
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on the impressive data collection and geolocalization efforts by Strange et al. (2017) and
Dreher et al. (2016), associated with AidData. Those authors compile data on Chinese
ODA-like commitments for the years 2000-2012 based on a variety of sources, mostly
media reports. In total, the ODA flows amount to USD 13.2 bn from 333 projects in
1308 locations.
3.3.2 Conflict Measures
For our main specification, we rely on the number of battle-related deaths at the re-
gional level based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) georeferenced event
dataset (GED) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). Derived
from media and NGO reports, as well as secondary sources (e.g., field reports or books),
GED provides the most reliable and comprehensive data on incidences of violence in-
cluding the involved parties, casualties and location.14 Table 3.2 shows that the range
of battle-related deaths per region-year varies between 0 and 33,417. The thresholds
commonly used in the cross-country literature to identify conflict are not applicable at
the smaller regional level. A threshold of 1000 casualties is too high, but a minimum
threshold of just one casualty would be too low and create too much measurement error.
Acknowledging the apparent trade-off, we chose 5 (low intensity) as the threshold for our
main specifications. We use 25 (medium intensity) as well as the log of battle-related
deaths for robustness tests. We use a similar measure from the Social Conflict Analysis
Database (SCAD) to evaluate smaller-scale conflict events like demonstrations, strikes
or riots and non-lethal government repression (Salehyan et al., 2012).
We depict the geographical distribution of development aid locations for the WB
and for China in Figure 3.3a, as well as the number of experienced conflict years in
Figure 3.3b. Until 2012, China was active in a large range of African countries, but
still on a smaller scale than the World Bank.
Visually examining the overlap between average aid disbursements / commitments
and conflict years in these maps is not very informative, as they do not display the
temporal order of events. Moreover, we cannot distinguish selection into conflict prone
regions from an effect of aid, as well as account for particular regions being different
in unobservable factors that cause them to be large aid recipients and conflict prone at
the same time. Countries that had endured conflict in the past are also more in need
of post-conflict aid. IDA, for instance, disbursed 19% of its funds to regions recently
suffering from conflict, and China commits about 10% of its project volume to such
regions. Generally, conflict is widespread and often overlaps with the presence of the
two donors. 52% of the World Bank’s IDA resources and 31% of Chinese ODA-like
14An alternative would be the ACLED and PRIO Gridded datasets, which rely on similar primary
data as UCDP. One issue with PRIO Gridded data is that neighboring cells in a 50km radius are
also coded as conflict-affected, which might lead to erroneous conflict coding of neighboring regions
(Tollefsen et al., 2012). Moreover, PRIO only provides dichotomous information on conflict occurrence,
but not on intensity. ACLED is broader in coverage than UCDP data, but is criticized for its ambiguous
inclusion criteria and vague geocoding (Eck, 2012).
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Figure 3.3 Maps: Conflict and Aid in Africa
a) Conflict b) Development Aid
Source: Authors’ depiction based on Croicu and Sundberg (2015), Dreher et al. (2016) and AidData
(2017).
Note: Conflict refers to more or equal to five casualties per region-year 2000-2012. Chinese aid refers
to the years 2000–2012 and World Bank aid to 1995–2012. The depicted borders refer to countries
(thick line) and first administrative divisions (thin line).
finance are spent in regions that also experience conflict at some point during the
observation period.
Overall, there is a lot of variation in aid from both donors, as well as in conflict across
and within countries. This variation is crucial for our analysis, which distinguishes
between two main types of equations. In the first set, we condition on observables
and unobservables through various fixed effects and time trends. For instance, region-
fixed effects eliminate within-country differences related to the likelihood of receiving
aid and experiencing conflict, which gets lost when aggregating at the national level.
For example, Angola appears to receive relatively more aid projects in specific regions,
which at the same time experience more conflict. However, this relationship may be
driven by a third omitted factor. The second set goes one step further and uses country
times year (from now on country-year) fixed effects to rule out an effect of any spurious
events at the country-year level affecting conflict and by chance coinciding with changes
in aid allocation (e.g., a change in political regime).
3.3.3 Control Variables
Besides our main variables of interest, we consider several other variables, which are
suggested in the literature as either determinants of aid allocation or drivers of conflict.
Regarding the targeting of development aid, it is interesting to account for the initial
99
Aid and conflict at the subnational level
regional development. GDP is proxied using nighttime light, as subnational income
estimates are scarce and of poor quality in low and lower-middle income states (Hen-
derson et al., 2012). Although lights already capture parts of population density, as
indicated by Henderson et al. (2017), we account for regional population taken from
the Center for International Earth Science Information Network’s gridded population
of the world dataset (CIESIN, 2016). Population is both a relevant variable in terms
of aid allocation as well as in terms of a scale effect for conflict potential (Hegre and
Sambanis, 2006).
As a large literature stresses the potentially conflict-inducing effects of windfall gains
related to certain resources (e.g., Berman et al., 2017), we control for several natural
resource indicators including oil, gold, gem-stones and narcotics. For this purpose, we
use information from the PRIO Gridded data (Tollefsen et al., 2012) and project them
on the administrative boundaries. This dataset also includes measures on temperature
and precipitation, providing us with proxy variables for local income shocks causing
conflict (Miguel et al., 2004). To match the gridded data to the respective regional units
of observation, we intersect the PRIO-Grid with the countries’ regional dimension and
calculate area-weighted averages for each region. Finally, we use data from Cederman
et al. (2014) and Wucherpfennig et al. (2011) to control for the spatial distribution of
ethnic groups, which are often linked to conflict (Esteban et al., 2012; Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou, 2016).
3.4 Empirical Strategy
Aid projects are not randomly allocated. This potential endogeneity of aid project
allocation is the concern when studying the relationship between development finance
and conflict. Time-varying omitted variables, like economic or political shocks at the
regional level can affect both aid inflows and conflict. Additionally, donors might tend to
reduce or increase aid targeting to conflict-affected regions depending on their allocation
targets, raising issues of reverse causality. We pursue two different empirical strategies.
First, we use OLS regressions with varying sets of fixed effects, time trends and control
variables, which allow a transparent examination of the underlying relationship when
exploiting different variation in the data. Our detailed subnational dataset exhibits
enough variation to allow the use of very restrictive sets of fixed effects and time trends
that rule out many concerns raised in the existing literature. Second, we will pursue
instrumental variable strategies for each of the two donors.
3.4.1 Linear Models – Fixed Effects, Time Trends and Control
Variables
Our baseline empirical specification is:
𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜆𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜅𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, (3.1)
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where 𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is our conflict indicator of interest in region 𝑖, in country 𝑐 and year
𝑡. 𝐴𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 are the log of per capita aid disbursements / commitments. With regard
to the timing, we consider the WB disbursements from the previous year and follow
the literature (Dreher et al., 2016, 2017), while we use a two year lag for Chinese
commitment data.15
𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 is a vector of lagged control variables, where we distinguish three types of
controls. First, controls such as climatic shocks are exogenous and not affected by
our treatment variable. Second, we account flexibly for the effect of time-invariant
controls like elevation or ruggedness by interacting them with year dummies. Third, we
lag potential “bad controls” like nighttime light (as a proxy for economic activity) or
population, which can be affected directly by aid projects, by two periods. This does
remedy but not solve the problem, which is why we show the third category only as a
robustness test.
Furthermore, our baseline specification contains 𝛾𝑡, 𝜆𝑐, and 𝜅𝑐,𝑡 which are time, coun-
try, and country-year fixed effects, respectively. We also add country-specific linear and
quadratic time trends, as well as regional linear time trends. The error term is denoted
as 𝜖𝑖𝑟,𝑡. Country-year fixed effects need to be considered carefully, especially, due to the
national dynamics of conflict. They eliminate many potentially critical omitted vari-
able problems, but also a lot of variation in the data. In essence, including them asks a
subtly different question: conditional on the whole country being in conflict or not in a
particular year, how have previous aid payments affected the likelihood of a particular
region to be in conflict. For that reason, we will always consider specifications with and
without country-year fixed effects.
We cluster standard errors at the country-year and regional level (Cameron et al.,
2011). This allows for arbitrary correlation within a country and year, which is im-
portant as conflicts often have a strong spatial component and tend to spill over. Also
allowing for correlation within a region over time is important as conflict also tends to
exhibit strong persistence over time. Other potential clustering options are shown in
the Appendix (Tables C.38 and C.39).
3.4.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
Our instrumental variable strategy exploits the heterogenous impact of a plausibly
exogenous time-series interacted with a (pre-determined or fixed) cross-sectional differ-
ence.16 The identifying assumption is that in absence of a change in the time series
15In line with personal correspondence with staff from aid agencies, China would disburse commit-
ments quickly with a lag of one to three years. We assume a two-year lag structure as reasonable.
16This builds on Nunn and Qian (2014), who exploit temporal variation in US wheat production,
which they then interact with the aid recipient’s probability to receive US food aid. In essence, this
strategy is similar to Bartik instruments used in the labor economics literature (e.g., Autor et al., 2013)
or the shift-share instruments common in the migration literature (Altonji and Card, 1991). In contrast
to most Bartik and shift-share instruments, where cross-sectional units differ in many dimensions, e.g.,
different industry shares or immigrant enclave sizes, the units in this approach differ only along one
dimension.
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there would be common trends in aid allocation in low and high aid probability recipi-
ent regions. As in any Difference-in-Difference (DiD) setup, the first and second stage
control for the main constituting terms forming the interaction and only the interaction
term is used as the conditionally exogenous instrument.
For both the WB and China, we use a cumulative (initial or pre-determined) prob-
ability as opposed to a constant probability over the whole sample period. This is
computed by dividing the number of years a region 𝑖 has received aid in the past by
the number of years passed until period 𝑡.17 Beyond the donor-specific probability, the
World Bank and China differ only in the time-varying factor 𝑇𝑡 used to induce variation
in project allocations over time.
Instrumenting World Bank Aid
For the World Bank, we use exogenous yearly variation in the availability of free IDA
resources. This funding position is defined as “the extent to which IDA can commit to
new financing of loans, grants and guarantees given its financial position at any point in
time” (World Bank, 2015a).18 Starting in 2008, we use the measure publicly disclosed
in the annual financial reports. From 1995 to 2008 we rely on the reconstructed time
series by Dreher et al. (2017). Thus, the first stage equation has the following form:
𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 = 𝛼1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝛼2𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑝𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑡−1 +𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, (3.2)
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 is again a vector of lagged control variables. Figure 3.5 shows the
fluctuations in the indicator. The variation can be caused by internal adjustments,
the timing of payments by the shareholders, as well as repayments by large borrowers
like India or Nigeria. Conflict in any individual African region cannot plausibly affect
the measure to a significant degree. Overall, there is a downward trend, partly caused
by some major shareholders failing to deliver on payments promised before. However,
despite the general decline, the indicator also fluctuates strongly between the years.
For instance, it initially increases between 1996 and 1997, before it falls sharply in the
following years.
We then interact this time-varying variable with 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, the probability of a region
receiving aid. Based on anecdotal evidence, for instance from personal correspondence
17If our sample begins in 1995, and a region received aid in three out of five years, the value of the
probability in 1999 would be 0.6. If aid receipts stop in 1999, the probability would decline to 0.5 in
2000 as the country would have received aid in three out of six years. The constant probability used in
Nunn and Qian (2014) or Bluhm et al. (2018) relies on all observed treatment values per unit, i.e., the
term for region 𝑖 in year 𝑡 also depends on the values in 𝑡+1, 𝑡+2, .... These future values can themselves
be a function of conflict. Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2016) show that under certain assumptions the
interaction of an exogenous variable with an endogenous variable can be interpreted as exogenous when
controlling for the endogenous factor (in this case the constant probability). Nonetheless, using initial
or pre-determined values gets us closer to a setting of interacting two exogenous variables.
18The idea is based on Lang (2016) and Gehring and Lang (2018), who employ such a supply-push
identification approach using variation in the IMF’s liquidity.
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with recipient country personnel administering WB projects, regions with a higher
likelihood to receive aid in the past seem to profit more if there are additional funds
available. Thus, we expect a positive interaction term in the first stage.19
Instrumenting Chinese Aid
Due to data limitations, there is no exact equivalent to the IDA’s funding position. In-
stead, 𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is a time series on production in the country’s over-sized steel sector (World
Steel Association, 2009, 2014). The production level was shown to affect the overall
amount of Chinese aid as China would commit to more aid projects to clear markets and
protect domestic companies from potential losses (Dreher et al., 2016). These projects
are often large-scale infrastructure projects (Bräutigam, 2011), but Bluhm et al. (2018)
show that steel production also induces variation in other sectors (social, education
or health) beyond roads and railways.20 China is also generally known as engaging
in “mega-deals” (Strange et al., 2017), which are generally larger than WB projects.
Thus, the local average treatment effect we want to estimate with the IV is not atyp-
ical for its activities. The time series is again plausibly exogenous to any individual
region in Africa, and we then interact it with the cross-sectional specific cumulative
probability to receive Chinese aid. Theoretically, one would expect that overcapacities
in steel benefit regions with a low probability of previous aid receipts more as China
expands its activities to new regions. However, the existing literature indicates that an
increase in steel overproduction benefits regions with an initially high probability the
most (Dreher et al., 2016; Bluhm et al., 2018). The first stage equation for Chinese aid
has the following form:
𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 = 𝛼1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−3 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑡−3 + 𝛼3𝑝𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−3𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑡−3 +𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 (3.3)
One potential issue is a long-term upward trend in Chinese steel (over-)production
and the fact that there is less year-on-year variation than in the WB funding position.
This linear trend increases the risk of picking up trends in other variables that differ
between high and low probability regions and overlap with the conflict trends, one of
the concerns raised by Christian and Barrett (2017). For that reason, we de-trend
steel production for our main specification, so that we exploit only deviations from the
long-term production trends.21
19Because the World Bank’s fiscal year ends in June, the reported position in the fiscal years t and
t-1 can both affect disbursements in t-1. Using only the position in t-1 is a viable alternative and also
works well in first stage estimations, which is demonstrated in Appendix Table C.10. Using both fiscal
years t and t-1 to compute the funding position appears more coherent and is applied subsequently.
20Although to a lesser extent, other sectors than hard infrastructure use steel as an input. E.g., the
social sectors education and health rely on steel to construct schools and hospitals.
21Detrending the global time series is not exactly analogue to the use of regional linear time trends
or country-year fixed effects as the interaction of the global trend with cumulative probabilities induces
yearly rescaling on a regional level.
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Examining the first stages
In order to provide readers with a transparent depiction of trends in the outcome and
instrumental variable as suggested by Christian and Barrett (2017), Figure 3.4 shows
the de-trended time series that we use, along with the variation in conflict in low and
high probability regions. On the left panel, we show the raw variation in conflict, on the
right panel we show the residual variation net of fixed effects and time trends that we
exploit in our estimations. There is no clear overlap between trends in the time series
variable and outcomes in either low or high probability regions, in particular when
considering the residual variation used in our subsequent analysis. The same holds true
for the WB (Figure 3.5).22
Figure 3.4 Deviations from Chinese Steel Production Trend & Battle-Related Deaths
a) Mean Battle-Related Deaths (raw) b) Mean Battle-Related Deaths (residual)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: Figure 3.4a displays the log of the detrended Chinese Steel Production (thick line), the mean
Battle-Related Deaths per low probability recipient regions (thin line) and the mean Battle-Related
Deaths per high probability recipient regions (dashed line). Figure 3.4b displays the log of Chinese
Steel Production (thick line), the mean residual of the Battle-Related Deaths per low probability
recipient regions (thin line) and the mean residual of the Battle-Related Deaths per high probability
recipient regions (dashed line). The residuals refer to the underlying variation used in our preferred
specification from column (4) in Table 3.3 and are net of FE and time trends.
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) describe the potential risks and caveats of simi-
lar IV strategies and highlight the importance of considering differences in the cross-
sectional units and emphasize the need to consider whether the first stage is driven by
only a few observations or outliers. Christian and Barrett (2017) emphasize potential
problems with trends that differ between high and low probability countries (regions)
22To allow the reader to assess the trends in the treatment variable, Appendix Figure C.4 depicts
the time series for the means of logged WB and Chinese aid per high and low exposure regions.
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both in the treatment and in the outcome variable. We carefully examine potential
problems with the IV approach in different robustness tests, but also highlight that we
regard the instrumental variable (IV) approach as complementary to the OLS specifi-
cations, which are also important and informative.
Figure 3.5 World Bank IDA funding Position & Battle-Related Deaths
a) Mean Battle-Related Deaths (raw) b) Mean Battle-Related Deaths (residual)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: Figure 3.5a displays the IDA Funding Position (thick line), the mean Battle-Related Deaths per
low probability recipient regions (thin line) and the mean Battle-Related Deaths per high probability
recipient regions (dashed line). Figure 3.5b displays the IDA Funding Position (thick line), the mean
residual of the Battle-Related Deaths per low probability recipient regions (thin line) and the mean
residual of the Battle-Related Deaths per high probability recipient regions (dashed line). The residuals
refer to the underlying variation used in our preferred specification from column (4) in Table 3.3 and
are net of FE and time trends.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 OLS, Fixed Effects and Time Trends
We estimate different specifications to transparently show the implicit trade-offs be-
tween them. Our dataset allows us to rule out many potential sources of omitted
variables bias in cross-country studies, but this elimination of potentially biasing infor-
mation comes at the cost of losing useful variation. Under most circumstances, we try
to minimize false discoveries. A plausible prior with regard to our research question,
however, is to assume that aid might fuel conflict (e.g., based on studies like Nunn and
Qian, 2014 and Crost et al., 2014). Thus, focusing on conservative specifications which
eliminate much variation creates the risk of over-looking such an effect.
105
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Aid and conflict at the subnational level
We begin by showing simple correlations and then step-by-step add fixed effects,
time trends and different categories of control variables.23
Beginning with World Bank aid in Table 3.3, we find that the raw correlation with
conflict incidence is negative. The coefficient of -0.19 suggests that 10% more WB aid is
correlated with a conflict likelihood that is about 1.9 percentage points lower. Adding
country and year fixed effects shifts the coefficient upward (column 2), adding country-
specific linear and quadratic trends to capture country-specific conflict dynamics moves
it again slightly downward to -0.05 (column 3). When adding region fixed effects, which
capture region-specific time-invariant attributes that can explain heterogeneity within
countries, the point estimates nearly quadruple in size (-0.21) and become statistically
significant at the 1%-level (column 4).
Adding exogenous controls and time-invariant region characteristics, interacted with
year dummies to capture their potentially time-varying influence (column 5), as well as
adding region-specific linear time trends changes the coefficient only slightly (column
6). Column 8 goes one step further by controlling for country-year fixed effects. The
remaining variation is then only due to differences in aid across regions within country-
years, conditional on the country as a whole being in conflict or not. Despite the
strict specification, the robust negative relationship between WB aid and conflict does
not disappear and remains significant at the 5%-level. It becomes insignificant when
controlling for lagged values of factors that are potentially endogenous controls (columns
7 and 9), but remains negative. Although these are only conditional correlations, the
fact that 8 out of 9 coefficients are negative suggests that there is no conflict-fueling
effect of WB aid on average.
Turning to China, our prior is that a positive relationship with conflict is more likely.
Chinese aid is by some observers deemed as “rogue aid,” which promotes authoritarian
and violent elites and leaders. Against this background, it comes at first glance as a
surprise that the raw correlation with conflict is also negative. The coefficient drops
drastically in size when adding country and time fixed effects, as well as country-specific
quadratic time trends (columns 2 and 3), but loses significance. Overall, the coefficients
are much smaller and closer to zero than for the WB. Remarkably, however, there is
not a single positive coefficient, also suggesting no signs of a conflict-inducing effect
of Chinese aid. Our preferred specifications in columns 6 and 8 indicate that 10%
more Chinese aid corresponds to a 0.65 and 0.35 percentage points decrease in conflict
incidence.
These results need to be put into perspective. Table 3.3 reveals that researchers have
many degrees of freedom, especially at the subnational level. What we find reassuring
is that throughout all these different specifications there is no sign of a conflict-inducing
23A second trade-off concerns showing both donors over the same period. The advantage is that it
would increase comparability. The disadvantage is that we would lose five years for the WB (1996 to
2001 due to the lag structure). Moreover, when doing this for IV specifications the F-statistics for the
WB are much smaller, giving rise to potential weak instrument concerns. Hence, we exploit the full
range of available data for the main specification, and show the results for both donors combined in
Appendix Table C.42 with OLS and Table C.43 with IV.
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effect for either World Bank or Chinese development finance projects. Relating to the
ideas in Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2017), we also see that the effect of adding
additional fixed effects, trends, and covariates neither suggests a clear upward nor a
downward bias. Certainly, a zero as well as negative effects could be a part of the
true confidence interval. Still, it seems unlikely that unobserved factors would push the
average effect towards a positive and significant coefficient.
We continue examining a potentially remaining selection bias with our IV estima-
tions, focusing on the specifications in columns 6 and 8.
3.5.2 Instrumental Variable Results
Table 3.4 shows the instrumental variable results for our preferred specifications. The
first stages for both donors work well. The interaction term between the prior probabil-
ity to receive aid and the IDA position (Chinese steel, respectively) is highly significant
in both specifications, with and without country-year fixed effects. On average, the
first stage works better for the World Bank (F= 99/86) than for China (F=22/16), but
all F-statistics are well above the critical value of 10.
In addition to being relevant, the signs of the coefficients are also plausible. Regions
with a higher initial probability profit more from a higher WB liquidity. Appendix Table
C.5 and C.6 illustrate that the mechanism seems to work through both the extensive
and intensive margin. High probability regions receive more projects, but the size of
projects also increases. As expected, China shows a reverse pattern. In years where
excess steel production is higher, China expands its activities with new projects in
regions with an initially lower likelihood of receiving a project.
The second stage results largely confirm the OLS results. Both specifications yield
a negative coefficient for the WB and China. The coefficients for the WB are somehow
smaller (larger) in the specification without (with) country-year fixed effects, and be-
come statistically insignificant. The coefficients for China become much more negative,
but remain insignificant. There is again no evidence for a conflict-fueling effect of aid
projects. This is noteworthy, as despite estimating a rich set of specifications, we could
not find for any of the two extremely different donors an average effect, which would
link aid to conflict.
Examining those results with more scrutiny raises the question to what degree they
represent a local average treatment effect (LATE) that might be different from the
average effect. By definition, the IV estimate is identified using a particular kind of
variation in the variable of interest. Nonetheless, comparing the IV point estimates
with OLS shows some differences in size but no difference with regard to the direction
of the effects.
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Table 3.4 IV Results – Aid and Conflict at the Local Level
Panel A: World Bank Aid (1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.1014 -0.2252
(0.3752) (0.4192)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 70.9363*** 80.8832***
(7.1065) (8.6854)
𝑁 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑡−2) -0.4509 -0.4276
(0.6168) (0.8068)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -70.8763*** -60.6567***
(14.9526) (14.9524)
𝑁 7975 7975
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of
1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regres-
sions include exogenous (time-varying) controls. Year and region fixed effects
as well as time trends are included in all regressions. Time trends include lin-
ear and squared country-specific time trends and a linear regional trend. The
constituent term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional
level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
We can check whether the direction of the changes when moving from OLS to
IV estimations is plausible by running OLS specifications using leads and lags of our
variable of interest (Appendix Table C.4). More specifically, we include three lags,
the contemporaneous value and a lead term. For the World Bank, there are no clear
indications of a pre-trend that would signal selection bias. For China, however, the lead
terms are positive in both cases. This indicates that China selects regions that are more
likely to have experienced a conflict in the previous years. Maybe this is due to China
being less worried about violent regimes, or attempts to fill up the space left by other
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donors who are more hesitant to enter that type of region.24 This suggests an upward
bias in the OLS coefficients, which is in line with the IV coefficients for China being more
negative. For the World Bank, without apparent pre-trends, IV and OLS results are
very similar. Despite signaling a null or slightly negative effect on average, the rather
large standard errors suggest that this average effect hides considerable heterogeneity.
Thus, we continue by examining different types of aid, the actors involved in conflict,
and potential heterogeneity related to ethnic fractionalization and governing coalition
membership.
3.5.3 Channels – Aid Subtypes
Theoretically, different types of aid should be more or less likely to fuel or calm down
a conflict. Investments in education and communication infrastructure are often high-
lighted as those with particularly high long-term benefits, but most likely also require
more time to have an effect. To the extent that projects in particular areas stimu-
late economic development in the short run, we would expect that they increase the
opportunity costs of fighting and could, thus, lead to less conflict. At the same time,
some development projects like hospitals, and to a lesser extent schools, provide more
potential for looting due to, for instance, expensive machines that can be sold on the
black market. Other areas, like infrastructure projects are notoriously known for being
prone to corruption. We assign aid projects to eight subcategories, and consider them
as a treatment in our two favorite specifications with and without country-year fixed
effects. For the WB, the IV strategy works well, using sector-specific probabilities. For
China, the IV does not work sufficiently well, because there are only few observations
in some sectors. Thus, we show those results using OLS. Interesting differences emerge,
suggesting that different types of aid indeed can have a different relationship to subse-
quent conflict. Note that in almost all cases, the country-year fixed effects only affect
the coefficient sizes, not their signs.
In some categories, there is a positive coefficient of World Bank (Chinese) aid, but
it never becomes statistically significant. Based on significance, the negative coefficient
we found for the WB seems to be driven by projects in the area “finance” and “trans-
portation” on average. Those coefficients remain significant both in the less and more
restrictive specification with country-year fixed effects. In the latter specification, a
10% increase in World Bank spending on transportation (finance) is related to a 6.7
(16) percentage points reduction in the likelihood of conflict. Transportation comprises
both a large scope of projects and funds, compared to financial development which is
rather small in terms of dollars spent. The negative effect for transportation, often
infrastructure projects, is particularly interesting when considering the potential for
corruption and cronyism in this sector.
24In this regard, Strange et al. (2017) demonstrate that after withdrawal of Western aid Chinese
aid does fill gaps and, hence, can reduce conflict risk.
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Aid and conflict at the subnational level
It suggests that existing constraints on movement or high transportation costs were
a significant obstacle for development before.25 Moreover, transportation is the only
sector where we consistently find negative and significant effects on conflict likelihood
for both the WB and China.
Putting these sector-specific results into perspective, Table 3.5 suggests hetero-
geneities across aid categories which help to explain the large confidence interval when
estimating the mostly negative coefficient on overall aid. It is important to note that we
find no significant conflict-fueling effect for any type of aid and any of the two donors. It
is reassuring that the negative relationship is not masking strong conflict-fueling effects
for some sectors.26
3.5.4 Actors
Many claims about a conflict-fueling or alleviating effect make implicit assumptions
about involved actors. It is a crucial difference whether the government is fighting
with rebel groups, rebel groups are fighting each other, or uninvolved third parties
(i.e., civilians) are attacked. Depending on political alignment, war actions against
rebel groups might be accepted or even supported by donors.27 In contrast, attacks on
civilians are often condemned by donors, even if happening during an existing conflict,
and might be a reason to withhold aid or reduce future payments. The UCDP data
allow us to distinguish between state and rebel violence, and actions by those two
groups against civilians not directly involved in the conflict.28
Table 3.6 shows the results for both the World Bank and China with and without
country-year fixed effects. State-based violence decreases with additional World Bank
aid, but increases with additional Chinese aid. The coefficients are not statistically
significant, but of an economically meaningful magnitude. Both for the World Bank
and China, we find positive coefficients on violence by actors like rebel groups, which
are larger for China but never statistically significant. The picture looks very different
when considering violence against civilians. In a region that receives either more World
Bank or Chinese aid, there are fewer attacks and assaults that kill civilians. This holds
for both violence by non-state and state actors, but the effect is more nuanced for state
violence.
25The high conflict reducing effect of aid in the “Transportation” sector also corresponds to other
related studies, which indicate the salience of transport costs for economic growth across African
countries (Berman and Couttenier, 2015; Storeygard, 2016).
26Appendix Table C.32 presents the regressions for the WB with OLS and China with IV. The OLS
results differ in some cases, but again there is no significant positive coefficient for any sector.
27Analogously donors might also accept or encourage rebels to fight an opposed regime as in the
case of covert aid to Angolan UNITA under president Reagan (Lagon, 1992). But as the data cover
mostly projects implemented in accordance with the government the latter will play less of a role.
28The UCDP Codebook describes one-sided violence as “the use of armed force by the government
of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians [...]. Extrajudicial killings in custody are
excluded” (Eck and Hultman, 2007).
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Aid and conflict at the subnational level
10% more World Bank aid leads to a between 3.6 and 2.9 percentage points lower
likelihood of lethal violence against civilians (columns 5 and 6), and 10% more Chinese
aid even to a between 7.9 and 8.9 percentage points reduction (columns 5 and 6).
Both coefficients are remarkably stable to the addition of country-year fixed effects,
suggesting that this effect is not driven by unobservable time-varying factors at the
country level. Even within a country that is already in conflict, administrative regions
with aid projects are less likely to experience violence against civilians.
A plausible, and so far maybe underappreciated channel is the threat of losing out on
future payments and projects (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009). Even for recipient politicians
who are not solely concerned with public goods, the withdrawal of aid can be a viable
threat, especially for important projects to the region or the government. It is inter-
esting to observe that this conflict-reducing effect is even stronger for Chinese projects.
Even without officially imposing conditions about human-right violations, governments
in Africa abstain at least from lethal actions against civilians when China supports a
project in a particular region. Besides business interests, the presence of Chinese work-
ers might be another reason to prevent recipient governments from engaging in actions
that could give rise to larger conflicts.
3.5.5 Types of Violence
In their article in the Washington Post, Kishi and Raleigh emphasize “dire conse-
quences” of Chinese aid and that “political violence rates involving state forces also
increase” (based on Raleigh et al., 2010). Should we conclude that these fears are un-
warranted? Not necessarily. Our analysis so far has focused on violent conflict that
involves battle-related deaths, but Kishi and Raleigh highlight that states “use this aid
to finance their hold on power by repressing political competitors.” It seems plausible
that China has every interest to avoid outright battles, but it might be more likely to
turn a blind eye on government repression as long as it ensures stability. Chinese aid
might even be used to build up recipient countries’ surveillance capacities to effectively
repress elements of civil society.29
To evaluate this hypothesis, we rely on the Social Conflict Analysis Database
(SCAD) (Salehyan et al., 2012). The particular strength of this database is that it
covers types of social and political disorder that are usually overlooked in other conflict
datasets, with georeferenced data available from 1990-2016. We are in particular
interested in two types of variables. We code binary variables that take on the value
one if there was at least one riot, strike, or demonstration in a district to measure
potential civil unrest or protests against projects related to China. Second, we code
whether there was at least one event recorded as repression by the government,
focusing on non-lethal repression to distinguish these regressions from our prior results.
29Washington Post, “When China gives aid to African governments, they become more violent,”
last accessed July 26, 2018.
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Aid and conflict at the subnational level
Table 3.8 IV Results – Non-lethal pro-government Violence [SCAD]
Panel A: World Bank Aid (1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) 0.1543 0.0885
(0.1042) (0.1177)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) 0.9798*** 1.3059***
(0.3663) (0.5025)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for a binary indicator of
non-lethal pro-government violence as dependent variable. The sample in-
cludes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World
Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and
region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends. Standard errors in parentheses, two-
way clustered at the country-year and regional level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05,
*** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Table 3.7 begins with regressions running our two main specifications, but now re-
placing the outcome variable with an indicator measuring whether at least one demon-
stration, riot, or strike took place.30 For the World Bank, all specifications yield a neg-
ative or very small positive coefficient, but remain statistically insignificant. Regarding
China, we observe positive coefficients for demonstrations and riots, but although they
are rather large (10% more aid increases the likelihood of riots by 5.3%) they remain sta-
tistically insignificant. Accordingly, despite reports about widespread protests against
Chinese development projects, we find no clear evidence of this. Recipient governments
might achieve this absence of protests and outright conflict by intensifying non-lethal
repression.
Table 3.8 tests whether there were more reports of non-lethal government repres-
sion related to aid. The results indicate neither a positive nor significantly negative
relationship for the World Bank. The results for China are in contrast to our prior
30Tables C.15 depicts the corresponding OLS results. Moreover, Tables C.17, C.18 and C.19 show
OLS regressions separately for demonstrations, riots and strikes. Figure C.5 presents the spatial
distribution of demonstrations, riots and strikes.
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findings and confirm that repression intensifies in regions where China is present. In
line with Bluhm et al. (2016), a 10% increase in Chinese aid increases the likelihood of
experiencing repression by about 13%.31
3.5.6 Spatial Spill-overs
Moving beyond studying aid and conflict in the same region we account for potential
spatial spill-over effects. This is important for two reasons. First, some existing theories
can only be tested by considering the effect of aid in location i on conflict in a particular
location j. The “price” theory postulating government as a price for rebels would predict
that more aid to capital regions or the capital itself leads to a higher likelihood of conflict
in that location. Other theories, however, predict that aid payments to one region affect
the likelihood of conflict in another region. Kishi and Raleigh (2015) suggest that as
aid is fungible, governments can shift expenditures towards strengthening their military.
Improved military forces could then be used to strike down on rebel groups and other
areas of the country.
In line with our prior results, aid projects to outsider regions might strengthen
those regions and reduce conflict there, but also enable rebel groups to contest the
government and attack regions that belong to the governing coalition. To test this, we
code binary variables indicating (i) whether a region is the capital region or not, and (ii)
whether a region features only groups that are part of the governing coalition, is mixed
or has no coalition groups. Second, even if actors are similarly concerned about losing
aid revenues, we would expect that fighting continues in other regions if underlying
tensions are not resolved.
For these tests, we proceed in the following way. Within each country and year, we
aggregate all aid projects and conflicts at the categorical level of these variables. For
instance, we aggregate the overall amount of aid spent in regions that belong to the
governing coalition in a country (A), and the overall amount spent in all other regions
(B). We apply the same procedure to get an aggregate of the conflict incidence variable.
In the following, we then test whether aid receipts in area A lead to a higher likelihood
of conflict in A but also in area B. Table 3.9 presents the results using OLS regressions
and clustering standard errors at the country level.
In line with previous results, aid disbursements in coalition regions as well as to
non-coalition regions strongly and significantly reduce conflict in the respective same
regions. In mixed districts, there is no significant relationship. For China, there are no
signs of any spill-overs on lethal conflict incidence. For the WB, spill-overs are more
nuanced. More aid to coalition regions increases the likelihood of violent conflict in
non-coalition regions, in line with the increase in state capacity as suggested by Kishi
and Raleigh (2015). This effect is only marginally significant, but considerably large in
31Table C.21 reports results for a count variable of non-lethal pro-government violence events, which
are robust to this change in the outcome variable. Table C.20 verifies that this is driven by events
recorded in SCAD that are distinct from the UCDP events, by coding only those region-years as a one
that did not experience lethal government violence against civilians according to UCDP.
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size. 10% more WB aid to the governing regions increases the likelihood of conflict with
at least five casualties by 10 percentage points. Moreover, more aid to mixed regions
also correlates with more conflict in coalition regions.32
Table 3.9 OLS Results – Spill-Overs from Coalition to Non-Coalition Regions
Panel A: World Bank
Conflict in region belonging to... Non-Coalition Coalition Mixed
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝐵 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1) -1.7092*** 0.4046** -0.0432
(0.5116) (0.1942) (0.4648)
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝐵 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1) 1.3437** -1.4479*** -0.0482
(0.5493) (0.3317) (0.6200)
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝐵 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 t-1) -0.6811 0.6578** 0.1513
(0.4946) (0.2806) (0.6715)
𝑁 703 703 703
Panel B: China
Conflict in region belonging to... Non-Coalition Coalition Mixed
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-2) -0.2931 -0.2897 -0.8032***
(0.4996) (0.3274) (0.2367)
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-2) -0.1080 -0.1373 -0.1501
(0.1816) (0.1482) (0.1673)
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 t-2) 0.2577 -0.0313 0.1550
(0.3071) (0.1773) (0.2523)
𝑁 666 666 666
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD ≥25, 0 if BRD<5).
The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the
World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the World
Bank from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag struc-
ture. Both regressions include year and country fixed effects as well as time trends.
Time trends include a linear country-specific time trend. Columns (1) & (2) refer to
all regions without members of the governing coalition, whereas columns (3) & (4)
to mixed regions with some groups in and out of the coalition, and columns (5) &
(6) to regions that contain groups exclusively from the coalition. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the country level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
Finally, we aggregate the aid and conflict data at the country level. This allows us
to see whether our prior analyses of spill-overs hide important patterns that we might
see in the aggregation, but also makes the results comparable to studies at the country
level. We show results with the WB and China in the same regression, with and without
32Appendix Table C.37 runs a similar analysis, but instead of regions that according to EPR are
part of the governing coalition, it focuses on the capital versus other regions in the country.
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Table 3.10 OLS Results – Aggregate Cross-Country Analysis
Excl. Budget Aid Incl. Budget Aid
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝐵 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.2035 0.1578
(0.2492) (0.4179)




Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if
BRD ≥25, 0 if BRD<25). Estimates refer to the country level,
where aid and battle-related deaths were aggregated at the
country level. The sample includes African countries for the
sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the World
Bank from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014
due to the lag structure. All regressions include year and coun-
try fixed effects as well as time trends. Regressions include
country and year fixed effects as well as a linear county-trend.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country
level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
adding non-geocoded aid to the model.33 When considering only geocoded aid, we find
a negative and for China even statistically significant effect. This changes, when adding
non-geocoded flows. Coefficients turn positive, but remain statistically insignificant. In
contrast to the non-geocoded projects, the geocoded aid could be earmarked for more
specific purposes and, hence, be less fungible. In this regard, project specificity might
be linked to different conflict outcomes analogous to the growth effect heterogeneity
observed for project and budget aid (Dreher et al., 2017).
3.5.7 Sensitivity
We conduct a large range of sensitivity tests, which we describe in short here grouped
by issue.
Aggregation level: Appendix Table C.34 (C.33) depicts the corresponding OLS (IV)
results at the ADM2 level. The OLS results for the WB and China are both similar
to the ones at the ADM1 level, with the majority of coefficients being negative. The
patterns of statistical significance are also similar with OLS. Five out of nine coefficients
33Non-geocoded refers here to the projects, which could not be precisely allocated to an adminis-
trative region.
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are significantly negative for the WB, and none for China. The IV point estimates differ
somehow, but in no case become statistically significant.
Computation of standard errors: Table C.38 (Table C.39) presents corresponding
OLS (IV) results using errors clustered only at the regional level. For the WB, seven
out of nine OLS coefficients are now significantly negative. For China, only one negative
coefficient becomes significant at the five percent level. The average IV results remain
negative and insignificant in both cases.
Choice of conflict indicator: As we discuss in the data section, there is no “correct”
coding of the dependent variable, just more and less plausible choices. Table C.25 (C.26)
presents alternative regression results with a higher conflict threshold of at least 25 BRD
per region year using the OLS (IV) specifications. Appendix Table C.23 (Table C.24)
considers the log of battle-related deaths (+0.01) as a continuous measure of conflict
intensity instead of looking at a binary indicator of conflict incidence using OLS (IV).
We find largely negative OLS coefficients for the WB and slightly positive ones for
China, but with IV both coefficients turn negative in line with prior results.
Instrumental variable: We conduct the majority of robustness tests regarding our
instrumental variable strategy. As outlined above, we detrended the Chinese steel
production time series because it is dominated by a long-term trend, but not the WB
liquidity where there is enough year-to-year variation.34 Table C.13 shows that our first
stages also work when using the detrended IDA position or the unadjusted Chinese
steel excess production. This suggests that the long-term trends in steel production
do not overlap with a problematic trend in conflict that differs between low and high
probability regions.
The second component of the instrumental variable, the probability term, can also
be computed in different ways. We test various plausible options. Using the cumulative
probability is advantageous as it only uses pre-determined values, but could create
problems if the probability in the first year(s) is not as informative. Appendix Table
C.12 drops the first year of the respective panel (start at 1998 for the World Bank’s IDA
and 2003 for Chinese Steel), so that the first probability observation is already based
on at least two observations. Table C.14 uses a constant probability from the third
year of the respective sample onwards, i.e., 1998 for the World Bank’s IDA, and 2003
for Chinese Steel, analogous to Nunn and Qian (2014). Appendix Table C.11 drops the
10 highest leverage region-year observations. The instrumental variable is robust to all
these choices and specifications.
Moreover, Appendix Table C.8 reports reduced form estimates. Table C.9 uses a
lead of aid as a placebo treatment in the first stage, which always shows up statisti-
34Although we control in later specifications for linear trends on the country and regional level, we
would not capture the variation incorporated in the interaction of a linear trend with the time-varying
exposure term.
120
Aid and conflict at the subnational level
cally insignificantly. Table C.7 reports the first stage including the coefficient for the
probability.
Non-linear estimators: In line with Berman et al. (2017), we also run a Poisson
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimation in Table C.41, which is suitable for binary
outcomes with a large fraction of zeros. The results are generally in line with the main
findings in terms of coefficient signs. However, one needs to note that we could only
include year fixed effects as the inclusion of further fixed effects caused convergence
issues.
Temporal dependence: As conflict might be highly persistent over time, we include
a lagged dependent variable in Table C.40. The results are very similar, with mostly
negative and partly significant coefficients for the WB and China.
Overlapping panels: Our main table uses the years 1995-2012 for the WB, and the
years 2000-2012 for China. As there could be coordination or competition between the
two donors (e.g., Gehring et al., 2017; Humphrey and Michaelowa, 2018), we also want
to estimate both jointly in one regression. Appendix Tables C.44 and C.45 show that the
coefficients change slightly, with the WB estimates becoming less negative on average.
This change seems to be nearly entirely explained by periodical differences in the effect
of WB aid. When re-estimating the WB results for the years 2000-2012 in Appendix
Tables C.42 and C.43, the point estimates are nearly the same without conditioning
on Chinese Aid. Hence, not controlling directly for the other donor does not seem to
create a large bias, it seems rather that the effects differ between different observation
periods. As limiting the WB period creates a weak IV problem with country-year fixed
effects (see Appendix Table C.43), we choose our two main specifications with differing
sample periods in order to exploit the maximum available information for each donor.
3.6 Conclusion
Our paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between devel-
opment aid and conflict at the subnational level. Therefore, we augment an important
literature that has so far either focused on the macro level (Nielsen et al., 2011; Nunn
and Qian, 2014; Bluhm et al., 2016), very specific types of aid (Berman et al., 2011;
Crost et al., 2014), or on a limited subset of countries (Berman et al., 2011; van Weezel,
2015; Crost et al., 2016), and has not converged towards a consensus.
To achieve that aim, we examine two donors that represent two contrasting ap-
proaches to development, the World Bank and China. One is a multilateral donor
that emphasizes human right conditions and expert knowledge, the other an emerg-
ing South-South donor that emphasizes “mutual benefits” without many official strings
attached (Asmus et al., 2017).
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Our results on aid and conflict in the same region show no signs of a conflict-fueling
effect on average. Rather aid seems to be able to somehow reduce the likelihood of
conflict in particular for WB projects. When distinguishing between different sectors,
we find the strongest and most significant conflict-reducing effects for projects in the
transport sector (both donors). Distinguishing different conflict types suggests that the
reduction in conflict is driven by less lethal violence by governments against civilians.
We examine claims that in particular Chinese projects lead to civilian unrest in
Africa by ignoring local traditions and circumstances, or replacing people. For none
of the two donors, we find evidence that demonstrations, strikes, or riots increase sig-
nificantly. When focusing on non-lethal repression by recipient governments, however,
we find consistent evidence that regions in which China is engaged show an increased
likelihood of repressive measures. The precise reasons for this should be explored in
future research. It seems in line with a rationale where China is eager to avoid violent
conflict that endangers its workers and investment, but less opposed to repression than
the Western donors.
We try to rule out whether, even if aid does not fuel conflict on average, it does so in
regions that are not part of the governing coalition. In this regard, we consider whether
there are spill-overs of aid-driven conflict between the governing coalition and other
regions, or between the capital and other regions. There is no evidence of conflict spill-
overs for China, but some suggestive positive correlations for the World Bank. Overall,
we conclude, based on OLS and IV results using geocoded data, that with regard to
outright conflict with at least five battle-related deaths, WB and Chinese projects both
seem to damping instead of fueling such conflicts.
Finally, country level aid to the government seems to be the factor in reconciling
the discrepancy in the literature. The conclusion that WB and Chinese aid projects
seem rather to dampen conflicts also holds when aggregating this project aid to the
country level. In contrast, including non-geocoded aid, which is directly allocated
to the government, the country level analysis reveals positive relationships of aid and
conflict for both donors, though statistically insignificant. Thus, aid fungibility remains
a critical issue that should be further investigated.
122
Aid and conflict at the subnational level
3.A Data Appendix
3.A.1 Sources
Tables C.1 and C.2 lists descriptions and sources of our independent, dependent and
control variables.
Table C.1 Data Sources
Variable Name Variable Description Time Period Variable Source
World Bank Aid log of World Bank Aid disburse-
ments in a given region-year
1995-2012 Strandow et al. (2011)
Chinese Aid log of Chinese Aid commitments
in a given region-year
2000-2012 Dreher et al. (2017)
Strikes, Riots,
Demonstrations
Binary indicator (100;0) if any vi-
olent event of this type in a given
region-year took place
1995-2012 Salehyan et al. (2012)
Intensity 1/2 Binary indicator (100;0) if
≥5/≥25 persons were killed in a
given region-year
1995-2014 Croicu and Sundberg
(2016)





SPI value of drought severity of
the region’s entire rainy season
1995-2014 Guttman (1999) and
Tollefsen et al. (2012)
Drought (start of
rainseason)
SPI value of drought severity dur-
ing the first month of the region’s
rainy season
1995-2014 Guttman (1999) and
Tollefsen et al. (2012)
Temperature Mean temperature (in degrees
Celsius) per region-year
1995-2014 Fan and Van den Dool
(2008) and Tollefsen
et al. (2012)
Precipitation Total amount of precipitation (in
millimeter) per region-year
1995-2014 Tollefsen et al. (2012)
and Schneider et al.
(2015)
Chinese Steel Production of Chinese Steel in
tonnes
1999-2013 World Steel Association
(2009, 2014)
Elevation Standard deviation of regional el-
evation as an indicator of rugged-
ness of terrain
Constant Riley et al. (1999)
Borders Binary indicator if a given ADM1
region borders another country
Constant Hijmans et al. (2012)
Ocean, Rivers,
Lakes
Binary indicator of presence of
rivers, lakes or ocean in a given
ADM1 region
Constant Natural Earth (2018)
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Table C.2 Data Sources (continued)
Variable Name Variable Description Time Period Variable Source
IDA Funding Po-
sition
“Bank‘s net investment port-
folio and its non-negotiable,
non-interest-bearing demand obli-
gations (on account of members’
subscriptions and contributions)”
divided “by the sum of the
Bank’s undisbursed commit-
ments of development credits and
grants.”(Dreher et al., 2017)
1995-2012 Dreher et al. (2017)
Landarea Area of a given region Constant Hijmans et al. (2012)
Travel Time
(Mean)
Gives the mean regional estimate
of the travel time to the nearest
major city
Constant Uchida and Nelson
(2009) and Tollefsen
et al. (2012)
3.A.2 Independent Variables (Development Aid)
World Bank’s IDA & IBRD disbursements For our analysis we draw on the
“World Bank IBRD-IDA, Level 1, Version 1.4.1” provided by the AidData consortium,
which covers approved loans under the IBRD-IDA lending line between 1995 and 2014.35
These data correspond to project aid disbursed from 5,684 projects in 61,243 locations.
The data build on information provided by the World Bank, including the disburse-
ment dates, project sectors and disbursement amounts. These values were deflated to
2011 values. In an effort to allow for more fine-grained analysis of aid projects, Aid-
Data’s coders filtered the location names from aid project documentation and assigned
these to specific locations. While for some projects exact locations including latitude
and longitude were assigned, other projects, which had a more policy or regulation
oriented purpose, could only be assigned to an administrative level (e.g., the first level
of subnational regions (provinces) or the second level (districts)). In order to include as
many disbursements as possible, but to be also able to grasp the advantages of georefer-
enced data, we focus our analysis on these administrative levels. For our administrative
boundaries, we build on the GADM dataset constructed by Hijmans et al. (2012). One
difficulty with these data is that for some countries, including more populous nations
like Armenia, more fine grained administrative distinctions are missing. As the size of
administrative regions is not fixed by size across countries, we assume in this cases that
our ADM1 regions would be ADM2 regions.
Figure 3.2 displays the development finance locations coded by donor, distinguishing
all projects (precision 1-8), projects coded at least at the first administrative level
35As the number of documented projects declines steeply after 2012, we focus on the 1995-2012
period.
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(precision 1-4), projects coded at least at the second administrative level (precision
1-3) and projects coded more precise (precision 1-2).
One challenge arises in projects with a multitude of locations, where it is not possible
to derive a distinct value of disbursements. In this regard, we suggest two solutions.
First, we allocate disbursements by the number of locations. In line with previous
research by Dreher and Lohmann (2015), we assume that aid is distributed equally
across locations and allocate aid proportionally to the locations per region. For instance,
for a project with 10 locations, where four locations are in region A and six locations
are in region B, 40% of project disbursements would be accounted in region A and 60%
in region B.
Second, we calculate population weighted disbursements. Here, we assume that
aid is allocated based on the regional population shares. For instance, if a project
would have project locations in two regions of a country, where two million inhabitants
would reside in region A and three million would reside in region B, 40% of project
disbursements would be accounted in region A and 60% in region B. Here, the aid
attribution formula would write as follows: 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡∫︀ 𝑃 𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑖 *𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑗, where
p is the project, i is the country, j is the region and t is the period for which we estimate
the allocation shares.
Finally, our dataset comprises development finance from IBRD and IDA. However,
only IDA disbursements can be classified as Official Development Assistance. For this
purpose, projects and corresponding finance were disentangled into IDA (development
aid) and IBRD (development finance) disbursements.
Chinese Aid (ODA-like and OOF flows) In order to create our data on the ADM2
and ADM1 level, we make use of the feature that aid can be defined on the ADM2 level
and then aggregated to the ADM1 level. One challenge with the data is, however, that
we lack information on the ADM2 regions for some countries (as there are no ADM2
regions in small countries). Therefore, we create two spatial joins of ADM1 and ADM2
regions from the GADM dataset with Chinese aid point features. This yields matches
of the specific project locations with the administrative regions as depicted in Figure
C.1.
In order to create our data, we first load our ADM2 data into Stata and drop the
ADM0 and ADM1 identifiers in order to be later able to rely on the identifiers from
the ADM1-Aid spatial join. The next step involves merging the ADM2-Aid spatial join
with the ADM1-Aid spatial join by the target-fid, which uniquely identifies the points
from the Dataset “aiddata_china_1_1_1.xlsx” by Dreher et al. (2016) and Strange
et al. (2017). Based on this data, we create unique identifiers for all ADM1 and ADM2
regions, whereby we treat ADM1 regions as ADM2 regions in cases that ADM2 regions
are missing (e.g., in Cape Verde). This assumption can be made as size of administrative
regions are rather arbitrary and several ADM2 regions are larger than other countries’
ADM1 regions. After getting the regional identifiers right, we can merge (a) the spatial
joins of ADM regions and Chinese aid locations with (b) data on flows of Chinese aid.
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Figure C.1 Chinese Aid ADM1 Spatial Join
Notes: Graphical depiction based on Quantum GIS.
In a first step, we clean these data from entries that only relate to pledges of Chinese
aid (information is from the variable status254). Although the data on Chinese finance
to Africa also contain information on official investment, the focus of this paper is on
development aid. Thus, we focus on flows, which correspond to “ODA-like” funds as
those would correspond closest to development aid (following individual correspondence
with the authors of Strange et al. (2017)). The data are then merged with population
data from the gridded population of the world data (CIESIN, 2016) in order to be able
to allocate financial flows with population weights in case one project had commitment
locations in different administrative regions. Yet, one further challenge has to be re-
solved before allocating the commitments to regions, as the Chinese aid commitments
are coded like World Bank disbursements with different precision (e.g., some are coded
only for geographic features, which involve several administrative regions or are flows
which go to central ministries or the government). For our commitment allocation, we
only consider those projects, which are at least coded at the ADM1 level. This means
that we proportionally exclude commitments, which provide information only on the
central level. We furthermore distinguish between projects, which are coded only at the
ADM1 level and ones that provide information on the ADM2 level (or more precise).
The former are proportionally split over the underlying ADM2 regions. Although the
latter can be precisely traced back to the ADM2 region, it might happen that projects
have commitments in several ADM2 regions. In this case, we also split the commitments
proportionally by locations or population as indicated earlier.
To exploit sectoral variation in development finance both for the World Bank and
China, we make use of the information provided by Strange et al. (2017) on Chinese
aid’s sectoral allocation using the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) codes.
To achieve comparability with the broad sectors indicated for the World Bank, we as-
sign sectors as follows: “Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry” (CRS-310: “Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishing”), “Public Administration, Law and Justice” (CRS-150: “Govern-
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ment and Civil Society”), “Information and communication” (CRS-220: “Communica-
tions”), “Education” (CRS-110: “Education”), “Finance” (CRS-240: “Banking and
Financial Services”), “Health and other social services” (CRS-120: “Health,” CRS-
160: “Other Social infrastructure and services”), “Energy and mining” (CRS-230: “En-
ergy Generation and Supply”), “Transportation” (CRS-210: “Transport and Storage”),
“Water, sanitation and flood protection” (CRS-140: “Water Supply and Sanitation”),
“Industry and Trade” (CRS-330: “Trade and Tourism,” CRS-320: “Industry, Mining,
Construction”).
Sectoral distribution of aid disbursements We use additional information on the
financier for each disbursement for each project. Based on these information, we can
construct sectoral distributions of aid flows. While both donors are investing heavily
in transportation across Africa, further priorities differ. The World Bank supports
Health and Social Services strongly, whereas China commits a large share of its funds
to Industry & Trade.
Figure C.2 Sectoral Distribution of Aid
a) World Bank’s IDA b) China
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Allocation scheme (more detailed)
Location weighting The World Bank geocoded data release comes in the format
of projects and several corresponding locations. For instance, a typical project report
would mention the transaction amounts, the project purpose as well as different project
locations. The latter can be classified in different degrees of precision (e.g., precision
codes smaller than 4 correspond to locations that refer to an ADM2 region or even more
precise, while precision code 4 corresponds to locations at the ADM1 level). When
allocating the development aid across locations on the ADM1 and ADM2 level, we
make following assumptions based on a three step procedure.36 First, we subtract the
share of development aid, which corresponds to locations, which are coded less precise
than ADM1 (e.g., large geographic regions or aid at the country level). E.g., if three
out of 10 locations in a project are coded less precise than ADM1, the further analysis
focuses on the remaining 70% of development aid. Second, we then allocate all aid with
precision codes 1-3 to the corresponding ADM2 regions. This is done by taking the
location share (either by equal or population weights) of the transaction amount per
location. As certain ADM2 regions might have several locations per project or even
several projects, we collapse our data by ADM2 region. Third, we then allocate all aid
with precision code 4 to the corresponding ADM1 regions. This is done by taking the
location share (either by equal or population weights) of the transaction amount per
location. As certain ADM1 regions might have several locations per project or even
several projects, we collapse our data by ADM1 region. In order to allow for inference
on the ADM2 level, we make the assumption that transactions coded with precision 4
are attributable equally to all corresponding ADM2 regions. In practice, this is done
by merging the ADM1 regions with all corresponding ADM2 regions and then splitting
the aid with location or population weights. Finally, data with precision codes 1-3
and precision code 4 can be simply added up on the ADM2 level yielding our treatment
variable of interest. For inference on the ADM1 level, totals of ADM2 level development
assistance are created on the geounit-year level.
36Throughout the paper we allocate the aid either assuming equal weights per location or weighting
each location by population.
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Aid and conflict at the subnational level
Population weighting Analogous to the location weighted aid, we also distribute
aid with population weights. Our population data are from the Center for Interna-
tional Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN, 2016). However, some projects
only consist of locations without population estimates (e.g., deserts). In this case, we
assume a population of 1 citizen per location in order to be able to distribute those aid
disbursements. We then consequently attribute population of ADM1 regions to project
locations, which are coded at the ADM1 level (precision 4), and ADM2 populations to
project locations, which are coded at least as precise as the ADM2 level (precision 1-3).
Similar to the location-weighing, we construct the total population of each project-
year 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡. For the projects coded with precision 4, we then attribute disburse-
ments via the regional share in population 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝐴𝐷𝑀1. This is then divided by 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
and multiplied with the project disbursements 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑉 𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗 in each year:
𝐴𝐷𝑀1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛4 = 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝐴𝐷𝑀1𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗 * 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑉 𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗. As there might be several ac-
tive projects per ADM1 region, we aggregate the disbursements on the ADM1 level.
In order to break those numbers down to the ADM2 level, we merge all correspond-
ing ADM2 regions to the ADM1 regions. We then divide the population in each
ADM2 region by the population in each ADM1 region and multiply this share with
the yearly disbursements per region, 𝐴𝐷𝑀2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛4 = 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝐴𝐷𝑀2𝑝𝑜𝑝𝐴𝐷𝑀1 *𝐴𝐷𝑀1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛4.
For the precision codes 1-3 (at least coded as precise as the ADM2 level), we then
attribute disbursements via the regional share in population divided by 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡. This
is then multiplied with the project disbursements in each year: 𝐴𝐷𝑀2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛123 =
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝐴𝐷𝑀2
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗
* 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑉 𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗. As there might be several active projects per ADM2
region, we aggregate the disbursements on the ADM2 level. Finally, we merge the pre-
cision code 1-3 and 4 data on the ADM2 level to obtain our variables of interest. Those
can then be aggregated on the ADM1 level.
3.A.3 Dependent Variables (Conflict data)
As AidData and UCDP use the same coding framework, we can make use of similar
coding rules and use likewise only observations, which are coded at least at the ADM1
level (precision codes 1-4).
Again for the more precise data (precision codes 1 and 2), we use a point to polygon
analysis on the ADM level. As one conflict event is always coded in one discernible
location (Croicu and Sundberg, 2016), we do not need to make additional distributional
assumptions by location number or population size for conflict data, because we do not
face issues of multiple project locations, which we had in the aid data. Yet, for conflict
observations on the ADM1 level (precision code 4), we do not distribute battle-related
deaths by population weights across ADM2 regions.
One further useful feature of the UCDP data is that it is possible to discern three
different types of violence. Those are namely the government against organized groups
(type 1), organized non-governmental groups versus the government (or against another
non-governmental group) (type 2), and one-sided violence by the government against
civilians (type 3 governmental) and by non-governmental groups against civilians (type
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3 non-governmental).37 UCDP data can be considered as comprehensive for our 1995
to 2012 sample, despite for Syria for which no battle-related deaths information are
providend. Hence, all missing values are treated as zeros except for the Syrian case,
which is not part of our analyisis.
SCAD data UCDP data focus on organized violence with lethal outcomes. How-
ever, along with the different theories it could be hypothesized that discontent and
aid appropriation do not necessarily need to be linked to full-fledged conflict. What is
more, recent empirical work by Bluhm et al. (2016) underscores the role of aid in con-
flict dynamics. Thus, we also consider social conflict as a further outcome, in terms of
demonstrations and repressions, based on the Social Conflict Analysis Database (Sale-
hyan et al., 2012). SCAD involves demonstrations, riots, strikes, coups, pro-, anti-
and extra-government violence, which can, but do not necessarily have to involve ca-
sualties. In this way SCAD complements the UCDP data.38 SCAD mainly builds on
data compiled by the Lexis-Nexis services from searches of Agence France Presse and
Associated Press (Lexis Nexis, 2018). Based on the available information, data are geo-
referenced by web searches of the locations mentioned in the event reports. Analogous
to UCDP data, precision codes are provided, which are used to allocate events in a
similar manner.
Matching EPR to GREG To measure ethnic homelands, we use the Geo-
referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) dataset (Weidmann et al., 2010), which is
a georeferenced version of the initial locations of ethnic homelands based on the
Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira. The information about the power status comes from the
time-variant Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). Wherever
possible, we match the group power status from EPR in a particular year to one
of the time-invarying GREG group homelands. The original dataset assigns eight
different power statuses to groups. The differences are sometimes marginal and hard to
interpret, which is why to minimize measurement error we only use the more precises
information on whether a group was part of the governing coalition or not. We then
intersect the ethnic group polygons with the administrative regions to classify regions
as one of the three categories.
37For a more detailed decription of the different types of violence, please consult Croicu and Sund-
berg (2015).
38Prior to 2014 armed conflict was not included in SCAD data and is now also distinguished from
“social disturbances” (Salehyan and Hendrix, 2017).
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3.B Analytical Appendix
3.B.1 Instrumental Variable
Notes: Yearly IDA-𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 based on Dreher et al. (2017).
Figure C.3 IDA Funding Position – Time Series
Figure C.4 Donor Funding Positions and Aid
a) World Bank IDA Funding
Position and ln(World Bank Aid)
b) Deviations from Trend in Steel
Production and ln(Chinese Aid)
Note: Figure C.4a displays the IDA Funding Position (thick line), the mean of logged World Bank Aid
disbursements per low probability recipient regions (thin line) and the mean of logged World Bank
Aid disbursements per high probability recipient regions (dashed line). Figure C.4b displays the log of
the detrended Chinese Steel Production (thick), the mean of logged Chinese Aid per low probability
recipient regions (thin line) and the mean of logged Chinese Aid per high probability recipient regions
(dashed line).
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Table C.4 Leads and Further Lags
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
Two Leads and Lags: World Bank
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t+1) -0.0059 0.1559
(0.1298) (0.1199)
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t) -0.1089 -0.2128*
(0.1152) (0.1157)
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) 0.0214 -0.0933
(0.0973) (0.0956)
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) 0.0516 0.1424
(0.0939) (0.1212)
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-3) -0.0811 -0.0535
(0.0877) (0.1076)
𝑁 10150 10150
Panel B: Chinese Aid
Lead and Lag: China
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t+1) 0.1681 0.2083*
(0.1244) (0.1258)
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t) -0.0127 0.0231
(0.1268) (0.1358)
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.0086 -0.0481
(0.1514) (0.1600)
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) 0.0121 -0.0506
(0.1165) (0.1313)
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-3) 0.0572 -0.0308
(0.0986) (0.1102)
𝑁 6525 6525
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country- × Year No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if
BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for
the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the World
Bank from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014
due to the lag structure. Both regressions include year and re-
gion fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends include lin-
ear and squared country-specific time trends. Standard errors in
parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional
level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
133
Aid and conflict at the subnational level
Table C.5 IV Results – First Stage: Extensive Margin
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV FS Extensive Margin: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 4.0782*** 4.8249***
(0.4140) (0.5238)
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 -4.3155*** -5.0339***
(0.4512) (0.5506)
𝑁 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV FS Extensive Margin: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -3.7025*** -3.1905***
(0.7694) (0.7572)
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -1.7443*** -1.5365***
(0.2117) (0.1989)
𝑁 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients the first stage
of the instrumental variable regression, when instead of the aid
amount a binary indicator of aid receipts is used. The sample in-
cludes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for
the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions
include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time
trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The
constituent term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Ta-
ble C.7. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.6 IV Results – First Stage: Intensive Margin
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV FS Intensive Margin: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 4.4155 8.5243**
(3.3348) (3.7926)
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 -2.3430 -6.3455
(3.8685) (4.3700)
𝑁 7091 7081
Country-Year FE No Yes
Regional Time Trend Yes Yes
Country Time Trend: Yes Yes
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇 𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑2: Yes Yes
Panel B: Chinese Aid: IV FS Intensive Margin: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -4.6878 -3.2045
(13.5122) (18.1847)
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -2.7933 -6.1660*
(5.5180) (3.4017)
𝑁 232 232
Country-Time Trends No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients the first stage of the instrumental vari-
able regression, when constraining the sample only on recipient regions. The sample in-
cludes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and
2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. All regressions include exogenous controls, region fixed ef-
fects and year fixed effects. Country-Year fixed effects and more rigid time trends are not
included for Chinese Aid due to the more limited variation. The constituent term of the
probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered at the country-year and regional level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.7 IV Results – First Stage with Probability Constituent Term
Panel A: World Bank Aid (1) (2)
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 70.9363*** 80.8832***
(7.1065) (8.6854)
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 -72.7723*** -82.0994***
(7.7291) (9.2698)
𝑁 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -70.8763*** -60.6567***
(14.9526) (14.9524)
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -33.3092*** -29.6850***
(3.9348) (3.7560)
𝑁 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients the first stage of
the instrumental variable regression, displaying additionally the con-
stituent term of the probability, which was also used in Table 3.4.The
sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-
2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both re-
gressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends.
Time trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends.
The constituent term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Ta-
ble C.7. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.8 IV Results – Reduced Form
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
Reduced Form: IDA Position
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 10.8281 19.2994
(27.3795) (33.4583)
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 -7.1921 -18.2132
(26.5498) (33.5818)
𝑁 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
Reduced Form: Chinese Steel
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -12.0548 -17.4914*
(9.1057) (9.5552)
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 47.2461 39.7102
(47.4192) (51.6767)
𝑁 7250 7250
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country × Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if
BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample includes African countries
for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and
2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and re-
gion fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends include lin-
ear and squared country-specific time trends. Standard errors in
parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional
level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.9 Placebo – Instrumented Lead of Aid
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
Placebo (Lead): World Bank
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t+1) 0.2299 0.2332
(0.3586) (0.3704)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.481 86.444
Panel B: Chinese Aid
Placebo (Lead): China
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t+1) -0.1709 -0.8099
(0.4393) (0.5778)
N 8700 8700
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 17.628 12.910
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country × Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period
of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both re-
gressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time
trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. Standard
errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional
level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.10 IV Results – IDA-Position𝑡−1
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second Stage: IDA Position (t-1)
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.1294 -0.0251
(0.3976) (0.3868)
IV FS: IDA Position (t-1)
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 51.3655*** 65.1984***
(5.6627) (6.9103)
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 -52.8484*** -67.1407***
(6.2620) (7.5204)
𝑁 12325 12325
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if
BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for
the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region
fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends. Instead of a running sum of
IDA funding position in “t” and “t-1” only the variation in “t-1”
is used. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.11 IV Results – Without high Leverage Regions
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.0990 -0.2268
(0.3761) (0.4197)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.363 86.752
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 70.8414*** 80.8936***
(7.1068) (8.6851)
𝑁 12317 12291
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.4529 -0.4367
(0.6166) (0.8058)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.462 16.449
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -70.8804*** -60.6611***
(14.9554) (14.9568)
𝑁 7974 7974
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of
1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regres-
sions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends
include linear and squared country-specific time trends. Standard errors in
parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.12 IV Results – Excluding First Year
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position 𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.2904 -0.2681
(0.4172) (0.3975)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 80.438 78.004
IV First stage: IDA Position 𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 68.5810*** 88.1297***
(7.6467) (9.9784)
𝑁 11600 11600
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.9072 -0.9387
(0.9329) (1.2510)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.002 0.012
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 9.548 6.144
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -52.0807*** -42.3054**
(16.8548) (17.0681)
𝑁 7250 7250
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The
sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank
and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well
as time trends. Time trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The
constituent term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7. Standard errors in
parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
141
Aid and conflict at the subnational level
Table C.13 IV Results – WB Aid detrended & Chinese Aid not detrended
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) 0.3239 0.0770
(0.7185) (0.7595)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.001
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 30.474 15.646
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 49.1363*** 59.7776***
(8.9010) (15.1125)
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 1.0001 0.3355
(1.5130) (1.8596)
𝑁 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.0980 0.0374
(0.2384) (0.2766)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 66.567 58.408
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -54.7934*** -50.5179***
(6.7158) (6.6102)
𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 634.3188*** 585.1439***
(80.2897) (79.2510)
𝑁 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of
1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions
include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends include
linear and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the
probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7. Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.14 IV Results – Initial Probability
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) 0.2253 -0.3389
(0.7469) (0.6205)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 27.151 26.086
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 98 43.4309*** 61.1537***
(8.3349) (11.9734)
𝑁 11600 11600
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -1.6319 -1.4597
(1.3706) (1.4889)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.001 0.004
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 10.461 7.880
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 03 -36.7317*** -35.9689***
(11.3566) (12.8131)
𝑁 7250 7250
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of
1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions
include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends in-
clude linear and squared country-specific time trends. The probability is based
on the third year in the corresponding sample (1998 for the World Bank’s IDA;
2003 for Chinese Steel) and held thereafter constant. Standard errors in paren-
theses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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3.B.2 Alternative Outcome Variables
Figure C.5 SCAD Data for Precision Codes 1-4
Source: Own depiction bases on Salehyan et al. (2012).
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Table C.16 IV Results – Riots, Demonstrations & Strikes [SCAD]
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.3854 -0.2032
(0.3092) (0.3362)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 70.9363*** 80.8832***
(7.1065) (8.6854)
𝑁 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) 0.1578 0.2686
(0.6087) (0.7312)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -70.8763*** -60.6567***
(14.9526) (14.9524)
𝑁 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for any violence of these three
types as dependent variable. The sample includes African countries for the sam-
pling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid.
Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends.
Time trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The con-
stituent term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7. Standard
errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.20 IV Results – Repression (non-lethal) without UCDP Violence
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV: IDA Position - Actors
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) 0.1543 0.0885
(0.1042) (0.1177)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV: Chinese Steel - Actors
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) 0.9798*** 1.3059***
(0.3663) (0.5025)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for a binary pro-
governmental violence indicator as dependent variable. Outcomes in re-
gions with UCDP governmental violence against civilians are coded as zero.
The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012
for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions in-
clude year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends
include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent
term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7. Standard errors
in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.21 IV Results – Count of non-lethal pro-government Violence [SCAD]
Panel A: World Bank Aid (1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) 0.0011 0.0012
(0.0014) (0.0013)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) 0.0146*** 0.0197**
(0.0056) (0.0092)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for a continuous measure
of non-lethal pro-government violence as dependent variable. The sam-
ple includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the
World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year
and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends include linear
and squared country-specific time trends. Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
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Table C.24 IV Results – Battle-Related Deaths
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.0179 -0.0340
(0.0340) (0.0358)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 70.9363*** 80.8832***
(7.1065) (8.6854)
𝑁 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.0413 -0.0270
(0.0470) (0.0635)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -70.8763*** -60.6567***
(14.9526) (14.9524)
𝑁 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for the log of battle-related
deaths +0.01 as dependent variable. The sample includes African countries for
the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chi-
nese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time
trends. Time trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends.
The constituent term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7.
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and re-
gional level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.26 IV Results – Intensity 2 (BRD ≥25)
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second Stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.1437 -0.4581
(0.3075) (0.3301)
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 70.9363*** 80.8832***
(7.1065) (8.6854)
𝑁 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) 0.1980 0.2563
(0.3729) (0.4669)
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -70.8763*** -60.6567***
(14.9526) (14.9524)
𝑁 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if
BRD≥25, 0 if BRD<25). The sample includes African countries for
the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012
for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed ef-
fects as well as time trends. Time trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probabil-
ity is depicted in Appendix Table C.7. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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3.B.3 Channels – Ethnic Groups, Governing Coalition and
Aid Types
Conflicts are not only driven by economic considerations, but often strongly influenced
by existing cleavages between groups. Ethnic identities are the most salient traits
and ethnic groups the most important reference group in most African countries. To
measure ethnic homelands, we use the GREG dataset (Weidmann et al., 2010), which is
a georeferenced version of the initial locations of ethnic homelands based on the Soviet
Atlas Narodov Mira. These locations were determined before our sample, and, even
though immigration becomes more important over time, prior studies suggest that a
large share of Africans still live in their ethnic home region (Nunn and Wantchekon,
2011). This makes those group polygons a noisy, but still informative measure.
A first important question is whether the effect of aid projects differs between more
and less ethnically fractionalized regions. Theoretically, one might expect more poten-
tial for dissatisfaction about an unequal allocation of projects or the distribution of
the associated benefits in ethnically fractionalized regions. We compute standard frac-
tionalization measures in line with the literature (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Alesina and
Ferrara, 2005), and split the sample between countries in regions with fractionalization
above or below the mean or median. Appendix Tables C.27 and C.28 show no large
differences. When including country-year FE, the negative relationship between aid
and conflict becomes even a bit stronger, but the difference is small. Even in the more
fractionalized regions, it does not turn positive.39
More important than considering ethnic cleavages in general is to define which ethnic
groups are allies and form a joint coalition and which groups are outside that coalition.
To classify administrative regions, our unit of analysis, we distinguish whether all groups
(Coalition), at least one group (Mixed), or no group (N-Coalition) in a region is part
of the governing coalition in a particular year. The information about the power status
comes from the time-variant Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015).
Wherever possible, we match the group power status from EPR in a particular year to
one of the time-invariant GREG group homelands. The original dataset assigns eight
different power statuses to groups. The difference are sometimes marginal and hard to
interpret, which is why we only use the more precise information on whether a group
was part of the governing coalition or not. We then intersect the ethnic group polygons
with the administrative regions to classify regions as one of the three categories.
This distinction aims at testing the plausibility of the existing results, and at un-
covering heterogeneous effects that might be hidden in the averages. For instance, it
might be that there is no conflict-inducing effect on average. However, assuming that
aid project benefit governing groups more often, existing tensions and conflict might
be fueled especially in mixed districts where other groups observe these distributional
39Note that like for individual aid types, the IV does not perform sufficiently well for China when
splitting the samples. Hence, we show the OLS specifications for all the sample splits for China. We
intend to conduct a more in-depth analysis of aid inequality and ethnic groups in an accompanying
paper.
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differences. In contrast, rapacity theory would predict that governing coalition regions
with large aid inflows become more attractive for rebels to capture.
We find several interesting differences in Table C.29. The results for the WB always
change signs depending on the inclusion of country-year fixed effects. Nonetheless,
there is again never a significant conflict-inducing effect. For China, all coefficients are
negative, even though again statistically insignificant. Even when considering governing
coalition structures, on average Chinese aid does not increase conflicts with at least five
battle-related deaths.40
Table C.27 Sample split – Mean of Fractionalization
Panel A: World Bank Aid – IV:
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) 0.0492 -0.5546 -0.0498 -0.0256
(0.4419) (0.4796) (0.6270) (0.8597)
N 6715 6698 3757 3740
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 79.593 56.722 63.955 45.934
Panel B: Chinese Aid – OLS:
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.0069 -0.0044 -0.0990 0.0527
(0.1222) (0.1434) (0.1845) (0.1641)
N 4740 4728 2652 2640
Country × Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sam-
ple is split in regions, which are below the country level mean of ethnic fractionalization (0)
[columns (1) & (2)] or above the mean (1) [columns (3) & (4)]. Ethnic fractionalization is
based on 1 −∑︀ 𝑠2, where s is the ethnic groups area share in the administrative region. The
sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank
and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the World Bank from 1996 to
2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Both regressions include
(time-varying) exogenous controls, year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time
trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as linear regional time
trends. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional
level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
40This finding is robust to defining the coalition only as the more powerful senior, dominant or
monopoly groups and excluding junior partners. Results are available upon request from the authors.
Appendix Table C.31 presents the coalition sample split without controlling for fractionalization. Ap-
pendix Table C.30 shows the results in Table C.29 for the WB using OLS and for China using IV.
There are overall no large differences that substantially alter our conclusions.
158
Aid and conflict at the subnational level
Table C.28 Sample-split – Median Fractionalization
Panel A: World Bank Aid – IV:
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.2585 -0.6189 0.1471 -0.0455
(0.4163) (0.4904) (0.5688) (0.7054)
N 5474 5474 4998 4998
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 71.721 49.454 75.067 65.391
Panel B: Chinese Aid – IV:
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.7075 -0.8209 0.0282 1.3653
(0.8256) (1.0744) (0.8463) (1.1783)
N 3542 3542 3234 3234
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 30.983 21.080 15.370 9.900
Country × Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sam-
ple is split in regions, which are below the country level median / mean of ethnic fractional-
ization (0) [columns (1) & (2)] or above the median / mean (1) [columns (3) & (4)]. Ethnic
fractionalization is based on 1 −∑︀ 𝑠2, where s is the ethnic groups area share in the adminis-
trative region. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for
the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the World Bank
from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Both regres-
sions include (time-varying) exogenous controls, year and region fixed effects as well as time
trends. Time trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as linear
regional time trends. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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3.B.4 Estimations – Miscellaneous
Table C.33 IV Results – ADM2 Regions
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) 0.2599 0.1522
(0.1644) (0.1171)
𝑁 99367 99367
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.0151 -0.0289
(0.1116) (0.1459)
𝑁 64285 64285
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator
(100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample includes
African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012
for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid.
Both regressions include year and region fixed effects
as well as time trends. Time trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends. The constituent
term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Table
C.7. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered
at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
164




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Aid and conflict at the subnational level
Table C.36 IV Results – Population Weighted Aid Allocation
Panel A: World Bank Aid (1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.1026 -0.2286
(0.3798) (0.4256)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 100.841 88.424
Panel B: Chinese Aid (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.4569 -0.4323
(0.6251) (0.8160)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.601 16.535
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period
of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both
regressions include exogenous (time-varying) controls. Year and region
fixed effects as well as time trends are included in all regressions. Time
trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends and a lin-
ear regional trend. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in
Appendix Table C.7. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered
at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Spatial spill-overs Analyzing spill-overs between capital and non-capital regions
has the advantage of not relying on the EPR data and the ethnic homelands, and the
disadvantage that it plots one region against all others. We run two sets of regressions.
In some we use only the aid payments we included so far, in the second set we assign
all aid that could not be allocated to an ADM1 region to the capital region. These
specifications indicate no significant spill-overs between capital and other regions.
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Conflict in other Region - World Bank Capital Non-Capital
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝐵 𝐴𝑖𝑑 non-Capital t-1) -0.3243 -0.7626
(0.4335) (0.4634)
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝐵 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 t-1) 0.3851 0.5004
(0.4071) (0.4782)
𝑁 836 836
Conflict in other Region - China Capital Non-Capital
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 non-Capital t-2) -0.1629 -0.0306
(0.1542) (0.1637)





Conflict in other Region - World Bank Capital Non-Capital
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝐵 𝐴𝑖𝑑 non-Capital t-1) -0.3725 -0.3694
(0.2928) (0.4252)
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝐵 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 t-1) 0.3953 -0.0802
(0.2417) (0.4529)
𝑁 836 836
Conflict in other Region - China Capital Non-Capital
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 non-Capital t-2) -0.1047 0.0585
(0.1647) (0.1813)
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 t-2) -0.2147* -0.1836
(0.1190) (0.1983)
𝑁 792 792
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if
BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for
the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the World Bank
from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to
the lag structure. Both regressions include year and country fixed
effects as well as time trends. Time trends include linear country-
specific time trends. Column (1) refers to aid and its effect in the
capital regions, whereas column (2) refers to aid and its effect in
non-capital regions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the country level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Aid and conflict at the subnational level
Table C.39 IV Results – Clustering at Regional Level
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.1014 -0.2252
(0.3276) (0.3899)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 237.269 132.466
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.4509 -0.4276
(0.6147) (0.8096)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 28.972 18.960
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period
of 1995-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both
regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends.
Time trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The
constituent term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Aid and conflict at the subnational level
Table C.41 Robustness – Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
main
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.0005 0.0178 -0.0171
(0.0063) (0.0149) (0.0173)
𝑁 6246 1476 7344
Panel B: Chinese Aid
main
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.0128* 0.0023 -0.0328*
(0.0076) (0.0131) (0.0189)
𝑁 3783 962 4589
Notes: Dependent variables: In column (1) a binary con-
flict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5), in column (2)
a binary indicator if any event of non-lethal pro-government
violence took place, in column (3) a continuous measure of
logged battle-related deaths. The sample includes African
countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the World
Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. All regressions include
year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the regional level. * 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table C.43 IV Results – World Bank Aid in Same Years as Chinese Aid
(1) (2)
Panel A: World Bank Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.6227 -2.3417
(1.0568) (1.6897)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.005
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.619 6.960
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 57.2759*** 63.9080***
(12.0429) (24.2241)
𝑁 7975 7975
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.4509 -0.4276
(0.6168) (0.8068)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -70.8763*** -60.6567***
(14.9526) (14.9524)
𝑁 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of
2001-2012 for the World Bank and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regres-
sions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time trends
include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent term
of the probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7. Standard errors in paren-
theses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Aid and conflict at the subnational level
Table C.45 IV Results – Both Donors
(1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-1) -0.7692 -2.4159
(1.0994) (1.7067)
𝑙𝑛(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑖𝑑 t-2) -0.4485 -0.4033
(0.6271) (0.8310)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.004
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 12.042 3.511
IV First stage: IDA Position
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-2 57.3141*** 63.8098***
(12.0387) (24.1928)
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 t-3 -0.5590 -0.5283
(4.6845) (4.3082)
𝑁 7975 7975
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
𝐼𝐷𝐴 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t-1 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑡−2 -18.0734* -9.5155
(9.3582) (12.7548)
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 t-3 × 𝐶𝑢𝑚. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑡−3 -70.7017*** -60.7419***
(14.9511) (14.9668)
𝑁 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls × Year Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of
2000-2012. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time
trends. Time trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends.
The constituent term of the probability is depicted in Appendix Table C.7.
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and re-
gional level.
* 𝑝 < 0.1, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Chapter 4
What Makes a Successful
Development Intervention?
The Theory of Planned Behavior –
An Application to Implementation
Research
Joint work with Jana C. Kuhnt, Katharina Richert and Sebastian
Vollmer
Abstract
The success of development interventions crucially depends on their uptake
in the targeted population. We investigate incentives for uptake of those inter-
ventions, making use of a framework grounded in psychological theory: “The
Theory of Planned Behavior.” The framework suggests three determinants for
intervention uptake: personal attitudes, the social influence of important others
and the perceived ease of intervention use. We use the setup of two random-
ized controlled trials in Indonesia and Pakistan to test the theoretical framework.
Our findings show that the proposed determinants are indeed associated with in-
creased uptake. We investigate further on the determinant personal attitudes by
conducting a framed field experiment in Indonesia. The experiment shows that
the study population in the Indonesian context exhibits higher levels of support
for the project if the participation of international actors is highlighted. Con-
sequently, our results encourage development research and cooperation, first, to
consider the determinants suggested by the “Theory of Planned Behavior” in
the design of interventions in order to increase uptake. Second, depending on
the country context and previous experience, explicitly framing participation of




The Theory of Planned Behavior – An Application to Implementation Research
4.1 Introduction
A large focus in the literature studying development cooperation naturally lies on its
effectiveness. On the macroeconomic cross-country level, the effectiveness of aid is stud-
ied to an impressive extent, while results are still inconclusive (Burnside and Dollar,
2000; Easterly et al., 2004). In focus of the literature typically stand donor character-
istics (Berthélemy, 2006; Minasyan et al., 2017), recipient characteristics (e.g., Dollar
and Pritchett, 1998; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008), or certain types of development
assistance (e.g., Dreher et al., 2008; Clemens et al., 2012; Roodman, 2015). Much less
attention is drawn to the specific implementation features of development interventions,
which might likewise and very likely predict success or failure of interventions. Take
for instance two very similar interventions on HIV/Aids education for young people in
Uganda from Kinsman et al. (2001) and Karim et al. (2009). While Karim et al. (2009)
show quite positive effects of the intervention on female participants with regard to
increased condom use, Kinsman et al. (2001) see almost no effect of their large-scale
intervention. Can we accordingly assume that HIV/Aids education works in all evalu-
ated eight districts, but Masaka, where Kinsman et al. (2001) conducted their study?
Alternatively in 2009, but not in 2001? Possible, but unlikely. The probability is higher
that the implementation strategy, which Karim et al. (2009) tested, was more successful
in achieving behavioral change than the approach evaluated by Kinsman et al. (2001)
in the given setting. However, what makes a successful development intervention? At
the heart of development interventions is regularly the aim to change human behavior –
generally as a mediator to reach a certain goal (e.g., increased use of condoms to reduce
sexually transmitted diseases). Limited participation or support from the respective
study population challenges these interventions (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2010; Cole et al.,
2013). In this chapter, we want to address the puzzle of success and failure of inter-
ventions and examine incentivizing factors for intervention uptake. What we have in
mind here, is a framework, guiding researchers and practitioners in designing successful
interventions. A systematic and deep understanding of what drives behavioral change
in response to development activities is in high demand and studies partly acknowledge
this by building a theory of change (Nayiga et al., 2014; Rogers, 2014). However, the
application of a general framework is missing (Duflo et al., 2007; World Bank, 2015b).
Instead, most interventions in development economics still predominantly rely on mon-
etary incentives to increase uptake. Other important drivers of human behavior have
attracted limited attention (Kettle et al., 2016). This is the case, despite insights from
behavioral economics stressing the importance of non-monetary incentives that shape
human motivation and behavior (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes,
2012), and scholarly work showing that these factors play a role in the successful design
of interventions (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2010; Cole et al., 2013; Ashraf et al., 2014).1
1These factors “disturbing” the rational decision-making are acknowledged by economists (here
often-called psychological biases and cognitive limitations) and insights from behavioral economics are
increasingly applied to public policy (e.g., Behavioral Insights Team in the UK; Mind, Behavior and
Development Unit at the World Bank; Madrian (2014)).
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We make use of a psychological theory called the “Theory of Planned Behavior”
(TPB), which provides a straightforward framework to identify and respond to facil-
itating and hindering factors related to human behavior. The framework rests upon
three determining factors that influence a person’s behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980;
Ajzen, 1985). The first determinant is the personal attitude towards the behavior,
which refers to the degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation
of performing the behavior in question. A certain attitude (e.g., dis-/trust) is mostly
acquired through knowledge or learning, which can be influenced by various factors,
including information or previous experience (Perugini and Bagozzi, 2001; Vogel and
Wanke, 2016). The second predictor termed “subjective norm” reflects the social influ-
ence felt by the individual. It refers to the perceived social pressure to perform or not
to perform the behavior. The third behavioral determinant is the degree of “perceived
behavioral control,” which refers to the perceived own control over the behavior, i.e.,
ease or difficulty in its performance (Armitage and Conner, 2001). Generally speaking,
individuals are more likely to intend a certain behavior if they judge it beneficial (atti-
tude toward behavior), if they think important others want them to do it (subjective
norm), and if they feel, they are able to do it (perceived behavioral control). Impor-
tantly, the TPB links its three predictors to intended behavior, which is the immediate
antecedent and, thus, a close predictor of an individual’s actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991;
Bilic, 2005).
The TPB is currently the most widely used and accepted social cognition model
across disciplines and researchers (e.g., Ogden, 2003; Hobbis and Sutton, 2005;
McEachan et al., 2011) and seems particularly suitable to development economics.
This is the case as there is a substantial body of literature which shows the applica-
bility of the TPB to a wide variety of behaviors in different cultural and geographical
settings including high and low income countries (e.g., Protogerou et al., 2012; Kiene
et al., 2014; Walrave et al., 2014; Hsu et al., 2017; Kassim et al., 2017). The TPB’s
predictive power was for instance shown in different settings with regard to technology,
health-care, consumption choices, voting or education (Blue, 1995; Armitage and
Conner, 2001; Bilic, 2005; Barnard-Brak et al., 2010; Cheon et al., 2012; Cooke et al.,
2014; Appleby et al., 2016; Landmann et al., 2017).2 To the best of our knowledge,
however, the framework has not yet been used in implementation research to guide
interventions in the field of development economics.
We apply the TPB to a real-world intervention, which we conducted ourselves. More
specifically, we consider the introduction of the World Health Organization (WHO)’s
Safe Childbirth Checklist (SCC) within two randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in
Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Kuhnt and Vollmer, 2018) and Indonesia’s
Aceh province (Diba et al., 2018). Evidently, the checklist can only be effective if
health personnel complies with the intervention and actually uses the SCC. Hence, the
behavior in question is the uptake (use) of the checklist during deliveries. Based on the
2Studies also looked into long-term predictions of the TPB. While the predictive power oftentimes
drops with time, the TPB is still able to predict behavior for time periods as long as 15 years (e.g.,
McEachan et al., 2011; Fichten et al., 2016).
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TPB determinants, we analyze incentivizing factors. In addition, we will strengthen the
analysis by looking into one specific parameter that is likely to influence the behavioral
reaction towards development programs. Recently, studies have started to shed light on
softer preconditions for the support of interventions: the implementer’s characteristics
(e.g., Cilliers et al., 2015; Findley et al., 2017). These fall into our determinant attitude
towards the behavior, because they influence trust levels. As this determinant is par-
ticularly well in control of implementers, the realization of potential incentives should
be comparably easy and promising. Accordingly, we deepen our analysis of the deter-
minant attitude towards checklist use by conducting a framed field experiment. Within
the context of the Indonesian SCC trial, we assess whether health personnel’s attitude
and support towards checklist use changes conditional on whether the participation of
local or international agents in the study is highlighted.3
Our results show that the TPB can indeed help in disentangling the puzzle about
intervention success and failure and consequently serve as a guideline in determining
and shaping factors affecting intervention uptake. In both country settings, all three
proposed TPB determinants are positively related to the uptake of the intervention. A
focus on the implementation design on stimulating these factors is thus likely to increase
the success of interventions through increased support and consequently higher partici-
pation rates among the targeted population. Furthermore, our framed field experiment
indicates that the change in attitudes due to the salience of international involvement
in projects seems to have advantages over solely locally organized programs in the In-
donesian context. The population under study shows higher trust and support for
interventions with international involvement. Previous exposure to both international
and local implementers drives those positive behavioral reactions towards international
research projects.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 links the “Theory of Planned
Behavior” to our intervention and describes our research design and data. Section 4.3
elaborates on the methods used, and the results are described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
discusses the generalizability and policy relevance of the results and concludes the study.
4.2 Research Design and Data
The interventions used in this study address safe childbirth. For a detailed description
of the interventions, see the evaluation articles of the main RCTs (Diba et al., 2018;
Kuhnt and Vollmer, 2018). Two-thirds of mother and newborn deaths globally occur
due to causes, which could largely be prevented if well-established essential practices
were followed (WHO, 2018). However, the gap between the knowledge about what
should be done to ensure safe deliveries and what is actually done is large. Following
the ideas of the rational choice theory that describes independent agents striving to
maximize their utility (Simon and Feldman, 1959), the deviation should be a matter of
information or knowledge availability, assuming that incentives to ensure the well-being
3For a visualization of our study design, see Figure D.2.
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of the patient are functioning (e.g., humanity; prestige or punishment and investigation
in case of death of mother or child). The WHO Safe Childbirth Checklist (SCC)
initiative aims at providing health personnel with a checklist to be used around the
delivery process entailing the essential practices addressing the major risk factors for
mothers and children in low and middle income countries. Experience from other
medical fields suggests that checklists could be a promising tool to motivate health
personnel to follow essential practices and tackle the know-do gap. Checklists compress
and bundle the necessary information into easy-to-use actionable items and herewith
reduce a possible “information overload” (e.g., Workman et al., 2007; Borchard et al.,
2012; Haugen et al., 2015). Insights from behavioral economics suggest that human
behavior is bounded by limitations of the working memory. In situations characterized
by high levels of cognitive load – the amount of mental activity imposed – the successful
execution of certain tasks might be interrupted or impaired (e.g., Croskerry, 2002;
Burgess, 2010; Hoffman et al., 2011; Deck and Jahedi, 2015; Lichand and Mani, 2016).
Checklists can be especially helpful to reduce additional cognitive load and allow a
reduction of complexity of the task at hand by reminding the user of the essential steps
to follow.
Using cluster randomized controlled trials, we evaluated the SCC in 32 health fa-
cilities in Indonesia, as well as in 17 health facilities and among 149 individual health
providers in Pakistan. In both countries, the intervention we conducted was very simi-
lar. The treatment (SCC) was randomly introduced to approximately half of the health
providers to causally identify the effect of the intervention on studied outcomes. The
randomization took place at the facility level. Hence, all staff working in the same
facility were jointly allocated to either treatment or control group.
4.2.1 The TPB in the Setting of the SCC Intervention
In this section, we apply the logic of the Theory of Planned Behavior to the SCC
intervention. This identifies the TPB determinants as illustrated in Figure 4.1. In the
logic of Ajzen (1991) the attitude towards the checklist, the subjective norm of health
personnel and the perceived behavioral control about checklist use will jointly determine
whether health staff intends to use the checklist, which finally leads to whether the
checklist is actually used during deliveries. We will go into more detail in the following.
The puzzle of this study is as follows: If health personnel know that the checklist
entails necessary essential practices supporting the safety of deliveries, why would they
decide not to use the checklist. This is where we apply the TPB to carve out how
the perception about the checklist’s usefulness and relevance (“Attitude towards the
Behavior”), support, and peer-pressure among staff members (“Subjective Norm”), as
well as perceived ability to use the checklist (“Perceived Behavioral Control”), shape
intended (“Intentions”) and actual uptake (“Behavior”). Specifically, the know-do gap
can be translated into the TPB determinants: The easiest explanation of why people
would not use the checklist is because they do not know its benefits. The research design
assured that all health personnel is informed about the checklist’s benefits. Knowing
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Figure 4.1 Applying the TPB to the SCC Intervention
Source: Authors’ depiction.
Note: Own illustration based upon Ajzen (1991).
the benefits, however, presumes that health personnel also believed in the information
attained. Trusting in the checklist would therefore be a first important precondition
for checklist uptake (attitude towards the behavior). On the perspective of the do-side
from the know-do gap, people might still not use the checklist as they feel unable to use
it (perceived behavioral control) or not obliged to do so (subjective norm). Using the
real-world setting of the SCC interventions in Indonesia and Pakistan, we are able to
empirically test the influence of the TPB determinants on intended and actual use of
the SCC.4 Of all TPB determinants, the attitude towards the behavior building on how
trust-worthy the intervention is perceived seems to be particularly well in control of
the intervention implementer. We therefore elaborate additionally on this determinant
within our field experiment.
Data: Measuring TPB Determinants and Outcomes
We measured our data through surveys with health personnel and clinical observations
of the delivery process. Our TPB determinants were collected through survey questions
and serve as explanatory variables in our analysis. We conducted surveys at the health
4Theoretically, opportunity costs of using the SCC might be an impeding factor. However, mon-
etary costs are very low and non-monetary components are implicitly part of attitudes and subjective
norms.
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facilities in Indonesia and Pakistan at the beginning and the end of the interventions.
Importantly, the data for the TPB analysis were only collected for the respondents
working in treatment facilities, as at the time of the endline survey health staff in control
facilities had not been in contact with the SCC. Hence, asking about the perceptions
of the SCC would not have been possible and limits our sample to those interviewed
at treatment facilities. This leaves us with 79 respondents in Pakistan and 163 health
workers in Indonesia.5 Including only the treatment facilities, gives us a non-random
sample limiting causal inference, which is discussed below.
The numerous applications of the TPB to a wide array of contexts ease the measure-
ment of TPB determinants (e.g., French and Hankins, 2003; McEachan et al., 2011).6
We were thus able to follow the respective literature when formulating survey questions.
The first determinant attitude towards the behavior, here towards the use of the SCC,
we prompt by asking the respondents to judge the usefulness of the SCC in their pro-
fessional context (based upon Kam et al. (2012)). Subjective norm would translate into
the degree of support by health practitioners’ superiors. Perceived behavioral control
takes into account how easy the health practitioners judge the checklist to be applicable
in their daily work routine. The judgment on the three TPB determinants was gen-
erally very positive. For all three determinants and in both contexts the respondents
provide a rating of five on a scale ranging from one to six, where six corresponds to
“fully agree.”7 However, Appendix Tables D.4 and D.5 indicate some distinct variation,
which we exploit in our analysis. Beyond the main TPB variables, surveys included
demographic background information, which serves as control variables.
Following the TPB, the three components then influence whether health staff intends
to use the checklist and, ultimately, if they actually use it during deliveries conducted
(see Figure 4.1). Intentions to use the checklist and actual checklist use represent our
outcome measures. We investigated respondents’ intended behavior towards the SCC
use, by asking whether they intend to continue using the SCC after termination of
5The Pakistani health staff worked at 70 different providers (including individual providers but
also larger health facilities). While we surveyed every individual provider, we increased the number of
interviews at health facilities proportionally with their number of delivery staff to get a more nuanced
picture within larger teams. The Indonesian trial involved interviews at 16 health facilities.
6It has to be noted that the TPB can be applied in various ways, which is likely to influence
its effects (Lugoe and Rise, 1999). In order to increase the TPB’s explanatory power and flexibility
to address also varying intentions and behavior, several studies extended the original framework by
further constructs and components (e.g., Conner and Armitage, 1998; Perugini and Bagozzi, 2001;
Armitage and Conner, 2001; Bilic, 2005; Cheon et al., 2012). We will stick to the original theory
when applying it to development economics, while we acknowledge the propositions made to deepen
or broaden the TPB. Especially, the consideration of other contextual factors offers interesting routes
for further research, e.g., in the framework the comprehensive action determination model (Klöckner
and Blöbaum, 2010).
7As the distribution of the TPB determinants is heavily right-skewed, we assessed robustness using
a binary indicator if respondents chose the top category. Results remain robust and are available upon
request.
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Figure 4.2 Intentions to use the Safe Childbirth Checklist
a) Intentions – Indonesia b) Intentions – Pakistan
Source: Authors’ calculation based on survey data.
Figure 4.3 Actual use of the Safe Childbirth Checklist
a) Behavior – Indonesia
N=233
b) Behavior – Pakistan
N=212
Source: Authors’ calculation based on clinical observations.
the study applying a 6-point Likert scale.8 Descriptive statistics show that the SCC
is generally valued by the practitioners in Indonesia and Pakistan (Figure 4.2). Yet,
there is some distinct variation within and across the settings. Additionally, Figure
4.3 describes the actual SCC use by health practitioners in Indonesia and Pakistan. It
indicates a limited uptake and, hence, a potential gap between intended and actual use.
Therefore, it is important to examine the factors that possibly constrain the behavior
more carefully.9
To also assess the actual use of the SCC, we additionally conducted standardized
clinical observations in a subsample of the health facilities. Trained observers doc-
8As an additional outcome measure we asked participants whether they would recommend the
SCC to colleagues. Results are available upon request.
9More detail on the data collected can be found in Kuhnt and Vollmer (2018) and Diba et al.
(2018).
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umented the delivery processes and marked whether the attending health staff had
used the checklist.10 This information was collected for 212 deliveries at 9 treatment
providers in Pakistan and 233 deliveries at 15 treatment facilities in Indonesia.11
All measures (except for the actual behavior measure through clinical observations)
are perception-based and, hence, subjective indicators. While this sheds light on sub-
jective experiences, these questions are more difficult to compare across individuals and
are subject to social desirability bias.12 However, evidence from TPB studies suggests
that self-reported behavior can have higher explanatory power for intended behavior
than objective measures as the latter can hardly reflect intentions, which are by nature
subjective (e.g., Armitage and Conner, 2001; McEachan et al., 2011).
4.2.2 What Shapes Attitudes? A Framing Experiment
We investigate further on the TPB determinant attitudes towards the behavior in a
framed field experiment, as this is particularly in control of intervention implementers.
If we can identify positive incentives with our analysis, those should be comparably
easy to implement and therefore promising to actually materialize in improved uptake.
Precisely, the experiment aims at shedding more light on what influences people’s trust
in the intervention. For practical reasons, we conducted the experiment within the
Indonesian trial only.13
Experimental evidence within the context of the SCC intervention strengthens the
real world applicability and external validity. It has been prominently voiced that these
types of experiments are a valuable and important tool to generate policy-relevant in-
sights, e.g., by better understanding structural parameters obtained from experimental
interventions like RCTs (Duflo et al., 2007; Viceisza, 2015). The experiment is, hence,
not only designed to inform our specific intervention but to generate insights for inter-
national development research and practice in more general terms.
Recent literature suggests that our channel in focus – attitudes towards the behav-
ior – in implemented interventions is influenced by characteristics of the implementers
themselves. International and local actors mostly implement development interventions
jointly. These might include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governmental
agencies, or profit-oriented service providers. Also, the growing number of impact eval-
uations in the domain of development economics, are often implemented by a research
10Checklist use was either defined by whether the practitioners picked up the checklist during or
directly after care, or whether the checklist poster was observed during the delivery process. To hang
up a checklist poster in the delivery room for simultaneous consultation formed part of our intervention.
11In Pakistan, our observations capture 50 percent of all monthly conducted deliveries at the ob-
served health facilities as well as 94 percent of all monthly conducted deliveries at observed individual
providers. In Indonesia, the fraction relates to 64 percent of all monthly conducted deliveries at
observed health facilities.
12The social desirability bias describes the bias respondents can have in their responses due to the
desire to act in a socially acceptable manner (Kemper et al., 2014).
13Due to the sampling of individual midwives in Pakistan, the organizational burden and anonymity
concerns prevented us from carrying out the experiment in both contexts.
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team working at an institution of higher education in a high income country that col-
laborates with varying intensity with local partners of low and middle income countries
to evaluate development policies or programs (Cameron et al., 2016).14 Based on in-
sights from previous studies, we propose that the implementer’s local or international
background might influence the participants’ attitude towards the intervention.
Scholarly work has identified several driving factors explaining this phenomenon.
Cilliers et al. (2015) show that the presence of a foreigner versus a local as a third-
party bystander positively affects the contributions of participants in a dictator game
in Sierra Leone and identify two potential channels: Firstly, an increase in contributions
to impress the foreigner and, secondly, reduced contributions in areas that were previ-
ously exposed to the aid-industry. In the latter locations, they show that participants
more frequently believed that the game tested their need for aid, and subsequently
contributed less. Findley et al. (2017) find that the support of Ugandans for foreign-
funded as compared to national government-funded programs is substantially larger.
They stress the importance of general levels of confidence and trust towards the im-
plementing agents for the support of projects. Dietrich and Winters (2015), as well
as Winters et al. (2017) show more specifically that respondents link higher quality
perceptions to donors rather than to the national government. This relates to the gen-
eral debate on how aid can be delivered most successfully, and whether foreign funding
undermines state legitimacy (e.g., Dietrich et al., 2018). Previous involvement and
experiences with the respective agents might play a substantial role in shaping those
attitudes and support vis-à-vis implementers’ projects. In this vein, Dietrich and Win-
ters (2015) condition their experimental effect on previous political participation and
Milner et al. (2016) find that the support for foreign-funded as compared to national
government funded programs is substantially larger, if participants are in favor of op-
position parties, and had negative experiences with the government in the past.15 Here,
the authors, especially, stress the role of corruption and clientelism (e.g., Milner et al.,
2016; Findley et al., 2017).16 In contrast, the “home bias”-phenomenon suggests that
participants have more trust in locals than in internationals as cultural proximity could
increase people’s trust (e.g., Fuchs and Gehring, 2017).
To the best of our knowledge, the described strand of the literature is currently lim-
ited to state versus non-state actors. However, against the background of the numerous
international development cooperation projects and in light of the increasing number
of large research projects as outlined above, it is important to understand whether the
14Cameron et al. (2016) find that in a random sample of development evaluation studies more than
50 percent of first authors were affiliated to an institution in North America or Europe. More specif-
ically in our Indonesian context, seven out of nine RCTs in Indonesia registered with the “American
Economic Association: RCT Registry,” had an US-based principal investigator and only one out of
nine was led by an Indonesian researcher (American Economic Association, 2018).
15Milner et al. (2016) also assess sub-group effects with regard to gender, education, poverty, media
exposure, geographic region, experience with aid, type of donor and political connections, but find
mainly insignificant results.
16Although not testing it explicitly, Findley et al. (2017) name perceptions on accountability, ca-
pacities, and level of control as further potential channels.
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origin of the program implementer also matters, irrespective of an affiliation to the
state. To this question, we dedicate our framed field experiment.17
Experimental Design
In the aggregate, our experiment compares whether the salience of international ver-
sus local program implementers affects support for the respective project. Stressing
certain aspects of a particular situation among otherwise equivalent descriptions can
lead to very different perceptions and behavioral reactions (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981; Kahneman, 2003; Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Hossain and List, 2012; Payne
et al., 2013). The result is what is called the framing effect.18 Stressing certain as-
pects invokes different associations and leads to different evaluations by the decision
maker. Framing effects have been incorporated into theories on human behavior to
explain deviations from rational choices (e.g., prospect theory). Their application to
real-world decision-making can have important practical implications. Based upon their
own intervention, Bertrand et al. (2006) specifically point out that framing might be a
particularly cost-effective way to increase interventions’ uptake, which we aim to test
here.
We make use of the randomized phase-in design of the SCC intervention in Indonesia.
Within the endline survey of the larger RCT project, we performed the experiment
with midwives at control facilities that neither have received the SCC nor were in
contact with the implementation team. Within this group of midwives, we used a
between-subject design and randomly assigned the study participants to two different
framing information on the actually conducted SCC intervention: The first framing
information stressed the involvement of international actors in the SCC program, while
the second made the participation of local counterparts more salient (see Figure D.2
in the Appendix for an overview over the study design).19 We use the fact that the
SCC evaluation has been implemented jointly by both – international and local – actors
and therefore, highlight different attributes of the project. We then investigated the
17We follow the classification of experiments proposed by Harrison and List (2004).
18The framing effect became popular through its essential role in Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) in which they describe gambles either by their loss or gain
probability. There are three different types of framing approaches that have been described and used
in the literature: Most prominently and widely researched is the risky choice framing (risk of losing
vs. risk of winning) as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Attribute framing makes certain
characteristics of a choice or good more salient (ground beef that is 75 percent lean vs. 25 percent fat).
Lastly, goal framing where either punishment or reward is emphasized (Behavioral Science Solution,
2018). Since then, framing experiments have been extensively applied in medical sciences both in
hypothetical (Wilson et al., 1987) and real contexts, often related to message framing experiments,
e.g., with regard to smoking cessation, HIV screening as well as skin and breast cancer prevention
(Kalichman and Coley, 1995; Detweiler et al., 1999; Schneider et al., 2001; Toll et al., 2007).
19The framing experiment does not include a control group as development programs are always
either conducted exclusively locally or have an international component. We believe that it is very
unlikely that the implementer’s identity is unknown to program participants, although salience might
differ.
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participants’ respective behavior towards the intervention by assessing the support for
the SCC project. Since we randomized participants into different treatment groups, we
can make causal inference on how the origin of implementers affects behavioral reactions
(i.e., different levels of support for the SCC intervention).
In a short pre-experimental survey, we collected background information, including
socio-economic and contextual work characteristics, of each participant.20 In appreci-
ation of participants’ survey participation, each respondent received a voucher for a
phone credit top-up worth 25,000 IDR (approx. 1.75 US$). Afterwards, the enumera-
tors offered the respondents to participate in the experiment.21 Lastly, we conducted a
short post-experimental survey, including questions capturing potential framing mech-
anisms and additional control variables, like the experience of current financial distress.
The “experimental commodity” was derived from the on-going RCT intervention
on the SCC. First, the idea and structure of the SCC was explained to the partici-
pants. Afterwards, they were presented with one of the two framings that selectively
either stressed the involvement of “local” or “international” actors respectively, in the
SCC intervention.22 A qualitative investigation was conducted prior to the experiment
to ensure that the correct terms were used to describe “local” versus “international”
agents.23
Our framing information reads as follows:
“Among other researchers, [INTERNATIONAL/LOCAL] researchers took an ac-
tive role in introducing the checklist to 17 facilities in Aceh province. The research
team received approval from the provincial health office of Aceh. However, no funding
was provided by the provincial health office. [LOCAL/INTERNATIONAL] research as-
sistants and [INTERNATIONAL/LOCAL] health professionals with a lot of experience
in delivery services were important partners and greatly supported the project.”
20This survey was included in the endline survey of the larger SCC intervention.
21All respondents chose to continue the survey and participated in the following framing experiment.
22As it is likely that respondents equate an international actor to a donor, we specifically addressed
the relevant actors as researchers and professionals in our framing component.
23For this purpose, we talked to health-care providers from different facilities, which were not part
of the sampled institutions. In the Acehnese setting “local” is understood as “Acehnese” identity,
whereby “Indonesian” would be an external concept. Certainly, it would have been of large interest
to examine the difference between local and Indonesian implementers. However, due to power con-
straints, we decided to focus on this more specific framing without splitting the group and reducing
the sample. The distinctness of “Acehnese” and “Indonesian” is also underlined by the fact that a
small set of respondents named Indonesia and certain provinces as international countries. To deepen
our understanding of the term “international” in the Acehnese context, we asked respondents to name
the three countries, they first think of when hearing this term (see Figure D.3 in the Appendix). There
is a large consensus among respondents regarding the main countries associated with “international,”
namely Germany (24 percent), Malaysia (19 percent), USA (13 percent), Australia (8 percent). The
high prominence of Germany among the foreign countries named, could first – of course – be attributed
to the fact that parts of the implementing researchers, were German. Second, it is likely that Germany
is indeed particularly present to the Acehnese people as it was the largest European donor after 2004’s
Tsunami (BBC, 2005). Moreover, Germany’s reconstruction efforts were characterized by a strong
focus on health interventions (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
(BMZ), 2005).
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In order to be able to draw broader conclusions and to generalize the findings to
different types of interventions, we named different actors (e.g., researchers, practition-
ers). To prevent potential effects through assumptions on political involvement, we
specifically address the role of the provincial health office in the information given to
the study participants. Further, to counter potential bias through speculations on the
financial capabilities of different actors, we stress that funding of the intervention is
ensured irrespective of the framing given to the participant. For the detailed experi-
mental protocol see Appendix 4.A.1. We hypothesize that the level of support would
significantly differ between the local and the international framing. Following the liter-
ature, there are arguments for directive effects on both sides, which leads us to handle
the issue as an empirical question.
Experimental data
In total, the experiment was conducted with 236 female midwives from the SCC inter-
vention’s control group. The average study participant was 33 years old (minimum: 21
years, maximum 50 years), had 10 years of work experience (minimum: 0 years; maxi-
mum 28 years) and 15 years of education (minimum: 12 years; maximum 17 years) (see
Table D.1 in the Appendix). Participants in the experiment were comparable in their
characteristics to health workers of the main RCT study (see Appendix Table D.3).24
Individual characteristics and further contextual variables are balanced across framings
indicating that the randomization was successful (Appendix Table D.1). In our main
analysis, we focus on those participants that have not been in prior contact with the
SCC as 27.92 percent of the respondents state that they were previously exposed to
the SCC.25 As we cannot infer how much these respondents know about the SCC in-
tervention and how intense the exposure was, excluding them is the more conservative
choice.26 This reduces our sample to 173 participants.27 Balance on important co-
variates is still given in this reduced sample (see Appendix Table D.2). Previous SCC
exposure was equally distributed across the framing treatments, ruling out selection
concerns and enabling us to interpret the estimates causally.
We proxy SCC support by asking the respondents whether they would contribute
24Health workers in the treatment group seem to have experienced on average five more months of
education (Appendix Table D.3).
25Although the respective facilities were not exposed to the SCC, reasons for previous exposure
might be a second job at another (treatment) facility (11.11 percent of respondents have a second job)
or communication with other health practitioners within the district. Contact to midwives from other
facilities is also significantly correlated with prior checklist contact.
26As a robustness check, we also report the full sample results including a prior contact binary
variable in the regression model in Appendix Table D.12. However, as we assume a large heterogeneity
of exposure – health practitioners with a job at another facility might have worked with the SCC,
others might have just heard the name of the SCC from colleagues – we prefer the reduced sample for
our main results.
27Due to two outcome measures that could not be matched to respondents and four respondents
that refrained from answering on control questions, the sample is reduced to n=165 in our main
specifications.
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parts of the money they had received through the voucher for phone credit top-up in
appreciation of their survey participation to buy checklist copies, which would then
support the implementation of the SCC in other anonymous health facilities within the
province.28 The contribution was made anonymously. After the experiment, all partic-
ipants received a debriefing.29 To create transparency on the use of the collected funds,
we publicly made information on total amounts available after the end of the study and
informed the participant about this procedure. In addition to this traditional mone-
tary outcome, we also collected measures suggested by other disciplines. Psychologists
commonly assess the respondent’s behavior through time investments (Wildschut et al.,
2014). Actual behavior measured by contributing money may be strongly influenced by
general or situational economic living conditions of respondents. In case respondents
face strong economic constraints, small or zero contributions might reflect a high needi-
ness rather than lack of support for the intervention. Hence, we asked the participant’s
willingness to invest additional time to practice checklist use during regular working
weeks. Further, in order to counter potential social desirability bias, we asked the par-
ticipants to estimate the average monetary contribution of colleagues in other health
facilities in the province. Those elicitation exercises based on introspection have been
shown to reduce potential conformity bias in the experimental literature (Trautmann
and van de Kuilen, 2015). We focus on the traditionally employed monetary outcome
as due to the costs incurred by the respondent this is likely to be the strongest measure,
while the additional outcomes are presented in the Appendix. Summary statistics for
all measures employed can be found in Appendix Table D.4 for Indonesia and D.5 for
Pakistan.
In the post-experimental survey, we asked several questions on potential mechanisms
to explain differential preferences towards implementers. Following Milner et al. (2016),
we measured participants’ level of trust towards different actors (international/local
actors) and towards the previously named countries that they understood by the term
“international.” We used 4-point Likert scales. In addition, we asked participants
whether they have previously participated in interventions by international or local
experts or researchers, respectively. In the Acehnese health sector, 10 percent (17.5
percent) of the surveyed providers have previously participated in research projects
by international (local) actors. Those interactions date back significantly before our
intervention as only 2.5 percent of the respondents faced international research projects
28If they wanted to contribute, we offered them five options from 5,000 to 25,000 IDR (equivalent
to 0.4 – 1.9 US$) due to pragmatic reasons of specific top-up values.
29After the debriefing, we offered participants to change their monetary contribution. 39 (16.5
percent) participants made use of this option. Generally, this led to an increase in contributions by on
average one category (about 4200 IDR), but the amount is not contingent on the framing applied. The
main analysis focuses on the pre-debriefing contribution, as we are interested in the framing effect.
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in their facility during the previous two years.30
4.3 Method
In the first part of our regression analysis we address the role of the TPB determinants
for intended behavior with regard to checklist use. Our regression line for intended
behavior reads as follows:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘
∑︁
𝑘
𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (4.1)
As throughout the study, we estimate models for Indonesia and Pakistan separately
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Our level of analysis is the individual
health worker 𝑖 (79 respondents for Pakistan and 163 individuals for Indonesia). 𝑦𝑖
determines our outcome variable, which measures intended behavior employing 6-point
Likert scales. 𝛼 is a constant, and 𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 capture our variables of interest
(also using 6-point Likert scales) via our three perception measures for the three TPB
pillars: Attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control.31 In adjusted re-
gressions we add ∑︀𝑘 𝑋𝑖, which represents our set of 𝑘 control variables. These include
a binary variable indicating the location of the facility (rural versus urban), a vari-
able capturing the district where the provider is located, the level of service provision,
which is proxied by a dummy for 24/7 opening hours, and a variable indicating the type
of facility.32 The idea is that those time-invariant facility characteristics might affect
the drivers of the TPB. Perceived behavioral control could be affected by staffing and
equipment, which is captured by the facility type and geographical remoteness (district
dummies and rural/urban distinction) as well as the 24/7 service provision. Remote-
ness, services and facility type also influence the safety culture, which affects provider’s
attitudes and the subjective norms of superiors towards the SCC.
Our second part of regressions is the equivalent to the first but changes the outcome
variable to birth observations 𝑗 measuring the actual behavior. Here, 𝑦𝑗, is a binary
variable equalling one, if the checklist was used by the health worker during the de-
livery. As we cannot link each delivery to the specific health workers’ responses, we
30To investigate additional potential mechanisms, we also collected information on perceived cor-
ruption, sufficient funding capabilities, accountability, skills, and control to implement interventions.
All this data were collected after the experiment was conducted in order to not affect our main out-
come measures. However, this procedure comes with the trade-off of potential justification bias, where
individuals would adapt their answers ex-post to justify the previously indicated support. We indeed
find that the framing statistically significantly affects some of these variables. Hence, in order to avoid
bad control issues, we focus on those variables not significantly affected: Participation in international
or local projects, trust in internationals, trust in named foreign countries and trust in locals. We use
these later in our regression analysis.
31Further, we also estimated regressions with an alternative coding for robustness, where we defined
a dummy variable with the value one for the highest category and zero otherwise. Results are robust
and available upon request.
32Our sample included a wide heterogeneity of facilities from primary to tertiary health providers.
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take averages of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control per health
facility. This would provide us with an intuition of more supportive environments being
associated with more or less take-up.33 The control variables 𝑋𝑗 stay the same as in
regression line 4.1.
Following the clustered setup of the intervention, in all specifications, we cluster
the error terms at the facility level to account for joint correlation within the clus-
ters.34 We employed Likert scales to all perception-based survey questions, which are
relatively continuous measures. Hence, we consider them as continuous variables in
the estimations, which is the preferred method of analysis proposed in the literature
(Pasta, 2009).35 As our sample is restricted to our treatment group and includes, thus,
a non-random set of individuals, estimations are not derived within the randomization
framework and do not allow a causal interpretation. Nonetheless, controlling for several
potentially confounding variables, we will receive informative correlations about how
behavioral processes are associated with intervention uptake.
The third part of our regression analysis concerns the experimental data. Our
analysis of the experiment aims to identify the existence of a systematic difference in
the support for our intervention by health practitioners, conditional on whether the
local or international implementation was more salient. Our results are based on the
following regression equation:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 * 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚
∑︁
𝑚
𝐶𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 (4.2)
In our most parsimonious model, 𝑦𝑖 is the outcome variable, indicating the support
of the SCC by health worker 𝑖. 𝛼 is a constant, and 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 is a binary variable,
which equals one if the respondent was exposed to an international, and zero for a local
framing. Moreover, heterogeneous effects are assessed by the inclusion of an interac-
tion between the framing and channel 𝑐𝑖, which is prior participation in international
or local projects. In adjusted regressions we add ∑︀𝑚 𝐶𝑖, which is our set of control
variables. The controls include a variable indicating the respective facility type, where
the participant is employed. Research from different facility types indicates very het-
erogeneous uptake and different attitudes of the respondents towards the tool (Semrau
et al., 2017; Kabongo et al., 2017; World Health Organization, 2018). Moreover, we
33As our analysis, thus, involves different aggregation levels and our measure of intention and actual
behavior capture slightly different concepts, we do not estimate a model on the direct link between
intentions and behavior.
34Due to a limited number of clusters we also present results with wild bootstrapped standard errors
following Cameron et al. (2008) for all our baseline models in the Appendix. However, this is only
possible for the unadjusted regressions (without controls). When bootstrapping standard errors in
models with control variables, we face problems of overfitting. This is the case as our controls consist
mainly of dummy or categorical variables, which reduce variation among our relatively small number
of observations too strongly to calculate meaningfully adjusted standard errors. Accordingly, we prefer
to present regressions without bootstrapped standard errors in our main models.
35We also assessed the feasibility of continuous items with a scale from 0 to 100, but learned that
those were harder to comprehend for respondents.
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add a binary variable marking whether the respondent experienced financial problems
within the past days as this might affect monetary contributions.36 Further, to control
for a potential social desirability bias, we measured social conformity following the so-
cial desirability scale developed by Kemper et al. (2014). This measure was adopted to
the Acehnese context and we transformed its five items into a composite index.37 We
control also for the subjective perception regarding the amount of paperwork during
deliveries, which was motivated by an often-experienced perception during implemen-
tation that the new tool adds to the already existing paperwork. Finally, 𝑣𝑖 describes
the residual. Errors are clustered at the facility level to take into account similarities
within teams. We are, thus, mainly interested in the effect sizes of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2.38
4.4 Results
Main results: TPB determinants and SCC support
For all three TPB determinants, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral
control, in both study sites, we find that coefficients point towards a consistently similar
direction. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 display the regression results of the intended and actual
SCC uptake for the data from Pakistan and Indonesia. While the first row always
presents the unadjusted coefficients, the second displays results adjusted for control
variables as described in Section 4.3. Results show that respondents who express a
strongly positive attitude towards the SCC are also more likely to intend to use the
new tool even if it is not freely provided to them anymore (columns (1a) to (2b)). In
Pakistan and Indonesia the coefficients are positive and statistically significant (ranging
from the 1-percent to 5-percent level).
36Previous research on the SCC has shown differential effects of the checklist across different health-
care facility settings. Applicability to the respective work environment is likely to be influenced by
factors like team size, resource access, or delivery load. Related research has similarly controlled for a
constructed wealth index (e.g., Cilliers et al., 2015).
37We adapted the social desirability measures to the respective context in cooperation with Indone-
sian counterparts. For instance, one of the items reads “I have occasionally thrown litter away in the
countryside or on to the road.” As environmental concerns are less salient in the Acehnese context
than religious concerns, we changed the item to “When I had the chance to donate for religious pur-
poses, I always contributed a lot.” The full set of questions we used for the construction of the social
desirability index are displayed in Appendix 4.A.1.
38Estimates using ordered probit regressions are shown for robustness in the Appendix. For the
ease of interpretation, we prefer to present OLS results in the main part.
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Table 4.1 Theory of Planned Behavior – Intended SCC uptake
Intended Behavior
Would use SCC even if copies are not provided
1 “disagree strongly” – 6 “agree strongly”
Pakistan Indonesia
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Attitudes:
SCC in professional role: 1 “completely useless” – 6 “completely useful”
0.984*** 0.818*** 0.454*** 0.309**
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.012)
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.187 0.254 0.114 0.272
N 79 79 163 163
Subjective Norms:
SCC is supported by superiors: 1 “not at all” – 6 “completely”
0.143 0.164* 0.536*** 0.316***
p-value (0.115) (0.060) (0.007) (0.001)
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.008 0.304 0.132 0.261
N 58 58 163 163
Perceived Behavioral Control:
Ease of SCC in work environment: 1 “very difficult” – 6 “very easy”
0.439*** 0.366** 0.261* 0.023
p-value (0.003) (0.029) (0.090) (0.863)
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.128 0.211 0.048 0.222
N 78 78 163 163
Control variables No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var. 4.628 4.628 4.847 4.847
Median of dep. var. 5 5 5 5
SD of dep. var. 1.452 1.452 0.634 0.634
Note: All regressions are based upon the treated providers. Adjusted regres-
sions (b) additionally control for a variable indicating the facility type, a binary
variable indicating rural/urban location, a variable indicating the district and
a binary variable indicating whether the facility is open 24/7. Standard errors
(SE) are clustered at the facility level. Asterisks indicate p-values according
to: * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4.2 Theory of Planned Behavior – Actual SCC uptake
Was SCC actively used or looked at during delivery?
0 “No” – 1 “Yes”
Pakistan Indonesia
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Attitudes:
SCC in professional role: 1 “completely useless” – 6 “completely useful”
0.655*** 0.471** -0.356 0.394***
p-value (0.003) (0.020) (0.245) (0.000)
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.288 0.346 0.017 0.061
N 212 212 219 219
Subjective Norms:
SCC is supported by superiors: 1 “not at all” – 6 “completely”
0.207* 0.078** 0.654* 0.279***
p-value (0.097) (0.027) (0.091) (0.000)
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.095 0.325 0.041 0.062
N 212 212 219 219
Perceived Behavioral Control:
Ease of SCC in work environment: 1 “very difficult” – 6 “very easy”
0.306*** 0.112 0.059 0.015
p-value (0.000) (0.169) (0.423) (0.979)
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.253 0.318 0.003 0.057
N 212 212 219 219
Control variables No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var. 0.344 0.344 0.389 0.389
SD of dep. var. 0.476 0.476 0.489 0.489
Note: All regressions are based upon the treated providers. Adjusted regres-
sions (b) additionally control for a variable indicating the facility type, a binary
variable indicating rural/urban location, a variable indicating the district and
a binary variable indicating whether the facility is open 24/7. Standard errors
(SE) are clustered at the facility level. Asterisks indicate p-values according
to: * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
This is also supported by the actual SCC use (in Table 4.2 columns (3a) to (4b)).
The stronger the positive stance towards the checklist, the more often health staff
actively uses the SCC during the delivery process. If the SCC is perceived to be
more useful (attitude), its actual use among Indonesian health workers increases by
39.4 percentage points and among Pakistani practitioners by 47.1 percentage points.
Further, we find consistently positive coefficients in both countries with respect to
the support of superiors for the new tool (social norms). While it seems to play an
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important role for intended and actual SCC uptake in Indonesia, it is less important
for intended behavior as compared to the actual SCC use in the Pakistani setting. This
can be explained by different samples across our outcome measures. While the actual
behavioral outcome was mainly collected for health practitioners working in facilities,
the sample measuring the intended SCC uptake is dominated by individual health
workers (like community midwives). Hence, for them the opinion of superiors is less
of a concern but rather the perceived usability (perceived behavioral control). In this
regard, we see that the ease of use is a statistically significant predictor of intended SCC
use in Pakistan (at the 5 percent level in the adjusted regression), while it is positive but
not statistically significant in the Indonesian context or for actual SCC uptake in both
countries.39 These results – though not allowing the establishment of a causal pathway
– give a consistent indication: Influencing the TPB determinants into the respective
positive direction, is associated with increased intended and actual uptake of the SCC.
The regressions without controls in the (a)-columns indicate that the TPB determinants
capture 5 to 13 percent of the variation in intentions among Indonesian respondents,
and 0.3 to 4 percent of the variation in actual behavior (measured by the adjusted
R-squareds between 0.048 and 0.132). Adjusted R-Squareds for the Pakistani case are
exceeding those from Indonesia and the TPB determinants explain 0.8 to 19 percent
of the variation in intentions. The explanatory power for actual behavior lies between
10 and 29 percent. Hence, the three TPB determinants are important predictors for
intended and actual behavioral outcomes, here the use of the SCC.
Differences in the adjusted R-Squareds across TPB determinants are well in line
with qualitative evidence. Indonesian coaches, who assisted health personnel in using
the checklist, were seldomly asked for help regarding the content of the SCC, which
corresponds to the ease of use of this intervention. In contrast, the assessment of the
supervisor seems to play an important role in the hierarchically structured Indonesian
society. This is also borne out by inter-facility staff meetings and midwives’ correspon-
dence with coaches in Indonesia, stressing the salience of supervisors and colleagues
reminding each other to use the checklist regularly. In the Pakistani case, we see the
strongest explanatory power for the determinants attitudes and control and far behind
for norms (12 to 19 percentage points difference). In line with explanations from above,
the effect is likely to be driven by the sample of community midwives, who work rather
self-employed and do not depend on superiors’ norms, accordingly.
Both sets of results imply that in both countries, specifically, attitudes are crucial in
shaping intentions and actual behavior. As indicated in the previous literature review,
perceptions about the implementer can be strong predictors in shaping intentions and
behavior. This is assessed in the subsequent section.
39As outlined above, we use wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors as robustness tests in samples
with a small number of clusters (9 in Pakistan and 15 in Indonesia). Results are displayed in Appendix
Table D.6 showing that results are by and large robust to this standard error adjustment. When
we generate a dummy variable as an outcome, equaling one for the highest category only (thus, if
respondents “fully agree” to “Would try to use SCC even if copies are not provided”) results are
qualitatively unchanged (see Appendix Table D.7).
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Main results: framing experiment
Table 4.3 displays the main results of the framing experiment conducted in Indonesia.
We only include our main outcome measure (monetary investment) here, while results
of the alternative outcomes are presented in the Appendix (Table D.11).40 The first
column presents the unadjusted results, whereas the second column gives the results
adjusted for additional control variables.41 We limit our sample to those respondents
who were not exposed to the SCC prior to this experiment. Full sample regression
results controlling for prior contact, are shown in the Appendix (Table D.12) and are
comparable to the findings presented in the main part.42 As a conservative robustness
check, we also present random inference based p-values.43 In unadjusted regressions,
the international framing has a positive but at conventional levels insignificant effect
on financial contributions of respondents. Once adjusting for control variables, this
coefficient turns significant at the 5% level. Respondents facing an international framing
contribute on average more money in support of the SCC project than their counterparts
being confronted with the local framing. In the adjusted specification, their contribution
is 1,284 IDR higher.44
40Similarly, we present estimates using ordered probit regressions in the Appendix Table D.15.
Results are qualitatively unchanged to OLS regressions.
41In line with the randomized setup of the study, results are robust to the inclusion of further
covariates, which increases the precision of estimates. The full specification including all control
variables is presented in the Appendix Table D.9.
42As a further robustness check we estimate a regression, which controls for an interaction of the
framing with the indicator for past contact. Individuals with prior contact to the checklist might not
have had contact with the research team and could, hence, still be receptive to the framing. First,
including this group is more conservative as the framing should have a lower effect on the persons that
are acquainted to the SCC and induce, thus, a downward bias. Second, individuals with prior contact to
the checklist might react heterogeneously due to more comprehensive information. Table D.13 depicts
the corresponding results. While the framing indicator decreases slightly in size, but stays significant
in the adjusted regressions, there is no significantly different treatment effect for those respondents
with past contact.
43Randomization inference takes the randomization explicitly into account and follows R.A. Fisher’s
idea of statistical inference via permutation tests of treatment allocation (Young, 2017). The idea is
to assume uncertainty about the treatment allocation and compare the actual treatment allocation to
possible alternative allocations.
44One’s willingness to support an intervention might also be strongly determined by the beliefs
about others’ contribution. However, reporting one’s perception about others might be subject to
conformity bias, especially, in the Indonesian society, where a large focus is put on keeping one’s face.
Elicitation exercises based on introspection have been shown to reduce potential conformity bias in the
experimental literature (Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015). Moreover, we use the outcome variable
elicitation as a control variable in a further robustness test (see Appendix Table D.10). As expected,
elicitation shows to be highly significant and positive, while the framing effect holds.
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Table 4.3 Framing Experiment – Main Results
Financial Contribution in support of SCC project (in IDR)
(a) (b)
Framing: 1 = “international” 557.6236 1,283.7717**
p-value (0.396) (0.021)
RI p-value (0.450) (0.057)
N 165 165
Control variables No Yes
Mean of dep. var. 4,757.576 4,757.576
SD of dep. var. 4,711.366 4,711.366
Note: All specifications are based upon the sample limited to those
respondents without prior SCC contact. Specifications (b) include
a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating
if the respondent had financial problems, a composite index of
social desirability variables and a variable indicating the subjective
perception of the amount of paperwork. The same regression with
wild cluster bootstrapped SE can be found in Appendix Table
D.8, for which significance levels hold. RI p-values are computed
with a permutation test based on Hess (2017). Asterisks indicate
p-values based on standard errors clustered at the facility level:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
These results are supported by the alternative outcome measures presented in Ap-
pendix Table D.11. Our alternative outcome measures are first, whether respondents
would recommend the SCC to fellow colleagues, second, whether they would be willing
to invest additional time for the SCC project, third, how high they estimate the av-
erage contribution by others and fourth an index of all four outcome measures, using
principal component analysis (PCA). Estimates in Table D.11 show robustly positive
coefficients, when controls are included and reach statistical significance for recommend-
ing the SCC to others and for the PCA-index. Here, however, the financial contribution
is the variable that explains the major part of the variation in the index. Hence, our
results suggest that the intervention is increasingly supported by the respondents, if it
is perceived as an internationally-led endeavor. The representativeness of the experi-
ment is supported by the balance of important individual and contextual characteristics
between the experimental sample and the larger sample of the SCC intervention.
Channels: previous exposure
In order to understand in more detail why respondents show stronger support towards
projects implemented by international actors as compared to local implementers, we
investigate a mechanism that could influence the attitude of respondents. Previous
exposure is one prominent factor determining attitudes. Hence, it might play a role
200
The Theory of Planned Behavior – An Application to Implementation Research
whether respondents have been in contact with locally or internationally-led research
projects in the past. Their respective experiences are likely to influence their present
attitudes and reactions to the intervention.
Descriptive correlations (see Appendix Table D.14) indicate that first-hand experi-
ences – both with local and international research programs – are associated with pos-
itive perceptions towards the corresponding implementer – though no claims regarding
the causal direction can be made here. Hence, it seems that those positive experiences
affect not only the respective implementer but also the support for other actors.45 It is,
therefore, of particular interest to examine the interaction of the international or local
framing with previous exposure to the respective implementing agent.
Figure 4.4 displays the point estimates and confidence intervals for the interaction
of our experimental framing with the binary variables indicating if respondents already
participated in international or local research projects. In order to facilitate inter-
pretation the different options were coded as categories and should be interpreted as
the difference from the base category “No Experience with International Experts – No
Experience with Local Experts – No International Framing.” As before, the framing
indicator equals one for the international framing treatment and zero for the local fram-
ing treatment. For the experience indicators, one corresponds to experience with the
respective actor and zero to no experience.
While the randomization ensured that the framing could be considered as exogenous,
project participation is potentially endogenous regarding other traits of the surveyed
respondent. However, as recent research by Bun and Harrison (2018) and Nizalova
and Murtazashvili (2016) indicates, the interaction of an exogenous and an endogenous
variable can be considered as exogenous, when controlling for the endogenous variable.
Exogeneity rests on the assumption that the treatment is not correlated with neither
previous project participation nor omitted variables, which is arguably the case due to
the experimental random assignment.46 Moreover, balancing tests provided in Tables
D.1 and D.2 underscore that previous participation is balanced across both framing
treatments.
Green bars in Figure 4.4 indicate the coefficients of regressions without covariates
and orange bars the adjusted point estimates. Regarding confidence intervals, thick
bars refer to the 10% and thin bars to the 5% interval. As we are interested in the
framing effect, the results are ordered to compare respondents with similar previous
experience (e.g., participation in international/local projects) across framings.
45The results in Table D.14 also hold if including as control variable local or international par-
ticipation, respectively, and if standard errors are bootstrapped. The majority of respondents, who
participated in international projects also participated in local projects, but not vice versa.
46Nonetheless, one needs to be aware that, especially, with a limited sample size omitted variables
might not be homogenously distributed and, hence, it is not inherently clear, which other factors are
correlated with our interaction variable of interest.
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Figure 4.4 Framing Experiment – Previous Experience
Note: While “Int1” refers to previous experience with international projects, “Loc1” refers to projects
with local implementers. “Fra1” indicates the international framing as described above. Covariates
include a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating if the respondent had
financial problems, a composite index of social desirability variables and a variable indicating the
subjective perception of the amount of paperwork. The comparison group had no prior experience
with either actor and faced a local framing. Errors are clustered at the facility level. The thick bars
refer to the 10% and the thin bars to the 5% confidence interval. The corresponding point estimates
are depicted in Table D.17.
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The Figure indicates a distinct pattern for midwives, who have been exposed both
to an international and local research project in the past. Our results indicate a lower
contribution of 6,500-8,500 IDR (e.g., 0.45-0.65 US$) if those midwives face the local
framing (p-value: 0.023 without control variables; p-value: 0.000 with control vari-
ables).47 In contrast, this implies that the attitude towards the intervention is signif-
icantly more positive if respondents knowing both international and local researchers
are framed internationally. For respondents with international and local experience
we find the only significant group-wise difference between individuals with comparable
experience.
However, if respondents who face the local framing were only exposed to interna-
tional and not to local projects, they do contribute less than the baseline group if we do
not condition on covariates (p-value: 0.0113). The other categories do neither indicate
significant group-wise differences nor deviations from the baseline category. Thus, the
results from Figure 4.4 suggest that the positive effects of the international framing are
driven by previous experience with the respective implementer. The reduced willing-
ness to contribute to local projects is most pronounced if respondents have participated
both in local and international projects.
The positive attitudes towards international projects might, however, depend on the
local context as every country will have its specifics in experiences with and attitudes
towards the local and international community. The Acehnese context is a very interest-
ing case to study as to its large exposure to various international as well as local actors
in the aftermath of the Tsunami 2004, which caused more than 130,000 deaths in the
country. Due to previous experiences with both local and international implementers,
the assessment of attitudes towards the different implementers is facilitated. However,
this context of ultimate human emergency, might have induced a more positive attitude
towards the international assistance and could make the interpretation specific to the
context.48
Qualitative data based on 66 surveys with health practitioners suggest that positive
attitudes towards internationals are mostly linked to perceptions of better knowledge
and more structured implementation approaches (based on the open question: “Please
describe your experience working with international teams. What did you find surpris-
ing?”). This is in line with the positive and significant correlation of the international
framing with positive perceptions of international control capabilities and skills of lo-
cal implementers (Appendix Table D.16) and corresponds to higher trust levels after
47Although this amount seems small, it corresponds to one meal or half an hour of work of a midwife
in the local context.
48Despite the individual tragedies, parts of the population perceived the natural disaster as a chance
to restart, as the successful reconstruction efforts coincided with the cessation of the Aceh insurgency
after almost 30 years of combat. Moreover, Aceh might be specific due to its strong Muslim heritage
and introduction of Islamic law in 2006.
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previous project participation (see Appendix Table D.14).49
Taken together, those results, first, suggest to consider the previous experience of the
targeted population, when aiming to achieve high project uptake and accordingly frame
development policies. Second, they call for caution when thinking about scalability of
projects by the local government if piloted by internationals. Third, they underline the
need to implement development policies prudently. Both actions from internationals
and locals might affect subsequent take-up and success of other projects.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Evidence from behavioral economics supports the importance of non-monetary incen-
tives, trust, or peer effects to explain human behavior. These insights are also of ut-
most importance to the design of interventions in development economics. This chapter
makes use of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) – a well-established theory origi-
nating from social psychology. The framework offers a systematic approach to explain
and influence supportive human behavior by considering three determinants: A positive
attitude towards the behavior or intervention, supporting subjective norms, and a high
degree of perceived behavioral control. We provide evidence of the positive association
of these mechanisms with the uptake of a program by studying participants in two
different cultural contexts. Using the settings of two randomized controlled trials in
Pakistan and Indonesia, we show that a more positive attitude towards the new tool
(here the Safe Childbirth Checklist (SCC)), more salient subjective norms in favor of
the intervention, and greater perceived behavioral control to actively use and implement
the checklist were associated with increased intended and actual use of the checklist.
Applying the TPB in two diverse study contexts strengthens the claim of generalizabil-
ity of the results. Previous studies on the TPB also support its broad applicability to
explain and influence human behavior. However, it is important to note that we left
the random setting for the TPB analysis and, hence, our study does not allow us to
infer causal effects of the TPB on intended and actual behavioral reactions.
Recent evidence shows the importance of implementers’ characteristics in shaping
behavior towards an intervention and it is likely that this affects the TPB determinant
attitude towards the behavior. Hence, we further investigate how the salience of the
implementer’s background, in particular, whether a project is led by an international
or local agent, influences the participants’ support for the project. The implementer’s
background is particularly interesting with regard to increasing experimental research
in low and middle income countries, which is often a collaboration between international
and local researchers and practitioners. The results of the framed field experiment in
49We asked midwives if they would attribute certain characteristics rather to local or international
researchers (e.g., skills, corruption, financial capabilities) in order to carve out how those channels
might affect support for the intervention. Those questions were asked intentionally after collecting the
outcomes in order to not confound the results. However, this comes with the risk of justification bias,
indicated by the significant framing effects in Table D.16. Hence, we did not use those channels for
further analysis. Yet, they might be still informative in terms of general attribute ascription.
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Indonesia indicate that respondents are more supportive towards interventions (mea-
sured through monetary support) implemented by international actors as compared
to solely locally led projects. This finding is in line with previous research on be-
havioral reactions towards international and multilateral donor agencies (e.g., Milner
et al., 2016; Winters et al., 2017). Even though research projects might be character-
ized by different conditions than practical development cooperation, our results could
be important for potential replication or scaling of interventions by local actors that
were previously implemented by international agents. Extra effort might be needed
to generate a positive, supportive behavior towards the intervention if solely imple-
mented by local agents (or probably vice-versa in countries with higher trust in local
than international implementers). Generally, trust towards both groups is high in the
Indonesian case. Interestingly, those respondents that have already been exposed to
previous internationally-led research interventions take a more positive stance towards
future international projects. This relationship cannot be established for those who al-
ready participated in local research projects. Overall, the results suggest that previous
experience with the respective agents influences the attitude and support for future
interventions. This underscores the importance of responsible conduction of interven-
tions.
The chapter also stresses the effect of the salience of project implementers to influ-
ence support and contribution towards an intervention in case trust levels towards the
implementer are high. However, experiences with local and international actors might
differ across contexts. For this reason, our results can be considered as one of the first
steps of evaluating the TPB and, more specifically, attitudes towards implementers,
experimentally. This way, we provide evidence in favor of an active consideration of
the TPB determinants in the design and implementation of interventions to increase
uptake, cooperative behavior, and general support by the targeted population. Cer-
tainly, researchers and practitioners will already have intuitively taken determinants
of the TPB into account when designing their intervention. In our study, however,
we argue for a systematic application of the TPB to increase interventions’ success. A
qualitative investigation prior to the project implementation and close cooperation with
people knowing the local context to identify behavioral, normative, and control beliefs
(that underlie the TPB determinants) within the study sample is recommended (Pro-
togerou et al., 2012). Following the logic of the TPB, changing the respective beliefs
(“attitudes”) in the appropriate direction will increase supportive behavior towards the
intervention (Hobbis and Sutton, 2005). What is more, considering above “subjective
norms” and “perceived behavioral control,” further contextual and habitual factors in
the framework of related theories, can help to get a more elaborate understanding what
determines successful uptake of interventions. Further research needs to contribute to
a clearer understanding by randomly altering these determinants or replicating results
in different settings. This way, important knowledge can be gained to improve not
only research interventions, but also practical development cooperation in more general
terms.
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If respondent asks you something, kindly answer by mentioning that you are only
involved as an enumerator in the project and that you do not have any information
on the Safe Childbirth Checklist. Furthermore, please connect the respondent with the
contact number, which has been stated before. Of course if there are misunderstand-
ings, you should repeat the provided information. However, please do not explain the
information in different words.
Part A “Now, we would like to present you a new tool and would like to learn
about your opinion towards it.” [Before the start of the experiment (after the completed
survey); give the 25,000 IDR voucher to the respondent] “This is in appreciation of your
time. Thank you very much. Subsequently, we will provide you with some information
on a new tool for health-care in Aceh province. After this, you can decide whether
you want to take the money for yourself or if you want to contribute some for the
implementation of this tool.”
Part B [Enumerator: Please, read this introduction out aloud and clear.] “During
complex events, like performing a surgery or a delivery, people can be forgetful or
might be distracted by other emergencies or duties. This can potentially have terrible
consequences, in the worst case losing the patient. Research proofs that checklists can
save lives and prevent these mistakes. Like a surgeon is responsible for patients’ lives
in the operation theater, the delivery team can have great impact on the safety of
mothers and babies. We would like to present you a new tool, which was developed
especially for your everyday work: The Safe Childbirth Checklist. It comprises 30 easy
to use items. The checklist begins with the admission of the patient and ends with the
discharge of mother and baby from the hospital. In each delivery, the doctor or midwife
fills in one checklist for every patient. You will fill in the checklist step by step and
the checklist will remind you to perform the important steps during delivery. If you
would like to know more about the checklist, here it is.” [Enumerator: Please hand
a checklist copy over to the doctor or midwife.] “For example, the checklist reminds
you to perform easy things, which are nevertheless very important like hand washing.”
[Enumerator: Show item “Confirm supplies are available to clean hands and wear gloves
for each vaginal exam.” on checklist] “The checklist also reminds you to share important
information with patients, including danger signs.” [Enumerator: Show item “Danger
Signs” on checklist to the midwife or doctor] “All these steps are already part of the
study curriculum. Hence, every checklist item is easy to understand. Generally, most
of the health workers already practice these important steps in the delivery process.
50The Indonesian version of the experimental protocol is available upon request.
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The checklist just has the purpose to remind you of all the important steps during
the delivery process. Especially, when health practitioners are under a lot of pressure,
e.g., during night shifts or if complications arise, it can be very helpful. For instance,
a research study has proven that during surgeries simple checklists can help to reduce
death rates even by almost half.”
Part C “Among other researchers, [INTERNATIONAL/LOCAL] researchers took
an active role in introducing the checklist to 17 facilities in Aceh province. The re-
search team received approval from the provincial health office of Aceh. However, no
funding was provided by the provincial health office. [LOCAL/INTERNATIONAL]
research assistants and [INTERNATIONAL/LOCAL] health professionals with a lot
of experience in delivery services were important partners and greatly supported the
project.”
Part D “I will now read to you information about the funding of the Safe Childbirth
study conducted by the [INTERNATIONAL/LOCAL] researchers. The following is a
page of paper containing information on the checklist.” [Enumerator: Please hand over
the SCC leaflet to the participant]
Figure D.1 SCC Leaflet
Page 1 Page 2
Source: Authors’ own depiction.
“The funds for the study have been used to implement the Safe Childbirth Checklist
in 17 health facilities in Aceh province during October 2016. Funds are still available
to introduce the checklist to 16 further facilities. The budget is enough to provide
the 17 health facilities over six months with checklist copies. Therefore, every delivery
during these six months can be conducted with the checklist. After this survey ends,
the first six months of the checklist implementation are also over. There will be no
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funds remaining to provide additional checklists to those 17 health facilities, where the
checklist was already introduced before.”
Part E “The researchers are collecting funds to be able to provide checklist copies
at those health facilities. Are you willing to support the activity? Remember that
the money collected will exclusively be used to provide checklist copies to the health
facilities. The total amount of money that was contributed by all donors together
will be made transparent. After finalizing the data collection, the amount of money
collected will be published openly in every participating facility of this research. If
you would like to support the activity, please decide on the amount of money you
would like to contribute and note it down on the voucher. You can choose to not
contribute at all, or you can give 5,000; 10,000; 15,000; 20,000 or 25,000 IDR. Every
contribution can help to conduct more deliveries with a Safe Childbirth Checklist. When
you are done, please put the voucher in the envelope and seal it. If you do not wish
to contribute anything, please put the number 0 on the voucher. In the end, only the
aggregate amount of contributions from all participating facilities will be announced.
Your individual contribution will be treated confidentially.”
Part F [Enumerator: Read this introduction out aloud to the participant] “During
the following task you have to estimate the most chosen answer, which neither refers
to the total amount nor the average. We have asked also other health practitioners /
workers in the district how much is their willingness to contribute to the provision of
checklist copies. Which amount do you think was contributed to the checklist copies
by your colleagues per person at other facilities? This estimation is not at all related
to your personal opinion. Instead, we would like you to estimate which amount of
contribution that was given by most of the other health practitioners per person. For
this question, if you assessed the most chosen amount per person correctly, you will be
given an additional 10,000 IDR. If you estimated the right amount, the 10.000 IDR will
be topped up to your phone credit together with the voucher within the next few days.
The other health practitioners also had to choose to contribute 0; 5,000; 10,000; 15,000;
20,000 or 25,000 IDR. Which category do you think was the most frequently chosen by
the health workers? / Which amount do you think most other health workers chose to
contribute per person?”
Part G “Your facility is one of the other 16 facilities, where the research team would
like to implement the Safe Childbirth Checklist. Experience shows that checklist use
needs to be practiced with coaches regularly in order to make deliveries safer. How
committed are you in investing your time to practice the use of the checklist in every
week?”
Debriefing “Thank you very much for your participation. We asked you previously
several questions. The aim is to find out what is your opinion about [local/international]
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researchers and how this opinion influences your motivation to use the Safe Childbirth
Checklist. The checklist was previously pilot tested in other countries around the world.
This way the most crucial practices during child delivery were identified. The research
collaboration was led by the Harvard School of Public Health and the World Health
Organization. Local researchers from Syiah Kuala University worked together with
international researchers to adapt the checklist to the local context. Both parties hope
that the Safe Childbirth Checklist can be implemented sustainably to serve as a tool
for safe deliveries in Aceh province. If these information change your attitude towards
contributing to the checklist copies in any way, you are free to change your indicated
contribution.” [Enumerator: If the respondent decides to change his/her contribution,
please hand the envelope back.]
Social desirability index We modify social desirability questions developed by
Kemper et al. (2014) to reflect social desirability norms in the Acehnese context. The
social desirability index was constructed by adding up the top categories (5 and 6)
indicated in the subsequent questions.
Items
1. “In an argument, I always
remain objective and not
become emotional.”
2. “Even if I am sad, I always
smile when talking to oth-
ers.”
3. “When talking to some-
one older, I always lis-
ten carefully to what s/he
says.”
4. “When I had the chance
to donate for religious
purposes, I always con-
tributed a lot.”
5. “Sometimes I only help
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4.A.2 Figures
Figure D.2 Study Design Flow Chart
Source: Authors’ depiction.
Figure D.3 Distribution of “International” Country Perceptions
Note: Based on “If you think of activities, programs or projects by internationals, which
countries come first to your mind?”
Source: Authors’ depiction.
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4.A.3 Tables
Table D.1 Experimental Balance – Full Sample
Full Full Full Control Control Treat Treat p-value
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD difference
Facility Type 236 1.538 – 1.690 – 1.433 – 0.021**
Gender (1=m, 2=f) 236 2.000 – 2.000 – 2.000 – –
Age (Years) 236 – 33.314 7.493 33.650 7.806 33.112 7.316 0.593
Education (Years) 236 15.051 0.527 15.020 0.603 15.067 0.462 0.619
Experience (Years) 236 9.576 7.271 9.690 7.736 9.537 6.979 0.886
Sufficient income 236 3.208 1.008 3.160 1.012 3.246 1.014 0.526
Financial problems 236 1.678 – 1.720 – 1.642 – 0.081*
Strategic donation 236 4.657 1.264 4.710 1.225 4.627 1.296 0.564
Social acc. Index 236 3.411 0.838 3.450 0.821 3.381 0.857 0.513
Social acc. # 1 236 4.966 0.690 5.000 0.778 4.940 0.622 0.480
Social acc. # 2 236 4.568 1.027 4.600 0.932 4.545 1.101 0.650
Social acc. # 3 236 5.343 0.558 5.310 0.506 5.366 0.595 0.172
Social acc. # 4 233 4.644 1.074 4.694 1.069 4.602 1.087 0.475
Social acc. # 5 236 2.229 1.254 2.250 1.298 2.216 1.235 0.784
Paperwork: too much 236 2.814 1.343 3.000 1.497 2.664 1.195 0.173
Routines ease work 236 5.153 0.734 5.150 0.626 5.179 0.764 0.660
Previous SCC experience 236 2.564 1.831 2.500 1.795 2.627 1.871 0.536
Previous SCC use 236 0.547 – 0.540 – 0.560 – 0.772
Access to resources 236 3.470 0.517 3.530 0.502 3.425 0.526 0.080*
Team effic. indicator 236 5.246 0.513 5.220 0.462 5.261 0.547 0.570
Part. in loc. projects 236 1.831 – 1.870 – 1.806 – 0.235
Part. in int. projects 236 1.898 – 1.880 – 1.910 – 0.511
Part. in donor projects 236 1.907 – 1.920 – 1.896 – 0.511
Note: Based upon the full sample with N denoting the number of observations, SD gives the standard
deviation. Standard Deviations are not depicted for binary outcomes. Proportions in the two groups are
significantly different from each other. Asterisks indicate p-values based on standard errors clustered at the
facility level: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.2 Experimental Balance – Reduced Sample
Full Full Full Control Control Treat Treat p-value
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD difference
Facility Type 170 1.500 – 1.618 – 1.409 – 0.050*
Gender (1 = 𝑚, 2 = 𝑓) 170 2.000 – 2.000 – 2.000 – –
Age (Years) 170 32.359 6.997 33.118 7.680 31.774 6.395 0.232
Education (Years) 170 14.994 0.516 14.974 0.565 15.011 0.478 0.742
Experience (Years) 170 8.888 7.094 8.974 7.494 8.849 6.824 0.908
Sufficient Income 170 3.200 1.069 3.118 1.083 3.269 1.065 0.348
Financial problems 170 1.741 – 1.763 – 1.720 – 0.396
Strategic donation 170 4.606 1.411 4.658 1.381 4.581 1.440 0.613
Social acc. Index 170 3.329 0.827 3.316 0.852 3.344 0.814 0.808
Social acc. # 1 170 5.000 0.738 4.987 0.887 5.011 0.599 0.834
Social acc. # 2 170 4.459 1.142 4.461 1.026 4.462 1.239 0.991
Social acc. # 3 170 5.429 0.584 5.408 0.521 5.452 0.634 0.436
Social acc. # 4 167 4.545 1.063 4.649 1.065 4.457 1.063 0.239
Social acc. # 5 170 2.118 1.286 2.184 1.334 2.065 1.258 0.375
Paperwork: too much 170 2.906 1.364 3.145 1.547 2.720 1.174 0.150
Routines ease work 170 5.100 0.727 5.079 0.648 5.151 0.722 0.471
Previous SCC experience 170 2.765 1.983 2.632 1.945 2.882 2.026 0.298
Previous SCC use 170 0.541 0.553 – 0.538 – 0.854
Access to resources 170 3.441 0.498 3.513 0.503 3.387 0.490 0.060*
Team effic. indicator 170 5.200 0.443 5.158 0.434 5.226 0.445 0.459
Part. in loc. projects 170 1.829 – 1.868 – 1.796 – 0.131
Part. in int. projects 170 1.918 – 1.895 – 1.935 – 0.272
Part. in donor projects 170 1.935 – 1.934 – 1.935 – 0.959
Note: Based upon the reduced sample excluding observations with prior contact to the checklist. N denotes
the number of observations, SD gives the standard deviation. Standard Deviations are not depicted for
binary outcomes. Proportions in the two groups are significantly different from each other. Asterisks
indicate p-values based on standard errors clustered at the facility level: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.3 Experimental Balance – Reduced Sample & SCC intervention
Full Full Full Control Control Treat Treat p-value
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD difference
Facility Type 335 1.676 – 1.859 – 1.503 – 0.002***
Gender (1 = 𝑚, 2 = 𝑓) 335 1.994 – 1.988 – 2.000 – 0.150
Age (Years) 335 32.529 0.403 32.706 0.606 32.379 0.539 0.687
Education (Years) 335 15.195 0.064 15.405 0.121 14.994 0.040 0.001***
Experience (Years) 335 8.928 0.404 8.969 0.600 8.905 0.547 0.937
Resource Access 335 3.486 0.027 3.534 0.039 3.444 0.038 0.102
Team Efficacy 335 5.240 0.025 5.282 0.036 5.195 0.034 0.081*
Note: “Full Sample” refers to the pooled Indonesian SCC intervention (treatment and control group), “SCC
Intervention” to the treatment group of the SCC intervention, and “Experiment” to the SCC intervention’s
control group where the framing experiment was conducted (excluding those with prior SCC contact). N
denotes the number of observations, SD gives the standard deviation. SDs are not depicted for binary
outcomes. Proportions in the two groups are significantly different from each other. Asterisks indicate
p-values based on standard errors clustered at the facility level: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.4 Summary Statistics for Indonesian data
Full Full Full Full Full
N Max Min Mean SD
Actual Behavior:
Active SCC Use 219 1 0 0.389 0.489
Intended Behavior
Would try to use SCC even if copies not provided 163 6 3 4.847 0.634
Would recommend the SCC to fellow colleagues 163 6 2 5.092 0.495
Using the SCC in my professional role is 163 6 4 5.325 0.483
Ease to use SCC in work environment 163 6 4 5.141 0.565
SCC supported by superiors 163 6 4 5.828 0.439
Urban (1) — Rural (2) 163 2 1 1.515 0.501
CEmONC Service Provision 24/7 163 1 0 0.178 0.384
Facility Type: Community Health Centre 163 1 0 0.589 0.494
Facility Type: Public Hospital 163 1 0 0.135 0.343
Facility Type: Private Hospital 163 1 0 0.190 0.394
Facility Type: Private Midwife Clinic 163 1 0 0.086 0.281
District: Aceh Besar 163 1 0 0.276 0.448
District: Banda Aceh 163 1 0 0.331 0.472
District: Bireuen 163 1 0 0.393 0.490
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Table D.5 Summary Statistics for Pakistani data
Full Full Full Full Full
N Max Min Mean SD
Actual Behavior:
Active SCC Use 212 1 0 0.344 0.476
Intended Behavior
Would try to use SCC even if copies are not provided 78 6 1 4.628 1.452
Would recommend the SCC to fellow colleagues 78 6 1 5.141 1.090
Using the SCC in my professional role is 79 6 1 5.380 0.821
Ease to use SCC in work environment 79 6 1 4.962 1.305
SCC is supported by superiors 58 6 1 5.155 1.508
Urban (1) — Rural (2) 80 1 0 0.813 0.393
Open 24/7 80 1 0 0.150 0.359
Facility Type: Health Facility 80 1 0 0.2125 0.412
Facility Type: Community Midwife 80 1 0 0.5625 0.500
Facility Type: Lady Health Visitor 80 1 0 0.225 0.420
District: Haripur 80 1 0 0.450 0.501
District: Nowshera 80 1 0 0.550 0.501
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Additional Results – Theory of Planned Behavior
Table D.6 TPB – Intentions and Behavior: Wild Bootstrapped SE




SCC in professional role: 1 “completely useless” – 6 “completely useful”
0.454*** 0.655*** -0.364
WB p-value (0.004) (0.000) (0.505)
Subjective Norms:
SCC is supported by superiors: 1 “not at all” – 6 “completely”
0.536* 0.207 0.642
WB p-value (0.072) (0.320) (0.503)
Perceived Behavioral Control:
Ease of SCC in work environment: 1 “very difficult” – 6 “very easy”
0.261 0.306*** 0.038
WB p-value (0.102) (0.000) (0.432)
N 163 212 218
Control variables No No No
Mean of dep. var. 4.847 0.344 0.389
Median of dep. var. 5 – –
SD of dep. var. 0.634 0.476 0.489
Note: Intended SCC Use was measured via the question “Would you try to use SCC
even if copies are not provided anymore? (1 disagree strongly – 6 agree strongly).”
Actual SCC Use was meassured via trained observers and is coded as a binary outcome
variable. All regressions are based upon the treated providers. Standard errors (SE)
are clustered at the facility level and wild cluster bootstrapped due to the small
number of clusters (15 facilities), following Cameron et al. (2008). No bootstrapping
is provided for intended SCC use in Pakistan as a sufficient number of clusters (70)
was sampled. Asterisks indicate p-values according to:
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.7 TPB – Binary Outcome
Intended SCC Use:
Pakistan Indonesia
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Attitudes:
SCC in professional role: 1 “completely useless” – 6 “completely useful”
0.930*** 0.704** 0.451*** 0.317**
p-value (0.007) (0.025) (0.006) (0.013)
Subjective Norms:
SCC is supported by superiors: 1 “not at all” – 6 “completely”
0.508 0.244 0.700*** 0.444***
p-value (0.118) (0.475) (0.009) (0.003)
Perceived Behavioral Control:
Ease of SCC in work environment: 1 “very difficult” – 6 “very easy”
0.763** 0.675** 0.303 -0.057
p-value (0.011) (0.041) (0.166) (0.746)
N 78 78 163 163
Control variables No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var. 4.628 4.628 4.847 4.847
Median of dep. var. 5 5 5 5
SD of dep. var. 1.452 1.452 0.634 0.634
Note: All regressions are based upon the treated providers. Adjusted regres-
sions (b) additionally control for a variable indicating the facility type, a binary
variable indicating rural/urban location, a variable indicating the district and
for the Pakistani data a binary variable indicating whether the facility is open
24/7. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. Asterisks indicate
p-values according to: * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Additional Results – Framing Experiment
Table D.8 Framing Experiment – Wild Bootstrapped SE
Financial Contribution in support of SCC project (in IDR)
(a) (b)
Framing: 1=“internat.” 557.624 1,283.772**
WB p-value (0.404) (0.032)
N 165 165
Control variables no Yes
Mean of dep. var. 4,757.576 4,757.576
SD of dep. var. 4,711.366 4,711.366
Note: See Table 4.3. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the
facility level and wild boostrapped due to limited cluster number
(13) for the specifications indicated as “WB p-values,” following
Cameron et al. (2008). Asterisks indicate p-values according to:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table D.9 Framing Experiment – Covariates
Recom- Time Own Elicitation PCA
mendation Investment Contribution
Public Hospital -0.063 -1.044 -3,444.525*** 415.641 -0.710*
p-value (0.595) (0.073) (0.0000) (0.816) (0.064)
WB p-value (0.651) (0.134) (0.002) (0.695) (0.200)
Private Hospital -0.217 0.826 -1,093.573 1,162.358 0.042
p-value (0.296) (0.265) (0.667) (0.337) (0.923)
WB p-value (0.302) (0.344) (0.541) (0.454) (0.873)
Social Acc. Index 0.132* 0.934*** 825.220* -81.462 0.446***
p-value (0.071) (0.000) (0.091) (0.704) (0.002)
WB p-value (0.082) (0.000) (0.114) (0.637) (0.000)
Paperwork: too much -0.149*** -0.637*** -978.225*** -599.969** -0.443***
p-value (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.019) (0.000)
WB p-value (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.004)
Note: All specifications are based upon the sample limited to those respondents without prior SCC
contact (refer to Table D.11). Community health clinics (puskesmas) constitute the comparison
group regarding the facility type. SE are clustered at the facility level. We present results based on
clustered SE indicated as “p-values” and wild bootstrapped due to limited cluster number (13) for
the specifications indicated as “WB p-values,” following Cameron et al. (2008). Asterisks indicate
p-values according to: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.10 Framing Experiment – Elicitation as Control
Financial Contribution in support of SCC project (in IDR)
Framing: 1=“internat.” 852.610*
p-value (0.064)
Elicited Contribution of Others 0.5000***
p-value (0.002)
N 165
Mean of dep. var. 4,757.576
SD of dep. var. 4,711.366
Note: See Table 4.3. Moreover, the elicited contribution of health
practitioners from other facilities is added as a control variable.
Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. Asterisks
indicate p-values according to: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
When being financially incentivized to assess the potential answer of an anonymous
third person, opportunity costs of not revealing the own true assessment increase. We,
thus, incentivized respondents with an additional pay-off of 10,000 IDR to estimate
the average contribution category of respondents at other facilities. In a resource con-
strained setting the beliefs about the willingness of others to contribute could provide
more accurate information about preferences as they are less subject to idiosyncratic
financial situations of respondents.
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The Theory of Planned Behavior – An Application to Implementation Research
Table D.13 Framing Experiment – Interaction with Prior Contact
Financial Contribution in support of SCC project (in IDR)
(a) (b)
Framing: 1=“internat.” 557.624 1,164.830**
p-value (0.395) (0.033)
Prior Contact × Local Framing 225.973 627.961
p-value (0.835) (0.547)
Prior Contact × International Framing 706.522 1,955.229
p-value (0.547) (0.105)
N 226 226
Control variables No Yes
Mean of dep. var. 4,757.576 4,757.576
SD of dep. var. 4,711.366 4,711.366
Note: See Table 4.3. The base category is No Prior Contact and Local Fram-
ing. Asterisks indicate p-values based on standard errors clustered at the
facility level: * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table D.14 Association between Previous Project Participation and Trust
Trust in Trust in Trust in
Local Actors Internat. Actors Foreign Countries
On a scale from 1 “not at all” to 4 “a great deal”
Participation int. project 0.604*** 0.474*** 0.286 0.368** 0.252* 0.378***
p-value (0.007) (0.008) (0.115) (0.020) (0.083) (0.002)
WB p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.112) (0.012)
Participation loc. project 0.065 0.140 0.302 0.312* 0.400*** 0.370***
p-value (0.810) (0.567) (0.133) (0.065) (0.003) (0.000)
WB p-value (0.791) (0.545) (0.102) (0.040) (0.002) (0.000)
N 168 168 168 168 168 168
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: All specifications are based upon the sample limited to those respondents without prior SCC
contact. Specifications (b) include a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating
if the respondent had financial problems, a composite index of social desirability variables and a
variable indicating the subjective perception of the amount of paperwork. SE are clustered at the
facility level. We present results based on clustered SE indicated as “p-values” and wild bootstrapped
due to limited cluster number (13) for the specifications indicated as “WB p-values,” following
Cameron et al. (2016). Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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The Theory of Planned Behavior – An Application to Implementation Research
Point Estimates – Previours Experience Table D.17 displays the results for the
interaction of our experimental framing with the binary variables indicating if respon-
dents already participated in international or local research projects. While the random-
ization ensured that the framing could be considered as exogenous, project participation
is potentially endogenous regarding other traits of the surveyed respondent. However,
as recent research by Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2016) and Bun and Harrison (2018)
indicates, the interaction of an exogenous and an endogenous variable can be consid-
ered as exogenous, when controlling for the endogenous variable.51 Moreover, balancing
tests provided in Table 4.3 and D.17 underscore that previous participation is balanced
across both framing treatments. The results in columns (1a-b) are structured to com-
pare respondents with similar previous experience (participation in international/local
projects) across framings. The corresponding comparison group are locally framed re-
spondents, who did neither participate in a local nor in an international project. Row
I and II show that if a person had been exposed both to an international and local
research project in the past, their contribution is approx. 6,500-8,500 IDR (e.g., 0.45-
0.65 US$) higher if framed international. Thus, the effect of the attitude towards the
intervention in the unadjusted and adjusted specification is significantly higher if re-
spondents knowing both implementers are framed internationally (p-value: 0.025 and
0.000, respectively). Respondents who previously participated in local projects do not
contribute different amounts of money when faced with an international framing. How-
ever, if respondents were only exposed to international projects in the past, they do
contribute significantly less if locally framed, both significant with and without adjust-
ing for controls (p-value: 0.012 and 0.052, respectively). Finally, row VII does not
depict any significant framing effects, if respondents did not have any prior experience.
Those estimates suggest that the positive effects of the international framing are driven
by previous experience with the respective implementer. The reduced willingness to
contribute to local projects is most pronounced if respondents have participated both
in local and international projects.
51Nonetheless, one needs to be aware that, especially, with a limited sample size omitted variables
might not be homogenously distributed and, hence, it is not inherently clear, which other factors are
correlated with our interaction variable of interest.
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Table D.17 Framing Experiment – Previous Experience (Point Estimates)
Outcome: Financial Contribution in support of SCC (in IDR)
(a) (b)
(I.) International Framing (1) × Int. Participation (1) × Loc. Participation (1)
𝛽 2,708.333 4,202.892**
p-value (0.237) (0.019)
(II.) International Framing (0) × Int. participation (1) × Loc. Participation (1)
𝛽 -3,791.667*** -4,313.226***
p-value (0.007) (0.000)
Coefficient Equality Row (I) & (II) 0.025 0.001
(III.) International Framing (1) × Int. participation (0) × Loc. Participation (1)
𝛽 -2,291.667* -1,196.631
p-value (0.068) (0.287)
(IV.) International Framing (0) × Int. participation (0) × Loc. Participation (1)
𝛽 -148.810 -537.176
p-value (0.918) (0.762)
Coefficient Equality Row (III) & (IV) 0.186 0.660
(V.) International Framing (1) × Int. participation (1) × Loc. Participation (0)
𝛽 -625.000 1,433.060
p-value (0.710) (0.507)
(IV.) International Framing (0) × Int. participation (1) × Loc. Participation (0)
𝛽 -4,791.667*** -4,184.609
p-value (0.000) (0.130)
Coefficient Equality Row (V) & (VI) 0.012 0.052




Control variables No Yes
Note: See Table 4.3. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. Asterisks indicate p-values




Abman, R. and C. Carney (2018). Agricultural productivity and deforesta-
tion: Evidence from input subsidies and ethnic favoritism in Malawi. Un-
published Manuscript available at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/mleewu3o68in0kj/
agricultural-productivity-deforestation.pdf?dl=0 .
Acemoglu, D., T. Verdier, and J. A. Robinson (2004). Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule:
A model of personal rule. Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (2-3), 162–
192.
Acemoglu, D. and P. Yared (2010). Political limits to globalization. American Economic
Review 100 (2), 83–88.
Adida, C. L., K. E. Ferree, D. N. Posner, and A. L. Robinson (2016). Who’s ask-
ing? Interviewer coethnicity effects in African survey data. Comparative Political
Studies 49 (12), 1630–1660.
Adler, R., G. Huffman, A. Chang, R. Ferraro, P. Xie, J. Janowiak, B. Rudolf, U. Schnei-
der, S. Curtis, D. Bolvin, A. Gruber, J. Susskind, and P. Arkin (2003). Global
Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP): Monthly Precipitation Analysis (1979-
Present), Version 2. Earth System Research Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration. Available at https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/data/gridded/
data.gpcp.html, last accessed 10 October, 2018.
Afrobarometer (2018). Afrobarometer: Merged rounds 1–6. Technical report, Afro-
barometer. Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org.
AidData (2017). World Bank Geocoded Research Release Level 1. Version 1.4.2
Geocoded Dataset. Technical report, Williamsburg, VA and Washington, DC.
Aidt, T. S. and M. Gassebner (2010). Do autocratic states trade less? The World Bank
Economic Review 24 (1), 38–76.
Ajzen, I. (1985). From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior. In J. Kuhl
and J. Beckmann (Eds.), Action-control: From cognition to behavior, Chapter 2, pp.
11–39. Heidelberg, Berlin: SSSP Springer Series in Social Psychology.
226
Bibliography
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organisational Behaviour and Human
Decision Processes 50, 179–211.
Aker, J. C., M. W. Klein, S. A. O’Connell, and M. Yang (2014). Borders, ethnicity and
trade. Journal of Development Economics 107, 1–16.
Akiyama, T. and D. F. Larson (1994). Adding up problem: Strategies for primary
commodity exports in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 1245.
Alesina, A., W. Easterly, and J. Matuszeski (2011). Artificial states. Journal of the
European Economic Association 9 (2), 246–277.
Alesina, A. and E. L. Ferrara (2005). Ethnic diversity and economic performance.
Journal of Economic Literature 43 (3), 762–800.
Alesina, A., J. Harnoss, and H. Rapoport (2016). Birthplace diversity and economic
prosperity. Journal of Economic Growth 21 (2), 101–138.
Alesina, A., S. Michalopoulos, and E. Papaioannou (2016). Ethnic inequality. Journal
of Political Economy 124 (2), 428–488.
Alkire, S. and M. E. Santos (2014). Measuring acute poverty in the developing world:
Robustness and scope of the multidimensional poverty index. World Development 59,
251–274.
Altonji, J. G. and D. Card (1991). The effects of immigration on the labor market
outcomes of less-skilled natives. In Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market, pp.
201–234. University of Chicago Press.
Altonji, J. G., T. E. Elder, and C. R. Taber (2005). Selection on observed and unob-
served variables: Assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools. Journal of Political
Economy 113 (1), 151–184.
American Economic Association (2018). AEA RCT Registry. Available at https://
www.socialscienceregistry.org/, last accessed 10 September, 2018.
Anderson, K., G. Rausser, and J. Swinnen (2013). Political economy of public policies:
insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets. Journal of Economic
Literature 51 (2), 423–477.
Angrist, J. D. and J.-S. Pischke (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics. An Empiricist’s
Companion. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Appleby, B., C. Roskell, and W. Daly (2016). What are health professionals’ intentions
toward using research and products of research in clinical practice? A systematic
review and narrative synthesis. Nursing open 3 (3), 125–139.
227
Bibliography
Armitage, C. J. and M. Conner (2001). Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behaviour:
A meta-analytic review. British Journal of Social Psychology 40, 471–499.
Ashraf, N., E. Field, and J. Lee (2014). Household bargaining and excess fertility: An
experimental study in Zambia. American Economic Review 104 (7), 2210–2237.
Asmus, G., V. Eichenauer, A. Fuchs, and B. Parks (2017). India’s Development
Cooperation Worldwide,Version 0.1 (beta release). Mimeo.
Autor, D. H., D. Dorn, and G. H. Hanson (2013). The China syndrome: Local labor
market effects of import competition in the United States. American Economic
Review 103 (6), 2121–2168.
Azevedo, J. (2011). wbopendata: Stata module to access World Bank databases, Sta-
tistical Software Components.
Baghdadi, L., I. Martínez-Zarzoso, and H. Zitouna (2013). Are RTA agreements
with environmental provisions reducing emissions? Journal of International Eco-
nomics 90 (2), 378–390.
Balassa, B. (1965). Trade liberalization and revealed comparative advantage. Manch-
ester School of Economic and Social Studies 33 (2), 99–123.
Baldwin, R. and J. Lopez-Gonzalez (2015). Supply-chain trade: A portrait of global
patterns and several testable hypotheses. The World Economy 38 (11), 1682–1721.
Ballard-Rosa, C., M. Malik, S. Rickard, and K. Scheve (2017). The economic origins
of authoritarian values: Evidence from local trade shocks in the United Kingdom.
Unpublished Manuscript available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
320044830_The_Economic_Origins_of_Authoritarian_Values_Evidence_from_
Local_Trade_Shocks_in_the_United_Kingdom.
Banerjee, A., E. Duflo, R. Glennerster, and D. Kothari (2010). Improving immunisation
coverage in rural India: Clustered randomised controlled evaluation of immunisation
campaigns with and without incentives. BMJ 340, 1–9.
Baranov, V., S. R. Bhalotra, P. Biroli, and J. Maselko (2017). Maternal depression,
women’s empowerment, and parental investment: Evidence from a large randomized
control trial. Technical Report 11187, IZA Discussion Papers.
Barnard-Brak, L., H. Burley, and S. M. Crooks (2010). Explaining Youth Mentoring
Behavior using a Theory of Planned Behavior Perspective. International Journal of
Adolescence and Youth 15 (4), 365–379.
Barrett, C. B., L. Christiaensen, M. Sheahan, and A. Shimeles (2017). On the structural
transformation of rural Africa. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7938.
228
Bibliography
Barron, P., R. Diprose, and M. J. Woolcock (2011). Contesting development: Partic-
ipatory projects and local conflict dynamics in Indonesia. New Haven, Connecticut,
United States: Yale University Press.
Barsbai, T., H. Rapoport, A. Steinmayr, and C. Trebesch (2017). The effect of labor
migration on the diffusion of democracy: evidence from a former Soviet Republic.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9 (3), 36–69.
Bartik, T. J. (1991). Who benefits from state and local economic development policies?
WE Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Baskaran, T., B. Min, and Y. Uppal (2015). Election cycles and electricity provision:
Evidence from a quasi-experiment with Indian special elections. Journal of Public
Economics 126, 64–73.
Bassnet, Y. (2011). Taking stock of aid for trade. Available at https://www.odi.org/
comment/5871-taking-stock-aid-trade, last accessed August 18, 2018.
Bates, R. H. (1989). Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of
Agrarian Development in Kenya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bates, R. H. and S. Block (2009). Political economy of agricultural trade interventions
in Africa. Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 87, World Bank.
Bates, R. H. and S. Block (2010). Agricultural trade interventions in Africa. In K. An-
derson (Ed.), In The Political Economy of Agricultural Price Distortions. Cambridge
University Press.
Bates, R. H. and S. A. Block (2013). Revisiting African agriculture: institutional change
and productivity growth. The Journal of Politics 75 (2), 372–384.
BBC (2005). Germany takes lead in aid effort. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/4148719.stm, last accessed October 4, 2018.
Beath, A., F. Christia, and R. Enikolopov (2012). Winning hearts and minds through
development? Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 6129.
Behavioral Science Solution (2018). Framing Effect. Available at https://www.
behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/framing-effect, last ac-
cessed September 29, 2018.
Beine, M., F. Docquier, and H. Rapoport (2008). Brain drain and human capital for-
mation in developing countries: winners and losers. The Economic Journal 118 (528),
631–652.
Bellemare, M. F. (2015). Rising food prices, food price volatility, and social unrest.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 97 (1), 1–21.
229
Bibliography
Berman, E., J. H. Felter, J. N. Shapiro, and E. Troland (2013). Modest, secure, and
informed: Successful development in conflict zones. American Economic Review:
Papers and Proceedings 103 (3), 512–517.
Berman, E., J. N. Shapiro, and J. H. Felter (2011). Can hearts and minds be bought?
the economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. Journal of Political Economy 119 (4),
766–819.
Berman, N. and M. Couttenier (2015). External shocks, internal shots: The geography
of civil conflicts. Review of Economics and Statistics 97 (4), 758–776.
Berman, N., M. Couttenier, D. Rohner, and M. Thoenig (2017). This mine is mine!
How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa. American Economic Review 107 (6), 1564–1610.
Berthélemy, J.-C. (2006). Bilateral donors’ interest vs. recipients’ development mo-
tives in aid allocation: Do all donors behave the same? Review of Development
Economics 10 (2), 179–194.
Bertrand, M., S. Mullainathan, and E. Shafir (2006). Behavioral Economics and Mar-
keting in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor. Journal of Public Policy &
Marketing 25 (1), 8–23.
Bezemer, D. and D. Headey (2008). Agriculture, development, and urban bias. World
Development 36 (8), 1342–1364.
Bilic, B. (2005). The Theory of Planned Behaviour and Health Behaviours: Critical
Analysis of Methodological and Theoretical Issues. Hellenic Journal of Psychology 2,
243–259.
Binswanger, H. P. and K. Deininger (1997). Explaining agricultural and agrarian poli-
cies in developing countries. Journal of Economic Literature 35 (4), 1958–2005.
Bjørnskov, C. and M. Rode (2018). Regime types and regime change: A new dataset,
Version 2.1. Available at http://www.christianbjoernskov.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018/03/Codebook-BR-dataset.pdf.
Blue, C. (1995). The Predictive Capacity of the Theory of Reasoned Action and the
Theory of Planned Behavior in Exercise Research: An integrated Literature Review.
Research in Nursing and Health 18, 105–121.
Bluhm, R., A. Dreher, A. Fuchs, B. Parks, A. Strange, and M. J. Tierney (2018).
Connective financing: Chinese infrastructure projects and the diffusion of economic
activity in developing countries. AidData Working Paper (64).
Bluhm, R., M. Gassebner, S. Langlotz, and P. Schaudt (2016). Fueling conflict? (De)
escalation and bilateral aid. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6125 .
230
Bibliography
Bommer, C., A. Dreher, and M. Perez (2018). Regional and ethnic favoritism in the
allocation of humanitarian aid. CESifo Working Paper 7038.
Bommer, C., E. Heesemann, V. Sagalova, J. Manne-Goehler, R. Atun, T. Bärnighausen,
and S. Vollmer (2017). The global economic burden of diabetes in adults aged 20–79
years: a cost-of-illness study. The lancet Diabetes & endocrinology 5 (6), 423–430.
Borchard, A., D. L. B. Schwappach, A. Barbir, and P. Bezzola (2012). A systematic
review of the effectiveness, compliance, and critical factors for implementation of
safety checklists in surgery. Annals of Surgery 256 (6), 925–933.
Bourguignon, F. and S. R. Chakravarty (2003). The measurement of multidimensional
poverty. The Journal of Economic Inequality 1 (1), 25–49.
Bowles, S. and S. Polania-Reyes (2012). Economic incentives and social preferences:
substitutes or complements? Journal of Economic Literature 50 (2), 368–425.
Brakman, S., H. Garretsen, and T. Kohl (2018). Consequences of Brexit and options
for a “Global Britain”. Papers in Regional Science 97 (1), 55–72.
Bräutigam, D. (2011). Aid with Chinese characteristics: Chinese foreign aid and devel-
opment finance meet the OECD-DAC aid regime. Journal of International Develop-
ment 23 (5), 752–764.
Brooks, D. H. and D. Hummels (2005). Infrastructure’s Role in Lowering Asia’s Trade
Costs: Building for Trade. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bruederle, A. and R. Hodler (2017). The effect of oil spills on infant mortality: Evidence
from Nigeria. CESifo Working Paper 6653.
Bueno De Mesquita, B. (2005). The logic of political survival. MIT press.
Bun, M. J. and T. D. Harrison (2018). OLS and IV estimation of regression models
including endogenous interaction terms. Econometric Reviews 113 (522), 1–14.
Burgess, D. J. (2010). Are providers more likely to contribute to healthcare disparities
under high levels of cognitive load? How features of the healthcare setting may lead
to biases in medical decision making. Medical Decision Making 30 (2), 246–257.
Burgess, R., R. Jedwab, E. Miguel, A. Morjaria, and G. Padró i Miquel (2015). The
value of democracy: evidence from road building in Kenya. American Economic
Review 105 (6), 1817–1851.
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar (2000). Aid, Policies, and Growth. American Economic
Review 90 (4), 847–868.
Calì, M. and D. W. te Velde (2011). Does aid for trade really improve trade perfor-
mance? World Development 39 (5), 725–740.
231
Bibliography
Cameron, A. C., J. B. Gelbach, and D. L. Miller (2008). Bootstrap-based improvements
for inference with clustered errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (3),
414–427.
Cameron, A. C., J. B. Gelbach, and D. L. Miller (2011). Robust inference with multiway
clustering. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 29 (2), 238–249.
Cameron, D. B., A. Mishra, and A. N. Brown (2016). The growth of impact evaluation
for international development: How much have we learned? Journal of Development
Effectiveness 8 (1), 1–21.
Caselli, F., M. Morelli, and D. Rohner (2015). The geography of interstate resource
wars. Quarterly Journal of Economics 130 (1), 267–315.
Cederman, L.-E., H. Buhaug, and J. K. Rød (2009). Ethno-nationalist dyads and civil
war: A GIS-based analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Cederman, L.-E., L. Girardin, and J. Wucherpfennig (2014). Exploring Inequality and
Ethnic Conflict: EPR-ETH and GROWup. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Cederman, L.-E., K. S. Gleditsch, and H. Buhaug (2013). Inequality, grievances, and
civil war. Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press.
Cederman, L.-E., N. B. Weidmann, and N.-C. Bormann (2015). Triangulating horizon-
tal inequality: Toward improved conflict analysis. Journal of Peace Research 52 (6),
806–821.
Cederman, L.-E., N. B. Weidmann, and K. S. Gleditsch (2011). Horizontal inequalities
and ethnonationalist civil war: A global comparison. American Political Science
Review 105 (3), 478–495.
Cheibub, J. A., J. Gandhi, and J. R. Vreeland (2010). Democracy and dictatorship
revisited. Public choice 143 (1-2), 67–101.
Cheon, J., S. Lee, S. M. Crooks, and J. Song (2012). An investigation of mobile learning
readiness in higher education based on the theory of planned behavior. Computers
and Education 59 (3), 1054–1064.
Child, T. B. (2018). Conflict and counterinsurgency aid: Drawing sectoral distinctions.
Journal of Development Economics.
Christian, P. and C. Barrett (2017). Revisiting the effect of food aid on conflict: A
methodological caution. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8171.
CIDOB (2018). Biografías líderes políticos. Available at https://www.cidob.org/en/
biografias_lideres_politicos_only_in_spanish, last accessed September 10, 2018.
232
Bibliography
CIESIN (2016). Documentation for the gridded population of the world, version
4. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Available
at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v4/documentation, last ac-
cessed October 10, 2018.
Cilliers, J., O. Dube, and B. Siddiqi (2015). The white-man effect: How foreigner
presence affects behavior in experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior and Orga-
nization 118, 397–414.
Clemens, M. A., S. Radelet, and R. Bhavnani (2012). Counting chickens when they
hatch: The short term effect of aid on growth. Economic Journal 90 (2000), 1–33.
Cogneau, D. and R. Jedwab (2012). Commodity price shocks and child outcomes: the
1990 cocoa crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. Economic Development and Cultural Change 60 (3),
507–534.
Cole, S., X. Giné, J. Tobacman, P. Topalova, R. M. Townsend, and J. Vickery (2013).
Barriers to household risk management: Evidence from India. American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics 5 (1), 104–135.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic
Papers 56 (4), 563–595.
Conner, M. and C. J. Armitage (1998). Extending the Theory of Planned Behavior:
A Review and Avenues for Further Research. Journal of Applied Social Psychol-
ogy 28 (15), 1429–1464.
Cooke, R., M. Dahdah, P. Norman, and D. P. French (2014). How well does the Theory
of Planned Behaviour predict alcohol consumption? A systematic review and meta-
analysis. Health Psychology Review 10 (2), 148–167.
Croicu, M. and R. Sundberg (2015). UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Codebook
Version 4.0. Journal of Peace Research 50 (4), 523–532.
Croicu, M. and R. Sundberg (2016). UCDP GED Codebook Version 5.0. Technical
report, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
Croskerry, P. (2002). Achieving quality in clinical decision making: cognitive strategies
and detection of bias. Academic Emergency Medicine 9 (11), 1184–1204.
Crost, B., J. Felter, and P. Johnston (2014). Aid under fire: Development projects and
civil conflict. American Economic Review 104 (6), 1833–1856.
Crost, B., J. H. Felter, and P. B. Johnston (2016). Conditional cash transfers, civil
conflict and insurgent influence: Experimental evidence from the Philippines. Journal
of Development Economics 118, 171–182.
233
Bibliography
Curto-Grau, M., A. Solé-Ollé, and P. Sorribas-Navarro (2018). Does electoral competi-
tion curb party favoritism? American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (forth-
coming).
Data in Space (2018). Regional Development Indicators (RDI) – Africa, Version 0.1.
Available at https://datainspace.org/, last accessed July 28, 2018.
Daudin, G., M. Morys, and K. H. O’Rourke (2008). Globalization, 1870–1914. Univer-
sity of Oxford – Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series (395).
De Luca, G., R. Hodler, P. A. Raschky, and M. Valsecchi (2018). Ethnic favoritism:
An axiom of politics? Journal of Development Economics 132, 115–129.
De Ree, J. and E. Nillesen (2009). Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign
aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics 88 (2), 301–313.
Deck, C. and S. Jahedi (2015). The effect of cognitive load on economic decision making:
A survey and new experiments. European Economic Review 78, 97–119.
Demmler, K. M., S. Klasen, J. M. Nzuma, and M. Qaim (2017). Supermarket purchase
contributes to nutrition-related non-communicable diseases in urban Kenya. PloS
one 12 (9), 1–18.
Denning, G., P. Kabambe, P. Sanchez, A. Malik, R. Flor, R. Harawa, P. Nkhoma,
C. Zamba, C. Banda, and C. Magombo (2009). Input subsidies to improve small-
holder maize productivity in Malawi: Toward an African Green Revolution. PLoS
biology 7 (1), 2–10.
Detweiler, J. B., B. T. Bedell, P. Salovey, E. Pronin, and A. J. Rothman (1999). Message
framing and sunscreen use: Gain-framed messages motivate beach-goers. Health
Psychology 18 (2), 189–196.
Diao, X., M. McMillan, and D. Rodrik (2017). The recent growth boom in developing
economies: A structural change perspective. NBER Working Paper 23132.
Diba, F., I. Ichsan, M. Muhsin, M. Marthoenis, H. Sofyan, S. Susanti, M. Andalas,
K. Richert, L. Kaplan, Samadi, and S. Vollmer (2018). Analysis of the Impact and
Effectiveness of Safe Childbirth Checklists on the Quality of Care and Birth Outcomes
in Health Facilities in Aceh Province, Indonesia – A Randomized Controlled Trial.
Mimeo.
Dickens, A. (2018). Ethnolinguistic favouritism in African politics. American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics 10 (3), 370–402.
Dietrich, S., M. Mahmud, and M. S. Winters (2018). Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy, and
Domestic Government Legitimacy: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh. The
Journal of Politics 1 (80), 133–148.
234
Bibliography
Dietrich, S. and M. S. Winters (2015). Foreign aid and government legitimacy. Journal
of Experimental Political Science 2 (2), 164–171.
Dixit, A. and J. Londregan (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in
redistributive politics. The Journal of Politics 58 (4), 1132–1155.
Dollar, D. and L. Pritchett (1998). Assessing Aid – What Works, What Doesn’t, and
Why. World Bank Policy Research Report 1.
Dorward, A. and E. Chirwa (2011). The Malawi agricultural input subsidy programme:
2005/06 to 2008/09. International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 9 (1), 232–
247.
Doucouliagos, H. and M. Paldam (2008). Aid effectiveness on growth: A meta study.
European Journal of Political Economy 24 (1), 1–24.
Doucouliagos, H. and M. Paldam (2009). The aid effectiveness literature: The sad
results of 40 years of research. Journal of Economic Surveys 23 (3), 433–461.
Dreher, A. (2006). Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of
globalization. Applied Economics 38 (10), 1091–1110.
Dreher, A., V. Z. Eichenauer, and K. Gehring (2018). Geopolitics, aid, and growth:
The impact of UN security council membership on the effectiveness of aid. The World
Bank Economic Review.
Dreher, A., A. Fuchs, R. Hodler, B. Parks, P. A. Raschky, and M. J. Tierney (2016).
Aid on demand: African leaders and the geography of China’s foreign assistance.
AidData Working Paper 3 (Revised).
Dreher, A., A. Fuchs, B. Parks, A. M. Strange, and M. J. Tierney (2017). Aid, China,
and growth: Evidence from a new global development finance dataset. AidData
Working Paper 46.
Dreher, A., A. Fuchs, B. Parks, A. M. Strange, and M. J. Tierney (2018). Apples and
dragon fruits: the determinants of aid and other forms of state financing from China
to Africa. International Studies Quarterly 62 (1), 182–194.
Dreher, A. and N. Gaston (2008). Has globalization increased inequality? Review of
International Economics 16 (3), 516–536.
Dreher, A., V. Lang, P. Rosendorff, and J.-R. Vreeland (2018). Buying Votes and
International Organizations: The Dirty-Work Hypothesis. Mimeo.
Dreher, A. and S. Langlotz (2017). Aid and growth. New evidence using an excludable
instrument. Economics Discussion Paper 635, Heidelberg University.
235
Bibliography
Dreher, A., S. Langlotz, and S. Marchesi (2017). Information transmission and owner-
ship consolidation in aid programs. Economic Inquiry 55 (4), 1671–1688.
Dreher, A. and S. Lohmann (2015). Aid and growth at the regional level. Oxford Review
of Economic Policy 31 (3-4), 420–446.
Dreher, A., P. Nunnenkamp, and R. Thiele (2008). Does aid for education educate
children? Evidence from panel data. World Bank Economic Review 22 (2), 291–314.
Dreher, A., J.-E. Sturm, and J. R. Vreeland (2009). Development aid and international
politics. Journal of Development Economics 88 (1), 1–18.
Dube, O. and J. F. Vargas (2013). Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence
from Colombia. Review of Economic Studies 80 (4), 1384–1421.
Duflo, E., R. Glennerster, and M. Kremer (2007). Chapter 61 Using Randomization
in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit. Handbook of Development Eco-
nomics 4 (07), 3895–3962.
Easterly, B. W., R. Levine, and D. Roodman (2004). Aid, Policies, and Growth: Com-
ment. American Economic Review 94 (3), 774–780.
Eck, K. (2012). In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP, GED, and ACLED conflict
events datasets. Cooperation and Conflict 47 (1), 124–141.
Eck, K. and L. Hultman (2007). One-sided violence against civilians in war: Insights
from new fatality data. Journal of Peace Research 44 (2), 233–246.
Ejdemyr, S., E. Kramon, and A. L. Robinson (2018). Segregation, ethnic favoritism,
and the strategic targeting of local public goods. Comparative Political Studies 51 (9),
1111–1143.
Englmaier, F. and T. Stowasser (2017). Electoral cycles in savings bank lending. Journal
of the European Economic Association 15 (2), 296–354.
Esteban, J., L. Mayoral, and D. Ray (2012). Ethnicity and conflict: An empirical study.
American Economic Review 102 (4), 1310.
Fafchamps, M. (2000). Ethnicity and credit in African manufacturing. Journal of
Development Economics 61 (1), 205–235.
Fan, Y. and H. Van den Dool (2008). A global monthly land surface air temperature
analysis for 1948–present. Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 113 (D1).
FAO (2018). FAOStat. Available at http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data, last ac-
cessed September 28, 2018.
236
Bibliography
Fearon, J. D. and D. D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American
Political Science Review 97 (01), 75–90.
Fearon, J. D. and D. D. Laitin (2011). Sons of the soil, migrants, and civil war. World
Development 39 (2), 199–211.
Fichten, C., T. Heiman, M. Jorgensen, M. N. Nguyen, A. Havel, L. King, J. Budd,
and R. Amsel (2016). Theory of Planned Behavior Predicts Graduation Intentions
of Canadian and Israeli Postsecondary Students with and without Learning Dis-
abilities/Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. International Journal of Higher
Education 5 (1), 208–219.
Findley, M. G., A. S. Harris, H. V. Milner, and D. L. Nielson (2017). Who Controls
Foreign Aid? Elite versus Public Perceptions of Donor Influence in Aid-Dependent
Uganda. International Organization (October 2015), 1–31.
Fishbein, M. and I. Ajzen (1980). Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Be-
havior (Revised ed.). Prentice-Hall.
Franck, R. and I. Rainer (2012). Does the Leader’s Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Fa-
voritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa. American Political Science
Review 106 (2), 294–325.
French, D. P. and M. Hankins (2003). The expectancy-value muddle in the theory of
planned behaviour – and some proposed solutions. British Journal of Health Psy-
chology 8, 37–55.
Fuchs, A. and K. Gehring (2017). The home bias in sovereign ratings. Journal of the
European Economic Association 15 (6), 1386–1423.
Fuchs, A. and K. C. Vadlamannati (2013). The needy donor: An empirical analysis of
India’s aid motives. World Development 44, 110–128.
Galiani, S., S. Knack, L. C. Xu, and B. Zou (2017). The effect of aid on growth:
Evidence from a quasi-experiment. Journal of Economic Growth 22, 1–33.
Gehring, K., S. Kienberger, and S. Langlotz (2018). Stimulant or depressant? Resource-
related income shocks and conflict. University of Heidelberg Department of Economics
Discussion Paper Series No. 652 .
Gehring, K. and V. Lang (2018). Stigma or cushion? IMF programs and sovereign
creditworthiness. University of Zurich CIS Working Paper No. 98 .
Gehring, K., K. Michaelowa, A. Dreher, and F. Spörri (2017). Aid fragmentation and
effectiveness: What do we really know? World Development 99, 320–334.
Gereffi, G. and K. Fernandez-Stark (2016). Global value chain analysis: a primer (Sec-
ond ed.). Duke CGGC (Center on Globalization, Governance & Competitiveness).
237
Bibliography
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (2005).
Review of German Government Funding for the Tsunami Relief Operations.
Gibson, C. and M. J. Woolcock (2005). Empowerment and local level conflict mediation
in Indonesia: A comparative analysis of concepts, measures, and project efficacy,
Volume 3713. World Bank Publications.
Giuliano, P. and N. Nunn (2018). Ancestral characteristics of modern populations.
Economic History of Developing Regions 33 (1), 1–17.
Gneezy, U., S. Meier, and P. Rey-Biel (2011). When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work
to Modify Behavior. Journal of Economic Perspectives 25 (4), 191–210.
Goldsmith-Pinkham, P., I. Sorkin, and H. Swift (2018). Bartik instruments: What,
when, why, and how. NBER Working Paper 24408.
Gollin, D. (2014). The Lewis model: A 60-year retrospective. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 28 (3), 71–88.
Grossman, H. I. (1991). A general equilibrium model of insurrections. The American
Economic Review, 912–921.
Grossman, H. I. (1992). Foreign aid and insurrection. Defence and Peace Eco-
nomics 3 (4), 275–288.
Guttman, N. B. (1999). Accepting the standardized precipitation index: A calculation
algorithm. JAWRA Journal of the American Water Resources Association 35 (2),
311–322.
Hanna, R., E. Duflo, and M. Greenstone (2016). Up in smoke: the influence of household
behavior on the long-run impact of improved cooking stoves. American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy 8 (1), 80–114.
Harms, P. and P.-G. Méon (2018). Good and useless FDI: The growth effects of
greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions. Review of International Eco-
nomics 26 (1), 37–59.
Harrison, G. W. and J. A. List (2004). Field Experiments. Journal of Economic
Literature 42 (4), 1009–1055.
Haugen, A. S., E. Søfteland, S. K. Almeland, N. Sevdalis, B. Vonen, G. E. Eide, M. W.
Nortvedt, and S. Harthug (2015). Effect of the World Health Organization checklist
on patient outcomes: a stepped wedge cluster randomized controlled trial. Annals of
surgery 261 (5), 821–828.
Hausmann, R., J. Hwang, and D. Rodrik (2007). What you export matters. Journal
of Economic Growth 12 (1), 1–25.
238
Bibliography
Hausmann, R., L. Pritchett, and D. Rodrik (2005). Growth accelerations. Journal of
Economic Growth 10 (4), 303––329.
Head, K., T. Mayer, and J. Ries (2010). The erosion of colonial trade linkages after
independence. Journal of International Economics 81 (1), 1–14.
Hegre, H. and N. Sambanis (2006). Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war
onset. Journal of conflict resolution 50 (4), 508–535.
Henderson, J. V., T. Squires, A. Storeygard, and D. Weil (2017). The global distribution
of economic activity: Nature, history, and the role of trade. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 133 (1), 357–406.
Henderson, J. V., A. Storeygard, and D. N. Weil (2012). Measuring economic growth
from outer space. American Economic Review 102 (2), 994–1028.
Hendrix, C. S. and S. Haggard (2015). Global food prices, regime type, and urban
unrest in the developing world. Journal of Peace Research 52 (2), 143–157.
Hess, S. (2017). Randomization inference with Stata: A guide and software. Stata
Journal 17 (3), 630–651.
Hijmans, R., N. Garcia, J. Kapoor, A. Rala, A. Maunahan, and J. Wieczorek (2012).
Global Administrative Areas, Version 2.8.
Hirshleifer, J. (1989). Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference
models of relative success. Public Choice 63 (2), 101–112.
Hirshleifer, J. (1995). Anarchy and its breakdown. Journal of Political Economy 103 (1),
26–52.
Hobbis, I. C. A. and S. Sutton (2005). Are Techniques Used in Cognitive Behaviour
Therapy Applicable to Behaviour Change Interventions Based on the Theory of
Planned Behaviour? Journal of Health Psychology 10 (1), 7–18.
Hodler, R. and P. A. Raschky (2014). Regional favoritism. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 129 (2), 995–1033.
Hoffman, M., V. Mukete, J. Szmanda, and C. Witt (2011). The effect of increased
stress levels on memory test performance. Unpublished manuscript available at
https://www.google.com/search?q=The+effect+of+increased+stress+levels+on+
memory+test+performance+hoffmann&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b-1-ab.
Hossain, T. and J. A. List (2012). The behavioralist visits the factory: Increasing




Hsu, C. L., C. Y. Chang, and C. Yansritakul (2017). Exploring purchase intention of
green skincare products using the Theory of Planned Behavior: Testing the mod-
erating effects of country of origin and price sensitivity. Journal of Retailing and
Consumer Services 34, 145–152.
Hultman, L., J. Kathman, and M. Shannon (2014). Beyond keeping peace: United Na-
tions effectiveness in the midst of fighting. American Political Science Review 108 (4),
737–753.
Humphrey, C. and K. Michaelowa (2018). China in Africa: Competition for traditional
development finance institutions? AidData Working Paper Series 61.
Idemudia, U. (2009). Oil extraction and poverty reduction in the Niger delta: A critical
examination of partnership initiatives. Journal of Business Ethics 90 (1), 91–116.
IFPRI (2013). Agricultural incentives. Available at http://www.ag-incentives.org/
indicator/nominal-rate-protection, last accessed September 30, 2018.
ILO (2013). Employment in Africa: Think agriculture! Available at http://www.ilo.
org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_203469/lang--en/index.htm, last
accessed July 18, 2018.
IMF (2018). IMF Primary Commodity Prices. Available at https://www.imf.org/
external/np/res/commod/index.aspx, last accessed October 2, 2018.
Iwanowsky, M. (2018). The effects of migration and ethnicity on African economic
development. Unpublished Mansucript available at http://www.mathiasiwanowsky.
com/Migration_and_Trade.pdf.
Johnson, E. J. and D. Goldstein (2003). Do Defaults Save Lives? Science 302 (5649),
1338–1339.
Kabongo, L., J. Gass, B. Kivondo, N. Kara, K. Semrau, and L. R. Hirschhorn (2017).
Implementing the WHO Safe Childbirth Checklist: lessons learnt on a quality im-
provement initiative to improve mother and newborn care at Gobabis District Hos-
pital, Namibia. BMJ Open Quality 6 (2), 1–8.
Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Eco-
nomics. The American Economic Review 93 (5), 1449–1475.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk. Econometrica 47 (2), 263–291.
Kalichman, S. C. and B. Coley (1995). Context framing to enhance HIV-antibody-




Kam, L., V. E. Knott, C. Wilson, and S. K. Chambers (2012). Using the Theory
of Planned Behavior to understand health professionals’ attitudes and intentions to
refer cancer patients for psychosocial support. Psycho-Oncology 21, 316–323.
Kanwar, S. (2012). Intellectual property protection and technology licensing: the case
of developing countries. The Journal of Law and Economics 55 (3), 539–564.
Karim, A. M., T. Williams, L. Patykewich, D. Ali, C. E. Colvin, J. Posner, and
G. Rutaremwa (2009). The impact of the African youth alliance program on the
sexual behavior of young people in Uganda. Studies in Family Planning 40 (4), 289–
306.
Kasara, K. (2007). Tax me if you can: Ethnic geography, democracy, and the taxation
of agriculture in Africa. American Political Science Review 101 (1), 159–172.
Kassim, K. A., L. Arokiasamy, M. H. M. Isa, and C. H. Ping (2017). Intention to
Purchase Safer Car: an Application of Theory of Planned Behavior. Global Business
& Management Research 9 (1), 188–197.
Keefer, P. (2007). Clientelism, credibility, and the policy choices of young democracies.
American Journal of Political Science 51 (4), 804–821.
Keefer, P. and S. Khemani (2014). Radio’s impact on preferences for patronage benefits.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5559.
Kemper, C. J., C. Beierlein, D. Bensch, A. Kovaleva, and B. Rammstedt (2014). Soziale
Erwünschtheit-Gamma (KSE-G) (Version 1.0). ZIS - GESIS Leibniz Institute for the
Social Sciences. GESIS.
Kettle, S., M. Hernandez, S. Ruda, and M. Sanders (2016). Behavioral interventions
in tax compliance: evidence from Guatemala. World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 7690.
Keynes, J. M. (1933). National self-sufficiency. The Yale Review 22 (4), 755–769.
Kiene, S. M., S. Hopwood, H. Lule, and R. K. Wanyenze (2014). An empirical test
of the Theory of Planned Behaviour applied to contraceptive use in rural Uganda.
Journal of Health Psychology 19 (12), 1564–1575.
Kinsman, J., J. Nakiyingi, A. Kamali, L. Carpenter, M. Quigley, R. Pool, and J. Whit-
worth (2001). Evaluation of a comprehensive school-based AIDS education pro-
gramme in rural Masaka, Uganda. Health Education Research 16 (1), 85–100.
Kis-Katos, K., J. Pieters, and R. Sparrow (2018). Globalization and social change:




Kishi, R. and C. Raleigh (2015). Chinese aid and Africa’s pariah states. Mimeo.
Klasen, S. (2000). Measuring poverty and deprivation in South Africa. Review of
Income and Wealth 46 (1), 33–58.
Klöckner, C. A. and A. Blöbaum (2010). A comprehensive action determination model:
Toward a broader understanding of ecological behaviour using the example of travel
mode choice. Journal of Environmental Psychology 30 (4), 574–586.
Kruse, H. W. and I. Martínez-Zarzoso (2016). Transfers in the gravity equation: The
case of foreign aid. CEGE Discussion Paper 288.
Kuhnt, J. and S. Vollmer (2018). Implementing the WHO safe childbirth checklist in
Pakistan: Can a simple checklist reduce maternal and neonatal health outcomes?
Mimeo.
Lagon, M. P. (1992). The International System and the Reagan Doctrine: Can Realism
Explain Aid to “Freedom Fighters”? British Journal of Political Science 22 (1),
39–70.
Lammersen, F. and M. Roberts (2015). Aid for trade 10 years on: Keeping it effective.
OECD Development Policy Papers 1.
Landmann, D., C. J. Lagerkvist, and V. Otter (2017). Determinants of smallholder
farmers intention to use smartphones – evidence from rural India. In A. Ruckelshause,
A. Meyer-Aurich, W. Lentz, and B. Theuvsen (Eds.), Informatik in der Land-, Forst-
und Ernährungswirtschaft 2017, Bonn, pp. 93–96. Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V.
Lang, V. (2016). The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs
on inequality. Heidelberg University Discussion Paper 617 .
Lang, V. F. and M. M. Tavares (2018). The Distribution of Gains from Globalization.
IMF Working Paper 18/54.
Larch, M. and J. Wanner (2017). Carbon tariffs: An analysis of the trade, welfare, and
emission effects. Journal of International Economics 109, 195–213.
Lebovic, J. H. and E. Voeten (2009). The cost of shame: International organizations
and foreign aid in the punishing of human rights violators. Journal of Peace Re-
search 46 (1), 79–97.
Lewis, A. W. (1954). Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor. The
Manchester School 22, 139–91.
Lexis Nexis (2018). Academic Search. Available at https://www.lexisnexis.com, last
accessed September 28, 2018.
242
Bibliography
Lichand, G. and A. Mani (2016). Cognitive droughts. CAGE Online Working Paper
Series 298.
Limao, N. and A. J. Venables (2001). Infrastructure, geographical disadvantage, trans-
port costs, and trade. The World Bank Economic Review 15 (3), 451–479.
Lipton, M. (1977). Why poor people stay poor: a study of urban bias in world develop-
ment. London:Temple Smith; Australian National University Press.
Lugoe, W. and J. Rise (1999). Predicting Intended Condom Use among Tanzanian
Students using the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Journal of Health Psychology 4 (4),
497–506.
Madrian, B. C. (2014). Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design.
NBER Working Paper 20318.
Martínez-Zarzoso, I., F. Nowak-Lehmann D., M. Parra, and S. Klasen (2014). Does
aid promote donor exports? Commercial interest versus instrumental philantropy.
Kyklos 67 (4), 559–587.
McEachan, R. R. C., M. Conner, N. J. Taylor, and R. J. Lawton (2011). Prospective
prediction of health-related behaviours with the Theory of Planned Behaviour: A
meta-analysis. Health Psychology Review 5 (2), 97–144.
McGuirk, E. and M. Burke (2017). The economic origins of conflict in Africa. NBER
Working Paper 23056.
McMillan, M. (2001). Why kill the golden goose? A political-economy model of export
taxation. Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (1), 170–184.
McMillan, M. S., D. Rodrik, and Í. Verduzco-Gallo (2014). Globalization, structural
change and productivity growth: with an update on Africa. World Development 63,
11–32.
Michalopoulos, S. (2012). The origins of ethnolinguistic diversity. American Economic
Review 102 (4), 1508–1539.
Michalopoulos, S. and E. Papaioannou (2016). The long-run effects of the scramble for
Africa. American Economic Review 106 (7), 1802–1848.
Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004). Economic shocks and civil conflict:
An instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy 112 (4), 725–753.
Milanovic, B. (2007). Global inequality, Chapter “Patterns and explanations”, pp. 26–
49. Polity Cambridge and Malden, MA.
243
Bibliography
Milner, H. V., D. L. Nielson, and M. G. Findley (2016). Citizen preferences and public
goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda.
The Review of International Organizations 11 (2), 219–245.
Minasyan, A., P. Nunnenkamp, and K. Richert (2017). Does Aid Effectiveness Depend
on the Quality of Donors? World Development 100, 16–30.
Monfreda, C., N. Ramankutty, and J. A. Foley (2008). Farming the planet: 2. Geo-
graphic distribution of crop areas, yields, physiological types, and net primary pro-
duction in the year 2000. Global biogeochemical cycles 22 (1), 1–19.
Morelli, M. and D. Rohner (2015). Resource concentration and civil wars. Journal of
Development Economics 117, 32–47.
Müller, A. and U. Pape (2018). Broken promises: Evaluating an incomplete cash
transfer program. Unpublished Manuscript.
Murdock, G. P. (1959). Africa: its peoples and their culture history. New York: United
States; McGraw-Hill.
Naím, M. (2007). Rogue aid. Foreign Policy (159), 96.
Natural Earth (2018). Natural earth – free vector and raster map data. Available at
https://www.naturalearthdata.com, last accessed September 3, 2018.
Nayiga, S., D. DiLiberto, L. Taaka, C. Nabirye, A. Haaland, S. G. Staedke, and C. I.
Chandler (2014). Strengthening patient-centred communication in rural Ugandan
health centres: A theory-driven evaluation within a cluster randomized trial. Evalu-
ation 20 (4), 471–491.
Nielsen, R. A., M. G. Findley, Z. S. Davis, T. Candland, and D. L. Nielson (2011).
Foreign aid shocks as a cause of violent armed conflict. American Journal of Political
Science 55 (2), 219–232.
Nizalova, O. Y. and I. Murtazashvili (2016). Exogenous treatment and endogenous fac-
tors: Vanishing of omitted variable bias on the interaction term. Journal of Econo-
metric Methods 5 (1), 71–77.
North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1), 97–112.
Nowak-Lehmann D., F., I. Martínez-Zarzoso, D. Herzer, S. Klasen, and A. Cardozo
(2013). Does foreign aid promote recipient exports to donor countries? Review of
World Economics 149 (3), 505–535.
Nunn, N. and N. Qian (2014). US Food Aid and Civil Conflict. American Economic
Review 104 (6), 1630–1666.
244
Bibliography
Nunn, N. and L. Wantchekon (2011). The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in
Africa. American Economic Review 101 (7), 3221–3252.
OECD (2008). The Paris declaration on aid effectiveness and the Accra agenda for
action. Available at https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf, last ac-
cessed September 27, 2018.
OECD (2015). OECD Creditor Reporting System. Available at https://stats.oecd.org/
Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1, last accessed November 5, 2015.
OECD (2017). OECD Query Wizard. Available at https://stats.oecd.org/qwids, last
accessed September 27, 2018.
OECD, WTO (2013). Aid for trade at a glance - 2013, Chapter Boosting Value Chains
via Regional Aid for Trade, pp. 119–144.
Ogden, J. (2003). Some problems with social cognition models: a pragmatic and con-
ceptual analysis. Health Psychology 22, 424–428.
Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Sci-
ence Review 87 (3), 567–576.
Østby, G. (2008). Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict. Journal
of Peace Research 45 (2), 143–162.
Oster, E. (2017). Unobservable selection and coefficient stability: Theory and evidence.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 1–18.
Pack, H. and J. R. Pack (1993). Foreign aid and the question of fungibility. The Review
of Economics and Statistics 75 (2), 258–265.
Padró i Miquel, G. (2007). The control of politicians in divided societies: the politics
of fear. The Review of Economic Studies 74 (4), 1259–1274.
Page, J. (2012). Can Africa industrialise? Journal of African Economies 21 (Suppl. 2),
ii86–ii124.
Pasta, D. J. (2009). Learning when to be discrete: Continuous vs. categorical predictors.
In SAS Global Forum, Number 248.
Payne, J. W., N. Sagara, S. B. Shu, K. C. Appelt, and E. J. Johnson (2013). Life
expectancy as a constructed belief: Evidence of a live-to or die-by framing effect.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 46 (1), 27–50.
Perugini, M. and R. P. Bagozzi (2001). The role of desires and anticipated emotions in




Pettersson, J. and L. Johansson (2013). Aid, aid for trade, and bilateral trade: An
empirical study. The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 22 (6),
866–894.
Piketty, T. (2016). We must rethink globalization, or Trumpism will pre-
vail. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/16/
globalization-trump-inequality-thomas-piketty, last accessed September 25, 2018.
Posner, D. N. and D. J. Young (2007). The institutionalization of political power in
Africa. Journal of Democracy 18 (3), 126–140.
Protogerou, C., A. J. Flisher, L. E. Aar, and C. Mathews (2012). The theory of planned
behaviour as a framework for predicting sexual risk behaviour in sub-Saharan African
youth: A critical review. Journal of Child and Adolescent Mental Health 24 (1), 15–35.
Rajan, R. G. and A. Subramanian (2008). Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-
Country Evidence Really Show? Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (4), 643–666.
Rajan, R. G. and A. Subramanian (2011). Aid, Dutch Disease and Manufacturing
Growth. Journal of Development Economics 94 (1), 106–118.
Raleigh, C., A. Linke, H. Hegre, and J. Karlsen (2010). Introducing ACLED-armed
conflict location and event data. Journal of Peace Research 47 (5), 651–660.
Rauch, J. E. and V. Trindade (2002). Ethnic Chinese networks in international trade.
Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (1), 116–130.
Riley, S. J., S. D. De Gloria, and R. Elliot (1999). A Terrain Ruggedness Index That
Quantifies Topographic Heterogeneities. Intermountain Journal of Sciences 5 (1–4),
23–27.
Rodrik, D. (1998). Has globalization gone too far? Challenge 41 (2), 81–94.
Rodrik, D. (2013). Unconditional convergence in manufacturing. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 128 (1), 165–204.
Rodrik, D. (2016). Premature deindustrialization. Journal of Economic Growth 21 (1),
1–33.
Rogers, P. (2014). Theory of change. UNICEF Methodological
Briefs 2, UNICEF. Available at https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/
747-theory-of-change-methodological-briefs-impact-evaluation-no-2.html, last
accessed September 27, 2018.
Roodman, D. (2015). A Replication of “Counting Chickens When They Hatch” (Eco-
nomic Journal 2012). Public Finance Review 43 (2), 256–281.
246
Bibliography
Salehyan, I. and C. Hendrix (2017). Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) Version
3.3 Codebook. Technical report.
Salehyan, I., C. S. Hendrix, J. Hamner, C. Case, C. Linebarger, E. Stull, and J. Williams
(2012). Social Conflict in Africa: A New Database. International Interactions 38 (4),
503–511.
Schneider, T. R., P. Salovey, A. M. Apanovitch, J. Pizarro, D. McCarthy, J. Zullo,
and A. J. Rothman (2001). The effects of message framing and ethnic targeting on
mammography use among low-income women. Health Psychology 20 (4), 256–266.
Schneider, U., A. Becker, P. Finger, A. Meyer-Christoffer, B. Rudolf, and M. Ziese
(2015). GPCC Full Data Reanalysis Version 7.0 at 0.5°: Monthly Land-Surface
Precipitation from Rain-Gauges built on GTS-based and Historic Data.
Semrau, K. E., L. R. Hirschhorn, M. Marx Delaney, V. P. Singh, R. Saurastri,
N. Sharma, D. E. Tuller, R. Firestone, S. Lipsitz, N. Dhingra-Kumar, et al. (2017).
Outcomes of a coaching-based WHO Safe Childbirth Checklist program in India.
New England Journal of Medicine 377 (24), 2313–2324.
Sen, A. (1993). Capability and Well-Being. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sexton, R. (2016). Aid as a tool against insurgency: Evidence from contested and
controlled territory in Afghanistan. American Political Science Review 110 (4), 731.
Simon, H. A. and J. Feldman (1959). Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and
Behavioral Science. Source: The American Economic Review 49 (3), 253–283.
Sokoloff, K. L. and S. L. Engerman (2000). Institutions, factor endowments, and paths
of development in the new world. Journal of Economic perspectives 14 (3), 217–232.
Sow, M. (2018). Figures of the week: Africa’s intra- and extra-regional
trade. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/03/29/
figures-of-the-week-africas-intra-and-extra-regional-trade/, last accessed September
7, 2018.
Storeygard, A. (2016). Farther on down the road: Transport costs, trade and urban
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Review of Economic Studies 83 (3), 1263–1295.
Strandow, D., M. Findley, D. Nielson, and J. Powell (2011). The UCDP-AidData
Codebook on Geo-Referencing Foreign Aid. Version 1.1. Technical report, Uppsala
Conflict Data Program.
Strange, A. M., A. Dreher, A. Fuchs, B. Parks, and M. J. Tierney (2017). Tracking
underreported financial flows: China’s development finance and the aid–conflict nexus
revisited. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (5), 935–963.
247
Bibliography
Sundberg, R. and E. Melander (2013). Introducing the UCDP georeferenced event
dataset. Journal of Peace Research 50 (4), 523–532.
te Velde, D. W. (2007). Regional Aid for Trade. ILEAP Negotiation Advisory Brief 12.
Temple, J. and N. Van de Sijpe (2017). Foreign aid and domestic absorption. Journal
of International Economics 108, 431–443.
Toll, B. A., S. S. O’Malley, N. A. Katulak, R. Wu, J. A. Dubin, A. Latimer, B. Me-
andzija, T. P. George, P. Jatlow, J. L. Cooney, et al. (2007). Comparing gain-and
loss-framed messages for smoking cessation with sustained-release bupropion: a ran-
domized controlled trial. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors 21 (4), 534–544.
Tollefsen, A. F., H. Strand, and H. Buhaug (2012). PRIO-GRID: A unified spatial data
structure. Journal of Peace Research 49 (2), 363–374.
Trautmann, S. T. and G. van de Kuilen (2015). Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among
Truth Serums. Economic Journal 125 (589), 2116–2135.
Trionfetti, F. (2017). An anatomy of the transfer problem. Mimeo.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of
choice. Science 211 (4481), 453–458.
Uchida, H. and A. Nelson (2009). Agglomeration index: Towards a new measure of
urban concentration. UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2010/29.
Van de Walle, N. (2003). Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa’s emerging party
systems. The Journal of Modern African Studies 41 (2), 297–321.
Van der Ploeg, F. (2011). Natural resources: curse or blessing? Journal of Economic
Literature 49 (2), 366–420.
van Weezel, S. (2015). A spatial analysis of the effect of foreign aid in conflict areas.
AidData Working Paper 8.
Viceisza, A. C. (2015). Creating a Lab in the Field: Economics Experiments for Poli-
cymaking. Journal of Economic Surveys 30 (5), 835–854.
Vicente, P. C. and L. Wantchekon (2009). Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from
field experiments in African elections. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 25 (2),
292–305.
Vijil, M. and L. Wagner (2012). Does aid for trade enhance export performance?
Investigating the infrastructure channel. The World Economy 35 (7), 838–868.
Vogel, T. and M. Wanke (2016). Attitudes and Attitude Change (Second ed.). London
and New York: Routledge.
248
Bibliography
Vogt, M., N.-C. Bormann, S. Rüegger, L.-E. Cederman, P. Hunziker, and L. Girardin
(2015). Integrating data on ethnicity, geography, and conflict: The ethnic power
relations data set family. Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (7), 1327–1342.
Walrave, M., W. Heirman, and L. Hallam (2014). Under pressure to sext? Applying
the theory of planned behaviour to adolescent sexting. Behaviour & Information
Technology 33 (1), 85–97.
Weidmann, N. B., J. K. Rød, and L.-E. Cederman (2010). Representing ethnic groups
in space: A new dataset. Journal of Peace Research 47 (4), 491–499.
WHO (2018). Newborns: Reducing mortality. Available at http://www.who.int/
news-room/fact-sheets/detail/newborns-reducing-mortality, last accessed Septem-
ber 10, 2018.
Wildschut, T., M. Bruder, S. Robertson, W. A. van Tilburg, and C. Sedikides (2014).
Collective nostalgia: A group-level emotion that confers unique benefits on the group.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 107 (5), 844–863.
Williams, M. J. (2017). The political economy of unfinished development projects: cor-
ruption, clientelism, or collective choice? American Political Science Review 111 (4),
705–723.
Wilson, D. K., R. M. Kaplan, and L. J. Schneiderman (1987). Framing of decisions and
selections of alternatives in health care. Social Behaviour 2 (1), 51–59.
Winters, M. S., S. Dietrich, and M. Mahmud (2017). Perceptions of Foreign Aid Project
Quality in Bangladesh. Research and Politics 4 (4), 1–6.
WITS (2018). World Integrated Trade Solutions Database. Available at https://wits.
worldbank.org/, last accessed September 26, 2018.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2015). Control functions methods in applied econometrics. Journal
of Human Resources 50 (2), 420–445.
Workman, M., M. F. Lesser, and J. Kim (2007). An exploratory study of cognitive
load in diagnosing patient conditions. International Journal for Quality in Health
Care 19 (3), 127–133.
World Bank (2015a). Management’s discussion & analysis and financial state-
ments. Available at https://ida.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/images/ida_
financial_statements_jun_15.pdf, last accessed September 27, 2018.
World Bank (2015b). World Development Report 2015 – Mind, Society, and Behavior.
Washington, DC: World Bank.




World Bank (2017b). World bank group finances – IDA: Commitments, gross disburse-
ments, and net disbursements. Available at https://finances.worldbank.org/dataset/
IDA-Commitments-Gross-Disbursements-and-Net-Disbur/tark-i8qh/data, last ac-
cessed October 3, 2018.
World Bank (2018a). Doing Business 2018. Available at http://www.doingbusiness.
org/, last accessed September 27, 2018.
World Bank (2018b). Global Economic Monitor (GEM). Available at https://data.
world/worldbank/global-economic-monitor, last accessed September 30, 2018.
World Bank (2018c). Supporting Africa’s transformation: Regional integration and
cooperation assistance strategy. Africa Regional Integration Strategy Progress Report
121912-AFR.
World Bank (2018d). World Development Indicators. Available at https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator, last accessed September 25, 2018.
World Health Organization (2018). Experiences with the WHO Safe Childbirth
Checklist from around the world. Available at http://www.who.int/patientsafety/
implementation/checklists/scc-photostory/en, last accessed October 3, 2018.
World Steel Association (2009). Statistical yearbook 2009. Annual Report, Worldsteel
Committee on Economic Studies, Brussels, Belgium.
World Steel Association (2014). Statistical yearbook 2014. Annual Report, Worldsteel
Committee on Economic Studies, Brussels, Belgium.
WTO (2005). Aid for trade capacity in poorer countries up by 50 per cent since
Doha. Available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr427_e.htm,
last accessed August 18, 2018.
WTO (2013). Countries of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community
(CEMAC). Trade Policy Review – Report by the WTO Secretariat WT/TPR/S/285.
Wucherpfennig, J., N. B. Weidmann, L. Girardin, L.-E. Cederman, and A. Wimmer
(2011). Politically Relevan Ethnic Groups across space and time: Introducing the
GeoEPR dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science 28 (5), 423–437.
Yotov, Y. V., R. Piermartini, J.-A. Monteiro, and M. Larch (2016). An Advanced Guide
to Trade Policy Analysis: The Structural Gravity Model. Geneva: WTO publications.
Young, A. (2017). Channelling Fisher: Randomization Tests and the Statistical Insignif-
icance of Seemingly Significant Experimental Results. Available at http://personal.
lse.ac.uk/YoungA/ChannellingFisher.pdf, last accessed September 27, 2018.
Zylberberg, E. (2013). Bloom or bust? A global value chain approach to smallholder
flower production in Kenya. Journal of Agribusiness in Developing and Emerging




Many people have supported me in the process of writing these chapters and without
their help, this thesis would not exist. First, I am very grateful to Axel Dreher –
my principal supervisor – whose provision of academic freedom and an “open door”
policy for PhD students I highly valued. In this regard, Axel contributed largely to the
development of this thesis by providing comprehensive feedback on the chapters and
always being open for discussions on methods as well as general concepts of the political
drivers of economic development. Equally, I enjoyed the great chair activities and found
it highly beneficial that Axel encouraged the cooperation with other researchers. Axel
provided me with the unique opportunity to be both a member of his chair in Heidelberg
and the research training group “Globalization and Development” in Hannover and
Göttingen. Being affiliated with Göttingen also provided me with the opportunity to be
co-supervised by Stephan Klasen, who actively supported me throughout the process
and impressed me by his ability to instantly grasp the strengths and weaknesses of
research projects. Further, I was inspired by his motivation to give young researchers
constructive feedback and contributing to their professional development. Moreover, the
thesis strongly benefited from the comments of my third supervisor Martin Gassebner
and I very much enjoyed the hospitality at his chair in Hannover. Equally, I valued
Krisztina Kis-Katos critical comments during seminars pushing one to think a step
further. I was very happy when she agreed without hesitation to become my third
examiner.
With regard to the chapters of this thesis, I consider myself very lucky to have
worked with so many gifted co-authors, from whom I learned a great deal. This ranges
from Hendrik’s critical theoretical thoughts and Melvin’s programming skills, as well as
Kai’s scientific curiosity to Jana’s and Katharina’s intrinsic motivation for development.
Moreover, Sebastian Vollmer fostered my interdisciplinary interest in health economics.
All of them made my PhD an invaluable learning experience. In this regard, I am very
grateful to Tristan and Inma, who encouraged me to go on and do a PhD after my
master studies.
Besides co-authorship, my doctoral studies would not have been the same with-
out the inspiring colleagues from Göttingen, Hannover and Heidelberg. The courses
organized by Melanie and Björn for the research training group helped me to gain a
thorough understanding of diverse fields in economics. However, without Bruno, Cara,
Christian, Esther, Ghida, Helke, Hendrik, Jana, Manuel, Marlene, Marcello, Melvin,
252
Acknowledgments
Paul, Reinhard, Sebastian, Simone, Slava, Stefanos, Tabea, Theres, and Wiebke courses
and seminars would not only have been very challenging, but also definitely less fun.
I would also like to thank Friederike, who organized many great seminars on behalf of
the research group, providing us PhD students with diverse opportunities for academic
exchange. It is also great to see that the research group continues its work involving
a new cohort – its members Lukas and Johannes already provided valuable comments
on this thesis. Of course, I also enjoyed the many coffee and lunch breaks with the
colleagues in Heidelberg, including Alexander, Alexandra, Andreas, Angelika, Christo-
pher, David, Gerda, John, Katharina, Michael, Onno, Rajesh, Sarah, Sebastian, Sven,
Valentin, Vera, and Zain. More specifically, I very much appreciated Andreas’ academic
guidance starting from the first meeting and admired Rajesh’s interest in all fields of
economics. While Angelika’s and Gerda’s good mood cheered up many breaks and
chair events, John and Sven reminded me that running and going out make for a good
work life balance. Sebastian and Valentin showed me how important conferences are
to sustain academic exchange, even if most of them only take place once a year. Sarah
and Zain helped me to not lose faith during the last weeks of the dissertation. The joint
work with Katharina in Indonesia and Heidelberg sustained and fostered my interest
in development cooperation and impact evaluation.
Also administrative hurdles can be equally a challenge, too. Had it not been for
Christiane Fuhlrott, Kerstin Renziehausen, Heike Kullmann and Freya Schadt, I would
have stopped researching and would still be working on the accounting for the travel
expenses. Similarly, if Lisa Rogge and Vivien Hülsen had not supported us in In-
donesia, we would still be checking survey answers. If I hadn’t had all my colleagues’
encouragement, I might have given up halfway (or even during the last weeks).
Here, I also have to thank our Indonesian colleagues Farah Diba, Dr. Ichsan, Dr.
Marthoenis, Dr. Suryane, Dr. Muhsin, Dr. Hizir Sofyan, and Professor Samadi for
their hospitality during our research on the Safe Childbirth Checklist, as well as the
student assistant team around Hujjatul Balighah, Putri Cynthia Eka, Mutia Elviani,
Masyitah Masyitah and Teddy Thaher, who taught us so much about the local con-
text. All of them made it an unforgettable experience, which involved many challenges
demonstrating the limits but mostly the great opportunities of international coopera-
tion.
Although I would not have liked to miss these first-hand experiences of globalization,
it was important for me to keep my local roots. In this regard, I would like to thank
Annabell, who helped me to focus on the important issues and keep a balance between
my PhD and life in general. I also owe a great deal to my friends Frauke, Nico and
Philip, who hosted me several times in Göttingen and made it possible for me to work
on my dissertation in two places. Finally, I would like to thank my sisters as well as
my parents, who were encouraging me throughout my studies. They provided me with
good advice, discussed research questions over dinner and if they would not have picked
me up from the train station uncountable times, I would be lost somewhere between
Göttingen and Osterode. Their support was invaluable.
253
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgements – Chapter 1: We would like to thank Ron Davies, Luca
de Benedictis, Axel Dreher, Stephan Klasen, Sarah Langlotz, Holger Strulik, Inma
Martínez-Zarzoso, Dennis P. Quinn, Simon Quinn, participants at the ETSG 2016 con-
ference, the 9th FIW conference in Vienna, the International Development Economics
Workshop 2016 in Clermont-Ferrand, the Beyond Basic Questions Workshop 2016 in
Salzburg, members of the Research Training Group Globalization and Development in
Göttingen and Hannover, as well as Seminar Participants at Heidelberg University for
valuable suggestions and comments. Harrison Bardwell supported us as a proofreader.
We thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) for financial support.
Acknowledgements – Chapter 2: I thank Richard Bluhm, Christian Bjørnskov,
Christian Bommer, John Cruzatti, Bruno Gabriel Witzel de Souza, Axel Dreher,
Krisztina Kis-Katos, Stephan Klasen, Sven Kunze, Sarah Langlotz, Johannes Matzat,
Angelika Müller, Dennis P. Quinn, Katharina Richert, Manuel Santos Silva, and Holger
Strulik for valuable suggestions and comments. Moreover, I received valuable feedback
from members of the Research Training Group Globalization and Development in
Göttingen and Hannover, as well as Seminar Participants at Heidelberg University and
at the 2018’s Beyond Basic Questions Workshop. Theresa Geyer, Lena Gempke and
Vivien Hülsen provided superb research assistance. Furthermore, Harrison Bardwell
supported me as a proofreader. I thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) for
financial support.
Acknowledgements – Chapter 3: We thank Richard Bluhm, Axel Dreher, Mar-
tin Gassebner, John Hoddinott, Christopher Kilby, Stephan Klasen, Stephen Knack,
Stephan Kyburz, Steffen Lohmann, Franziska Luig, Tania Masi, Katharina Michaelowa,
Richard Nielsen, Paul Schaudt, Arthur Silve, Philip Verwimp, Lukas Wellner and Tore
Wig for valuable comments. Moreover, this work benefited from input provided at
seminars in Groningen, Göttingen, Heidelberg, Hannover and Zürich, the Beyond Basic
Questions conference at Lago di Garda, the 2017’s General Conference of the European
Political Science Association, the 2017’s Jan Tinbergen Conference organized by the
Network of European Peace Scientists, the EUDN PhD Workshop 2017 in Wageningen,
the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society 2017, the Northeast
Universities Development Consortium Conference NEUDC 2017, the HiCN Conference
2017, the 2017 PRIO Workshop in Addis Abeba, the European Public Choice Society
Meeting 2018, the CSAE Conference 2018 and the 2018 Silvaplana Workshop on Po-
litical Economy. Bradley Parks kindly shared data on the IDA’s funding position. We
are grateful to Michele McArdle and Tatiana Orozco, who provided excellent research
assistance and support, as well as to Harrison Bardwell for proofreading.
254
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgements – Chapter 4: We thank Manuela De Allegri, Britta Augs-
burg, Stephan Brenner, Martin Bruder, Erwin Bulte, Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Simone
Dietrich, Siobhan Doria, Axel Dreher, Kerstin Grosch, York Hagmayer, Marcela
Ibañez, Ghida Karbala, Rossa O’Keeffe-O’Donovan, Christian König, Dirk Landmann,
Friederike Lenel, David McKenzie, Anna Merkel, Atika Pasha, Jan Priebe, Gert
Pönitzsch, Holger Rau, Miriam Romero, Robert Schmidt, Santiago Saavedra, Sebas-
tian Schneider, Simone Schotte, Reinhard Weisser, Hendriek Yopin, and colleagues
from the chair in Heidelberg as well as the participants of seminars at Heidelberg
University and the University of Göttingen and the members of the Research Training
Group 1723 “Globalization and Development” for valuable feedback on the design
and implementation of the field experiment conducted in Indonesia. Moreover, we
are grateful for the proofreading of Harrison Bardwell and highly valued the excellent
research assistance in Indonesia and Pakistan.
255
